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This research studies the change of information security risks during the transition to
Integrated Operations (an operation extensively utilize advanced information communication
technology to connect offshore facilities and onshore control centers and even vendors.) in
Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian oil and gas company. The specific case for this study is a pilot
platform in transition to Integrated Operations, Brage: twenty traditional work processes are
to be replaced by new work processes. The operators on the Brage platform have to build up
relevant new knowledge to work effectively with new work processes. The new work
processes, new knowledge and their interrelationship all affect information security risks.
The management of Norsk Hydro is concerned with the problem of the increasing
information security risks, which might cause incidents with severe consequences. We look
for policies that support a successful (smooth and fast) operation transition.
System dynamics is adopted in this research to model the causal structure (mechanism) of
the operation transition. We chose system dynamics because operation transition is a process
rich in feedback, delays, nonlinearity and tradeoffs. All these features are captured by system
dynamics models. Moreover, system dynamics models can be used to simulate various
scenarios. The analyses of these scenarios can lead to insights on policy rules. We
specifically investigate policies concerning transition speed, resource allocation during the
transition to Integrated Operations and investment rules in incident response capability.
Since historical time series data about incidents and information security risks are scarce, we
use following model-based interventions to elicit structural information from our client and
experts:
May 2005 First group model-building workshop Problem articulation
Sep 2005 Second group model-building workshop Model conceptualization
Dec 2005 Model-based interview Model formulation
Year 2006 Series of model-based meetings Model refinement
Nov 2008 Model-based interview Model validation
The Brage model was developed and validated through these model-based interventions. The
analyses of various simulation results lead to the following policy insights:
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1. Transition speed. The operation transition should be designed with a speed that allows
the operators not only to get familiar with new work processes, but also to build up the
detailed knowledge supporting these work processes. The relevance of such knowledge,
which is mostly tacit, is sometimes underrated. If the operators only know what to do,
but not how to do it effectively, the benefit of the new technology (embedded in the new
work processes) will not be fully realized, and the platform will be more vulnerable to
information security threats.
2. Resource allocation. Resources (operators’ time) are needed to learn new work processes
and to acquire related knowledge. Generally, the operators will first put their time into
achieving the production target. Investment on learning activities will not be prioritized
if these activities hinder reaching the production target, even if the operators know this
short-term performance drop is the cost for obtaining long-term higher performance.
Nevertheless strategic decision should never be influenced by operative goals and high
level managements should be responsible to make decisions on whether focusing on
long-term profits and accept short-term performance drop as a trade-off.
3. Investment in incident response capability. The management in Norsk Hydro is aware of
the increasing information security risks changing from unconnected platforms to
integrated ones. However, investment in incident response capability to handle
increasing incidents is not made proactively. Only if the frequency of incidents has
increased or severe incidents has occurred or the incident cost have been proved high,
will the management decide to invest more on incident response capability. The Brage
model simulations illustrate that these reactive decision rules will trap the management
into ignoring the early signs of increasing information security risks, and cause
underinvestment, which results in inadequate incident response capability, and
subsequently leads to severe consequence. Proactive decision rules work effectively in
reducing severity of incidents.
This work helps our client in two ways. First, the model-based communication helps the
management in Norsk Hydro clarify the problem it is facing and understand the underlying
mechanism causing the problem. There is an increased insight into the relevance of new
knowledge acquisition. Second, the Brage model offers the management a tool to investigate
the long-term operation results under different policies, thus, helping improve the
management decision process.
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This work contributes to the information security literature in three ways. First, previous
research in information security is mostly on risk assessment methodology and information
security management checklist. The dynamics of information security risks during the
operation transition period has not been well studied before. In this fast changing society,
this aspect of changing information security risks is of importance. Second, we introduce a
dynamic view with the long-term perspective of information security. Although incidents
happen in random manner, the underlying mechanism that leads to such incidents often
exists for a period. Understanding such mechanism is the key to prevent incidents. Last, but
not least, we demonstrate how formal modeling and simulation can facilitate the building of
theories on information security management. Information security management involves
not only “hard” aspects, such as work processes and technology, but also “soft” aspects, such
as people’s awareness, people’s perception, and the cultural environment, - and all of which
change over time. These soft aspects are sometimes the major factors affecting information
security.
This work also contributes to the system dynamics literature by adding examples of how
model-based interventions are used to identify problems, conceptualize and validate models.
The activities of group model-building workshops and model validation interviews are
carefully documented and reflected. It is an important step towards the accumulation of
knowledge in model-based intervention.
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11 Introduction
This chapter consists of four sections. It starts with a discussion of our research
motivation: information security risks are becoming more important with the wide use
of computer and Internet. Research for this problem from organizational view is in
need. In the second section, we introduce the problem domain: in the context of the
transition to Integrated Operation (also called “operation transition” in the following)
in a Norwegian oil and gas Company, Norsk Hydro (the short form “Hydro” is used in
the following). In the third section, we present our research questions with a brief
explanation about them, while in the fourth section we provide an overview of the
thesis structure.
1.1 Research motivation
Today, computer and the Internet have penetrated most organizations and normal
households, changing the way we live, work, and play. At the same time, we are
facing increasing threats from information security risks. Figure 1-1 shows the fast
growth of number of security incidents reported to the Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC). A security incident, also referred as
incident or information security incident in this document, is defined as an occurrence
that actually or potentially jeopardizes an information system or the information in the
system (NIST 2006). Detailed information on the definition of security incidents is
provided in Section 2.2.3.
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Figure 1-1 Number of security incidents reported to the CERT/CC from 1991 to 2003.
(Source: http://www.cert.org/stats/historical.html NB: From 2004, the CERT/CC stopped
publishing incident statistics. With the increase in automation, counting single incidents
2became misleading. One and the same attack could trigger a large number of incidents.)
Research on information security surfaced with the development of computers in the
1960s. Given the fact that computers were products of advanced technology,
information security naturally boiled down to technology measures. The security
solutions for the first 20 years were almost exclusively technology-focused (Schou
and Shoemaker 2007). As computers are now accessible to most of the public,
technological measures alone can no longer ensure minimal damages and misuse. In
Deloitte's 6th annual Global Security Survey1 (Protecting What Matters: The 6th
Annual Global Security Survey 2008), it has been identified that the root causes of
information systems failures can be attributed to human error, technology, operations,
and third parties, among others (See Figure 1-2). The top cause of information
systems failures for the years 2007 and 2008 was identified as human error. It has
risen from 79% in year 2007 to 86% in 2008. This could be attributed to “the
increasing adoption of new technologies and social network spaces”, explained the
survey report.
Figure 1-2 Root causes of information systems failures.
(Source: The report from Deloitte's 6th annual Global Security Survey p.30)
1 The report is accessible at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_fsi_GlobalSecuritySurvey_0901.pdf.
3In the recent two decades, more researchers have realized the importance of human
factors and organizational factors in information security. For example, Gifford
pointed out that even the most sophisticated security system is worthless if disks are
left lying about and passwords are not secured (Gifford 1998). Werlinger et al.
identified many organizational factors that weaken security:
“Tight schedules may result in human errors that could make the organization more
vulnerable. Tight schedules may also result in security controls not being
implemented in the systems unless the implementation of security controls is
integrated with the development process.” (Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov 2009)
Organizational factors become important as the number of organizations that use
advanced Information Communication Technology (ICT) is increasing. Even in the
high-hazardous industry such as oil and gas production, where the consequences of
incidents could be major, there are plans to utilize advanced ICT on the oil platforms.
Technology helps organizations to become more efficient, however, the cost to
organizations is that the technology is often more complex, takes specialized support
and resources, and creates a rich environment for breeding vulnerabilities and risks,
especially during the technology adoption process, when employees have to change
their traditional working routines and learn to work with new technology.
The technology adoption process, changing from using traditional technology to
advanced ICT, is of great challenge to organizations. Repenning and Sterman studied
cases of implementing innovations for a decade, and concluded: “the inability of most
organizations to reap the full benefit of these innovations has little to do with the
specific improvement tool they select. Instead, the problem has its roots in how the
introduction of a new improvement program interacts with the physical economic,
social, and psychological structures in which implementation takes place (Repenning
and Sterman 2001).” Many researchers have studied the process of operation
transition and the factors that make this process successful, such as (Winch 1997;
Fichman 2001; Brown and Duguid 2001; Brown and Duguid 1991). The focus of
these studies is to answer the question of why some firms are successful in new
technology adoption while others are not and how to make the new technology
adoption successful. However, the information security risks induced in the changing
process is not considered in this bunch of literature. In the literature of information
security, the research focus is mostly on technological solutions, such as firewall,
4intrusion detection and prevention systems. Emerging research on human factors and
organizational factors has studied user interfaces, counterproductive computer usage,
security checklist, risk assessment, etc. (See chapter 2 Literature review). The studies
of information security seldom consider how information security risks change during
the process of operation transition. The question of how information security risks
change during operation transition is the cross-section of the above two research areas,
while ignored by both of them. Therefore, we would like to investigate information
security risks during the operation transition. We have a case of a Norwegian oil and
gas company, Hydro, transitioning from tradition operation to Integrated Operations
(detailed information about the case will be presented in Section 1.2). Our research is
not only motivated by the fact that this specific problem has not been addressed
before, but also by the practical needs of our client. A severe information security
incident on an oil and gas platform could lead to major consequences (injuries, deaths
or environmental damage). Such a catastrophe might result in postponenment of the
transition to Integrated Operations, and even threaten the continuous operation of the
company. Therefore, information security is a crucial factor for the success or failure
of operation transitions. Efforts to investigate the change in information security risks
during the operation transition and look for policies that foster a successful operation
transition are needed.
This research is embedded in the research project AMBASEC (A Model Based
Approach to Security Culture), which was required to collaborate with a related
project IRMA (from Incident Response to Incident Management) by the project
sponsor, the Research Council of Norway (RCN). The Norwegian Oil Industry
Association (OLF) contributed to IRMA funding. In return, OLF called for IRMA to
investigate the information security issues in the current Oil and Gas Industry, which
was planning to start transition to Integrated Operations. Therefore, AMBASEC also
worked with this case. Hydro2, as one member of OLF, volunteered to be the client
for both projects, supplying us the case of transition to Integrated Operations on the
Brage platform (a pilot platform in operation transition). The project setting is
illustrated by Figure 1-3. Information about the transition to Integrated Operations and
the Brage platform is introduced in section 1.2.
2 When the research project started, Hydro Oil and Gas was a company division under the Hydro group. At the
end of year 2006, Hydro Oil and Gas merged with Statoil, the biggest oil and gas company in Norway and formed
a new company StatoilHydro, which finally was renamed to just Statoil.
5Figure 1-3 The AMBASEC Project Setting
1.2 Case information
The oil and gas industry is Norway’s most important industry and the country’s
largest source of revenue. Oil and gas have made an important contribution to
economic growth and to financing the Norwegian welfare state (Facts: The
Norwegian Petroleum Sector 2007). Integrated Operations in Norwegian oil and gas
companies utilize advanced ICT technology to connect offshore facilities to onshore
control centers and even vendors. The motivation for changing from traditional
operation into Integrated Operations is to improve productivity and reduce operation
costs. The operation transition will take years to complete and it has a huge impact on
the oil and gas industry in Norway.
1.2.1 Integrated Operations in the Oil and Gas Industry
1.2.1.1 The Oil and Gas Industry in Norway
In the report of Norwegian Petroleum Sector published in year 2005 (Facts: The
Norwegian Petroleum Sector 2005), it was estimated that one-fourth of the oil and gas
resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) have been produced. Under the
right circumstances, oil production on NCS could continue for at least 50 years and
gas production for at least 100 years. In this same report, the Minister of Petroleum
and Energy pointed out that significant portions of the NCS were now in a mature
phase, with declining output and increasing operating costs, as well as lower
expectations for the sizes of future discoveries. The falling output of the oilfield leads




6abandoned because it cannot create value any more. Yet, considerable oil reserves
remain in the oilfield. In 2004, the average recovery rate for oil from the NCS was 46
percent. For the mid and long-term well-being of the petroleum industry, it was of
extreme importance to improve average recovery rate and reduce operating cost so
that the lifetimes of the fields could be extended. The Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate set the average recovery target for oil at 50 percent in 2004 and was still
seeking possibilities to raise this figure (Facts: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector
2005).
1.2.1.2 The transition to Integrated Operations
In order to improve oil recovery and efficient operations, the oil companies on NCS
have been working on several solutions. The most promising one has been Integrated
Operations or eOperation.
Integrated Operations adopts new ICT technology, mainly remote control of hardware,
collaborative video conferencing and real-time decision support, to link onshore,
offshore, and other parties (vendors, external experts, etc) together through
high-capacity networks. The advanced ICT technology enables almost real-time data
sharing to all parties. Pilot projects on offshore and onshore collaboration of drilling
functions have shown improved well placement and drilling efficiency. Furthermore,
projects utilizing suppliers’ condition monitoring centers have also resulted in fewer
breakdowns and increased regularity and production.
Based on the results of pilot projects and an overall evaluation of Integrated
Operations, it is planned that Integrated Operations will be implemented in two stages:
Generation 1 (G1—Integration of on- and offshore operations), and then Generation 2
(G2—Integration of companies, such as vendors). G1 (ca. 2003-2010) will integrate
processes and people onshore and offshore using ICT solutions and facilities that
improve onshore ability to support offshore operationally. G2 (ca. 2007-2015) will
help the operators utilize vendors’ core competencies and services more efficiently
(Integrated Work Processes: Future work processes on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf 2005).
7Figure 1-4 Two generations of Integrated Work Processes
(Source: presentation slide on OLF conference on June 2, 2005)
There has been a vision on changing from today’s manned platforms towards future’s
unmanned platforms. The technology for remote control is already present. But how
to utilize the technology on platforms in a safe and secure way still needs further
research. Integrated Operations, a closer coupling and integration between the onshore
and the offshore installations, is a step towards the vision: the organization onshore is
developing from being a support-function into becoming a control-function.
1.2.1.3 The benefit of Integrated Operations
The core benefits of Integrated Operations are the availability of almost real-time data
to experts and the increased accessibility to experts using video conference on
broadband connection. Thus, critical decisions, such as (oil and gas) well placement,
well completion and production optimization, can be made with the continuous
support of experts onshore, of vendor representatives, and of specialists in other
organizations. Better decisions will increase production and lead to high revenue. At
the same time, with the help of the advanced ICT technology, it is possible to move
some offshore functions to onshore control center and use the existing human
resources more efficiently. For example, instead of having an expert in geology at
every platform, the expert may be stationed on land and be available for consultation
8for several offshore platforms. The reallocation of human resources from offshore to
onshore has a big impact on cost saving. Every person located offshore is costly. They
require accommodation, transportation (by helicopter), administrative support,
managing, and insurance. Moreover, people offshore are paid high for working in a
high hazardous environment. Reducing the basic manning on the platform not only
reduces costs but also reduces the number of people at risk when incidents or
accidents happen. As such, it can be said that the total impact of Integrated Operations
on production, recovery rates, costs and safety is profound. Table 1-1 briefly
summarizes the major benefits of Integrated Operations.
Table 1-1 Benefits from integrated operations
It is estimated that when Integrated Operations is fully implemented, the production
could increase by 10% and the cost of operating could be reduced by 30% (Integrated
Work Processes: Future work processes on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005).
OLF estimated that the program might generate an incremental net present value of








Down-sized manning of the platform
Improved availability and up-time of critical equipment
Reduced maintenance cost
3. Reduced risk
Better decision with less risk
Earlier detection of degradation
Reduced personnel expose to risk
Quick access to experts when incidents happen
91.2.1.4 From traditional operation to Integrated Operations
To realize the benefit of new technology, profound changes are necessary to many
work processes including (oil and gas) well planning, well completion, production
optimization, and maintenance management.
In traditional operation, each offshore platform acts as an independent “factory”. Most
operation decisions are made offshore, in isolation, or with limited support from
experts onshore. On-platform personnel manage daily operations and have sole
responsibility for the safe operation of their machinery. Communication with onshore
personnel is periodic. Production plans are relatively rigid and primarily changed at
fixed intervals. In the face of malfunctioning equipment, experts will be transported
by helicopter to the platform if needed. The IT systems are specialized, and it is
difficult and time-consuming to gather the data necessary to optimize processes.
In essence, each platform is an island; all the resources need to be on-platform, at
significant cost and some risk to personal safety. The offshore field is essentially a
closed system.
Figure 1-5 Traditional operation
The transition to Integrated Operations will take 2 generations. In generation 1, onshore
centres will closely collaborate with offshore personnel through ICT technology solutions that
share real-time data and provide real-time collaboration facilities. When coming up with
operation decisions, professionals onshore can carry out “what-if” analyses and discuss
consequences of various decisions with personnel offshore via high-fidelity audio and video
systems to find out what can be done to optimize operations further. Both personnel onshore
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and offshore can monitor operations in real-time, compare actual data with simulations, and
identify operational as well as safety-related problems (see Figure 1-6 below).
Figure 1-6 Integrated Operations generation 1-Integration of on- and offshore operations
In generation 2, technology implemented will facilitate a closer integration of the
work processes of the operators and vendors. An oil and gas field will be operated by
personnel located in operation centres belonging to both the operators and vendors. A
large portion of the services required to operate a field will be delivered “over the net”.
The vendors will take over some of the daily work and decision-making processes
that were earlier carried out by the operators, e.g., monitoring, analyzing and
optimizing tasks, and will deliver services to the operators in real time, digitally “over
the net” (see Figure 1-7 below).
Figure 1-7 Integrated Operations generation 2-Integration of companies
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The organizational structure needs to be changed as well. In traditional operation,
onshore and offshore personnel belong to several different units with different goals.
Production plans are made and problems are solved in a fragmented manner. In
Integrated Operations, personnel from different units and in different disciplines all
come together in the operation centre to collaborate in decision-making and problem
solving.
Figure 1-8 Organization structure change
1.2.1.5 The challenges of the operation transition
Oil and Gas Companies constitute a predominantly hazardous industry. A one-day
outage may cost millions of dollars, while catastrophic failure can result in the loss of
lives and huge damage to the environment. There are concerns for the HSSE (Health,
Security, Safety and Environment) during the transition from the traditional setup to
Integrated Operations.
From the technological aspect, the prevalence of standard PC hardware and
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, and the availability of remote control,
create a new opening for malware to control the operation systems. The increased
interconnections between process control networks and office networks create more
points where the combined network may fail or be exploited by outsiders (Askildsen
2004).
From the human aspect, change is a difficult and painful process. When advanced
technology is in place and new work processes are implemented, operators need to
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take time and effort to familiarize themselves with the new system. Technology
unfamiliarity is one possible reason behind human errors (Wantanakorn, Mawdesley,
and Askew 1999). The new operation presupposes an effective communication and
collaboration via video conference, which is completely different from the traditional
operation. It would be a challenge for people to learn to communicate effectively in
the new way. For those who are moved from offshore to onshore, new competency
will be needed for the new tasks.
From the organizational aspect, new work assignments and new work locations could
disrupt the company’s social structures and their associated “know-who” networks.
Rebuilding one takes time. Above all, the company is moving into an uncertain area
where no former experience exists. What to do, how to do, when to do are questions
that must be considered with care (Integrated Work Processes: Future work processes
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005).
1.2.2 The Brage platform
The Brage platform serves as a pilot project in the transition to Integrated Operations.
Brage started production in 1993, and reached its peak production in 1998 with
120,000 barrels of oil per day. In year 2003, the production dropped to 40,000 barrels
of oil per day. Brage is a so-called mature platform and it has reached its tail-stage.
Revenue from 40,000 barrels per day barely covers the production cost. A further
drop of production will lead to the close down of the platform because it will no
longer be profitable. The platform was originally planned to shut down in year 2006
without measures to boost production efficiency.
However, upon utilization of the advanced ICT, the basic manning on the platform
has been reduced from 41 to 25 persons. Reduced manning has a huge impact on cost
reduction. Three shifts work on Brage. Each shift work two weeks on a platform and
have four weeks time off. One basic manning on the platform means three employees
all of whom are highly paid because they work in a hazardous environment. Given
that Brage has achieved 25% cost reduction, amounting to 100 million NOK a year,
the lifetime of the Brage platform has been successfully prolonged. It is still operating
now. The platform chief suggested that it might continue operation until year 2015.
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Good collaboration between the operational organization offshore and on land is an
essential factor in cutting costs. It is planned that the basic manning of the platform is
to be reduced to 20 people. The extended life time of the Brage platform implies
additional revenues of several billions of dollars. Figure 1-9 provides a general
illustration.
Figure 1-9 Efficient Operations in the Brage field
Source: PPT from Oil & Energy Business Area Seminar 2-3 June 2004
NB: Only for illustration. Not for precise data. The extension of the lifetime of Brage
is expected to be until 2015.
In 2004, the management team examined operations on Brage, after which they
identified that 20 traditional work processes to be modified or give room for new
work processes, i.e., Integrated Operations. This transition started in year 2005 and
would continue over several years. In the first year, 5 key new work processes, mainly
related to production optimization would be introduced and then 2 new work
processes every year thereafter.
1.3 Research Questions
The information infrastructure (including hardware and related device, software, and
network connection) becomes vital to the operations of the Norwegian Oil and Gas
Industry. If a major failure of information infrastructure occurs, it could lead to
devastating consequences. Studies have shown that, although one can readily buy
machinery that embodies new technology, the knowledge needed to use the modern
production technology is acquired much more slowly and with considerably more
difficulty (Attewell 1992; Brown and Duguid 1991). Without the adequate level of
knowledge to operate new work processes, the system will be more vulnerable. There
will be more human errors. Rasmussen’s studies show that without adequate
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knowledge, human error rate is high; and when knowledge is built up, the human
error rate will be reduced (Rasmussen 1982, 1987). The extensive utilization of new
technology will introduce new threats, new vulnerabilities, which might cause
information security incidents.
According to an interview with the NPD (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate), human
mistakes, knowledge, and attitudes are considered as the most critical factors during
operation transition (Askildsen 2004).
In this research, we will look into the following aspect and seek answers to the
specific questions listed below:
1) Transition speed
Transition speed is defined as how many new work processes is implemented in
certain time period, for example, a year. A fast transition to Integrated Operations is
desirable because the management would like to reap the benefit of the advanced
technology immediately. However, fast transition might cause problems. It is possible
for the management team on Brage to develop and implement new work processes at
a short interval, but it is difficult for the operators on Brage to learn the new work
processes and acquire the related knowledge with little time. Johnsen et al. noted that
the ICT teams did not always understand the demands of production and support
teams. There is a knowledge void that requires concerted communication and
cooperation, something that may not be part of the existing operational culture.
Moreover, control room staff was not familiar with the risks associated with
information technology, and that their skills in identifying potential
computer-generated hazards (e.g., software bugs, viruses, intrusions) are limited
(Johnsen, Line, and Askildsen 2006). Building new knowledge for new ways of
operation takes time and effort. Moving into new ways of operation without necessary
knowledge is risky. The key question here is: what is a proper transition speed that
can on the one hand, avoid severe incidents and on the other hand, realize the benefit
of advanced technology soon?
Research question 1: What is an appropriate speed for the transition to Integrated




There are limited resources on the platform. A fixed number of the operators work on
a platform. Normally, they work 12 hours a day and work continuously for 14 days
until another team takes the shift. During operation transition, the operators have to
not only complete routine production work but also need to learn new work processes
and acquire related knowledge. Resource allocation here means how to allocate the
operators’ time for routine production, for learning new work processes and for
learning new knowledge.
The learning of new work processes and knowledge has two forms: 1) special training
program which takes the operators off routine production job; and 2) on-job training.
The former, as it takes the operators off-job, clearly claims the operators’ time and
causes production disruption, which lead to reduced output. On-job training is
sometimes perceived as costless. In fact, it also needs the operators’ time but in small
slices that are not so obvious, which also reduces output.
Repenning studied why most firms failed to achieve the desired improvement when
implementing new tools, techniques, and technologies. He found that under
throughput pressure, the operators tend to ignore efforts needed to improve long-term
productivity (that is learning), but focus on achieving short-term throughput target
(Repenning and Sterman 2001). Similarly, the operators’ on the Brage platform also
have the pressure to achieve their product target. In this research, we will investigate
how resource allocation during the operation transition affects the long-term
productivity and information security risks.
Research question 2: How does resource allocation during operation transition affect
the effective use of new technology and the information security risks?
3) Investment in incident response capability
One of the ways to mitigate information security risks is to invest in incident response
capability so that the information security incidents are timely detected and properly
handled. As a result, the severity of incidents can be controlled. However, most
organizations view security control as an overhead costs and adopt a reactive security
management approach, i.e., they address security concerns only when security
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incidents happen. Indeed, “actions taken to secure an organization’s assets and
processes are typically viewed as disaster-preventing rather than payoff-producing,
which makes it difficult to determine how best to justify investing in security, and to
what level” (Allen 2005). For those responsible for security, it is often difficult to
persuade senior executives and board members of the need to implement information
security in a systemic way. Caralli and Wilson point out that the reason why security
is viewed as overhead is the lack of financial justification. They argue that
“organizations do not routinely require return on investment calculations on security
investments, nor do they attempt to measure or gather metrics on the performance of
security investments” (Caralli and Wilson 2004).
Based on the group model-build workshops, and model validation interviews, we
identified that the current decision rules for investment in incident response capability
on the Brage platfom are as follows:
1. make investment in incident response capability when increasing number of
incidents happen.
2. make investment in incident response capability when the severity of
incidents exceeds a pre-set warning line.
3. make investment in incident response capability when incident cost goes
beyond certain pre-set amount.
In this research, we will investigate how different decision rules affect the information
security risks, especially during the operation transition period.
Research question 3: How do management decision rules on investment in incident
response capability affect information security risks?
These are the three research questions that we investigate in this research. It is
because of them that we choose to use system dynamics (see chapter 3). And the
model is built focusing on these questions (see chapter 5). They are investigated in
chapter 8, using the model we developed. Below we will present the thesis structure.
1.4 Thesis structure
This thesis contains nine chapters, which could be categorized into four parts. The
first part provides background information for this research. The second part discusses
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the methodology used in this research. The third part presents the main research
activities and results. The last part discusses the research activities and findings.
Below, we offer more detail information about each part of the thesis.
1.4.1 Background information
The first part of the thesis presents an overview of the research problem and the
rationale for this research. Two chapters are included in this part: chapter 1
Introduction and chapter 2 Literature Review. Chapter 1 discusses the research
motivation first. Then it provides background information for the case: the transition
to Integrated Operations on the Brage platform. Based on the above two, the specific
research questions are raised. Finally, the structure of this thesis is described. Chapter
2 covers the relevant literature on information security, technology aspects, human
aspects and organizational aspects. This review of literature provides a base for this
research. We argue that current methods could not address the research questions
because they have not included the dynamic feature that this case requires. System
dynamics is a method specifically designed to address problems with dynamics
features. Thus, we will propose the use of system dynamics to address the problems in
our case (See section 3.1).
1.4.2 Methodology
The methodology part contains only chapter 3, which discusses the rationale for
choosing system dynamics as a method for this research. The chapter explains the
characteristics of the case—dynamic, long-term, with delays, feedback, nonlinearity
and lack of data, which can be addressed by system dynamics. System dynamics is
designed to deal with dynamic complexity, which includes feedback, delays,
nonlinearity. It is an interdisciplinary approach which allows us to address issues that
belong to different fields. Moreover, system dynamics models are built on the
assumption that the underlying causal structure of a system is what governs its
behavior. The model-building process starts with qualitatively identifying causal
structures. The model itself and the simulation experiments it allows us to undertake,
enable us to identify the information that is most relevant, i.e. to allow us to
distinguish between a valid and an invalid causal structure. In such a way, model
based information collection can be made very efficient. Even with imprecise data,
given the right model structure, the model is able to simulate and generate insight.
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The characteristics of the case under investigation are very well captured by system
dynamics and, therefore, we choose to use system dynamics to address the research
questions. Chapter 3 also presents how system dynamics is used in this study to tackle
the research problem.
1.4.3 Research activities and results
This research unfolds in several steps in compliance with the system dynamics
modeling process. Most experts in system dynamics agree that the modeling process
includes the following stages: model conceptualization, model formulation, model
testing and model implementation (Randers 1980; Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003).
We fit our research activities according these stages.
Table 1-2 Modeling process
Model Conceptualization Chapter 4 Group model building workshops
Model Formulation Chapter 5 Formal model presentation
Model Testing Chapter 6 Model validation tests
Chapter 7 Model validation interviews
Model Implementation Chapter 8 Scenarios and Policies
Chapter 4 presents how we articulate the problem, form dynamic hypothesis and
obtain qualitative and quantitative data for model development in the two group
model-building workshops. Chapter 5 explains the model structure using causal loop
diagram and describes the formal model sector by sector. Chapter 6 presents how we
validate our model. Chapter 7 presents the experts’ opinions of the model as a means
of behavior validation. Chapter 8 discusses various scenarios and policy
recommendations based on the insights from the model.
1.4.4 Conclusion
Chapter 9 revisits the model building process and the model insights for policy
recommendations. Moreover, the research methodology will be discussed reflectively:
what could be improved for this study? Finally, there is a section for future research
directions.
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1.5 Closing Remarks for Chapter 1
Information security research has been mostly technology focused. As computer and
Internet has reached normal households and most of the organizations, investigating
information security problems from human and organizational aspects is of increasing
importance. We foster studies of information security from human aspect and
organizational aspect. The case for this Ph.D. study is information security risks
during the transition from traditional to Integrated Operations in Hydro, a Norwegian
oil and gas company. The operation transition will continue for several years,
adopting advanced ICT technology to connect off-shore platforms with on-shore
facilities and vendors. The management of Hydro has concerns for information
security risks during the operation transition, when new work processes and
knowledge are introduced. Literature has pointed out that human error rate is high
without adequate knowledge. The knowledge building is affected by transition speed
and resources available for learning. Therefore, two research questions concern
transition speed and resources allocation respectively. Investment in incident response
capability is one way to reduce information security risk. But literature also pointed
out the difficulties to make proactive investment in incident response capability. As a
result, the third research question concerns how the decision rules on investment in




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the relevant literature. The
review presents the state of the current information security research and practice,
which will provide the basis for the selection of the methodology for our research.
This literature review starts with the definitions of the key concepts of this research
such as information security, risk, vulnerability, incident, and others. The precise
definitions are the basis for further discussion.
Afterward we review the research and practice in the information security area. First,
a brief overview of the technological development of information security is
presented. The reason for a technology-focused view is then discussed, as well as the
limitations of the technological approach in the current information security. Second,
research on human factors in information security is examined. Third, the theory and
practice of organizational factors in information security is discussed.
2.1 Definitions of the Key Concepts
Definitions are the basis for discussion. Looking into the literature, we found that the
same information security terms sometimes have different meanings, while some
different terms have the same meaning. This makes it difficult to make comparisons,
conduct confrontations, or draw conclusions. Here, we present the definitions of the
key concepts used in this work, allowing us to express our thoughts in a common
language.
The definitions of the key concepts mostly come from the “Glossary of Key
Information Security Terms” (NIST 2006), a summary document from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST is one of the main government
agencies involved in security program development. Taken from the NIST Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and the Special Publication (SP) 800 series,
this glossary summarizes the most frequently used security terms. We will refer to it
as “the NIST Glossary” here after.
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2.1.1 Information Security and Computer Security
In the NIST Glossary (NIST 2006), information security is defined as follows:
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide the following:
1) integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification
or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and
authenticity
2) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information
3) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of
information
In the international quality assurance standard for information systems ISO 177993,
information security is defined as the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information. The above two definitions are similar. The main
difference is that the ISO 17799 definition only emphasizes information, while the
NIST definition emphasizes both information and information systems. To protect
information, information systems must be protected. That could be the reason that
ISO 17799 has not made specific emphasis on information systems. However, we
think it is still necessary to stress the protection for the both information and
information systems. Some attackers and events have direct consequence to
information systems but not to information. For example, an operator from the vendor
unintentionally introduces a virus to the system while updating the system. This virus
does not jeopardize information integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Instead, it
weakens the information system, which may cause further problems of production.
The ISO 17799 standard specifies that information exists not only in electronic form
but also in other forms, such as printed in paper. However, as most of the information
storage and exchange take the electronic form today, most of the current research in
information security focuses on electronic information on computer, which is
sometimes referred to as computer security. This study investigates the behavior of
3 The ISO 17799 has been replaced by the ISO 27000 series since 19 Dec 2008, in particular, ISO/IEC 27002:
Code of Practice for Information Security Management.
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information security during the transition to Integrated Operations using advanced
ICT. Therefore, we will also focus on protection of information in electronic form.
2.1.2 Risk
According to the NIST Glossary (NIST 2006), risk is defined as follows:
The level of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or
reputation), agency assets, or individuals, resulting from the operation of an
information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that
threat occurring. This definition is in line with that given by ISO 17799, which can be
expressed by following mathematical equation:
Risk = Likelihood of incident occurring (Probability) * Potential impact
(potential damage) (1)
ISO 17799 further points out that the probability that a damaging incident happen
concerns threat as well as vulnerability, which can be expressed by following
mathematical equation:
Likelihood of the incident occurring = Threat * Probability of the threat
penetrating the vulnerability (2)
Combining equation (1) an equation (2), risk can be formulated as:
Risk = Threat * Probability of the threat penetrating the vulnerability * Potential
impact (potential damage) (3)
With more threats, the risk will be higher. With higher vulnerability, the probability of
the threat getting through will increase and the risk will become higher. When the
potential impact is bigger, the risk is higher.
The NIST glossary (NIST 2006) gives some examples of how IT-related risks may
arise:
“IT-related risks arise from legal liability or mission/business loss due to,
but not limited to, the following:
 Unauthorized (malicious, non-malicious, or accidental) disclosure,
modification, or destruction of information
 Non-malicious errors and omissions
 IT disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters
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 Failure to exercise due care and diligence in the implementation and
operation of the IT”
Non-malicious or accidental actions are under the scope of information security risks.
In safety research, two categories, error and violation, are used to distinguish
unintentional and intentional breaches of safe measures (Reason, Parker, and Lawton
1998).
 Error: unintentional deviations from a planned course of action or in the case
of mistakes, incorrect plans arising from various kinds of informational
underspecifications.
 Violation: intentional deviations from safe operating procedures, standards, or
rules.
Within the violation category, further distinction can be made, depending on whether
the intention is malicious or not. A violation with malicious intention (to cause
damage to the system) is referred to as sabotage in information security. A violation
without malicious intention, such as corner-cutting, does not have a clear label. We
will use the term non-malicious violation.
Therefore, we can summarize that information security risks arise from sabotage,
non-malicious violation, and human errors. Sabotage can come from the outside or
inside, sometimes referred to as an outsider attack and insider attack, respectively.
The realization of sabotage risks lies in both how vulnerable the system is and how
skillful the attacker is. A well-defended system can prevent sabotage attempts from
getting through. However, even the best-defended system has holes and can be
penetrated. For errors and violations, the realization of such kinds of risks mostly
depends on the vulnerability of the system. A well-designed and well-regulated
security system can prevent or mitigate most of these risks, while a poor vulnerable
system can facilitate such risks to materialize and develop into severe incidents.
2.1.3 Incident
Incident is defined as “an occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information
the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent
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threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies”
(NIST 2006).
Note that an incident may not incur actual cost if it only potentially jeopardizes
information or information systems. An example is when a hacker penetrates the
system just for fun, goes into the system, and then leaves without doing any damage.
Actually, a great number of incidents are relatively costless, but they have a
consequence of the employees becoming frustrated and perceiving their job situation
as being disturbed, thus resulting in reduced working efficiency (Jaatun et al. 2007).
More harmful incidents may put out technical equipment and interrupt business
continuity. Severe incidents may even cause a chain of consequences resulting in
large economical losses, environmental damage, and injuries or loss of life.
2.1.4 Threat
In the NIST glossary, threat is defined as “any circumstance or event with the
potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions,
image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an information
system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service. Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit
a particular information system vulnerability” (NIST 2006).
A threat can be categorized as an outside threat or an inside threat depending on the
source of the threat. If a threat comes from an unauthorized entity from outside the
domain perimeter, then it is an outside threat. If a threat comes from an entity with
authorized access to the domain perimeter, then it is considered an inside threat.
However, in the cases of outsourcing, virtual organization, and Integrated Operations,
in which companies are connected using advanced ICT, the domain perimeter is
vague. Threats from suppliers or virtual teams are not purely from insider or outsider.




According to the NIST glossary, vulnerability is defined as “weakness in an
information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation
that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source” (NIST 2006).
In some other information security literature, vulnerability is often regarded as
weakness in the software, and the way to manage vulnerability is through patching
(Chuvakin 2006). In the NIST glossary, we can see that vulnerability is not about the
software only, as it includes weakness in procedures, controls, or implementation,
which means the whole system. The weaknesses in human beings, organization,
software, hardware, and network are all vulnerabilities. We will use this broader
definition of vulnerability in this document.
2.1.6 Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)
In the NIST glossary, Computer Security Incident Response Team is defined as “a
capability set up for the purpose of assisting in responding to computer
security-related incidents; also called a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) or
a CIRC (Computer Incident Response Center)” (NIST 2006). There are different
types of CSIRTs, for example, International Coordination Center, National Team,
Network Service Provider Team, IT Vendor, and Corporate Team (West-Brown et al.
2003). In this case, we consider the corporate team.
According to the Handbook for CSIRTs (West-Brown et al. 2003), the mission of a
corporate CSIRT would be “Improve the security of the corporation’s information
infrastructure and minimize threat of damage resulting from attacks and intrusions.”
(p. 62). And the service objective for such a CSIRT is to:
“Provide a center of excellence for incident handling support to system
and network administrators and system users in the corporation.
Provide on-site technical support for incidents impacting company
systems to isolate and recover from intruder threats and attacks.” (p. 62)
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When incidents happen, it is the response team’s responsibility to handle them. If
handled with efficiency, the impact of the incidents can be reduced. Otherwise, the
impact will become bigger.
A corporate CSIRT can be a formal team or an ad hoc team (gathered when needed).
In our case, the Brage platform uses the later form. Therefore, we will use the term
“incident response capability” in the following discussions.
IRMA proposed the following tasks for incident response capability on Brage (Line et
al. 2007):
 Prepare: Planning for and preparation of incident response
 Detect and recover: Detect incidents and restore to normal operation
 Learn: Learning from incidents and how they are handled.
Preparation phase includes activities such as risk assessment, documentation of the
detailed configurations, awareness creation and monitoring.
Detection and recovery phase includes activities such as altering (by others reporting
of deviation or by use of technical security measures), assessment of the altering,
immediate response and recover.
Learning phase includes activities such as identifying root cause of the incidents,
recommending security improvements, and evaluating the incident handling process.
2.2 Research on Information Security
With the expansion of the computer and Internet users, information security has
gained increasing attention. For many people, technology is the most effective way to
secure a system. A large portion of the research effort is devoted to advance security
technology, such as the implementation of firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
Lately, it has been acknowledged that a major part of security and safety problems is
due to human factors (Sawicka 2004). It is no longer technology that constrains the
reliability of the systems. Research on information security focusing on human and
organizational factors has emerged. Below, we will review the research on
information security from the technological aspect, as well as the human and
organizational aspect.
27
2.2.1 Managing Information Security: Technological Aspect
The concept of information security surfaced in the 1960s. The concerns ranged from
forced entry into computer and storage rooms to destruction by natural or man-made
disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and fire. Recent attention has focused on
protecting information systems and data from accidental or intentional unauthorized
access, disclosure, modification, or destruction. The consequences of these events can
range from degraded or disrupted operation to corporate failure (Loch, Carr, and
Warkentin 1992).
2.2.1.1 Information Security Technology Advancement
Research on information security with a technological aspect has a long history.
Research interests have evolved over time with the development of computers and the
Internet.
In the 1960s and 1970s, when computers were mainframes, information security was
mostly concerned with internal operating system security. Substantial research efforts
were devoted to secure operating systems design and security mechanisms against
subversions, resulting to the emergence of security-oriented subsystems such as
IBM’s Resource Access Control Facility and Computer Associates’ ACF-2 and Top
Secret (Arce 2003).
During the 1980s, the use of personal computers spread in companies and households.
In using the floppy disk to transfer information between computers, a new security
threat became imminent: the virus. Research focus was then on the desktop computer
and its susceptibility to computer viruses. Newly discovered viruses and virus
infection incidents were extensively documented and analyzed.
In the 1990s, with the fast development of networks, the security concern was focused
on network security. The interconnectivity of multiple networks via Internet Protocol
Standards made the networks of academic, business, government, and even military
organizations open to attackers. The firewall emerged to separate the internal network
from the outside. Extensive study on the security of networking protocols and
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infrastructure components led to better solutions in Internet protocols, user
authentication systems, and others.
At the end of the 1990s, with the full adoption of the World Wide Web and the
Internet to conduct daily business, the organizations’ perimeter got blurred. It became
less obvious to differentiate internal users from external attackers. Solutions such as
firewalls, cryptographically strong authentication systems, network and host-based
intrusion detection systems, VPN devices, and cryptography additions to networking
protocols were not enough. Research attention turned to server security, operating
system controls, patch management, and additional defenses.
Today, workstation security attracts much research interests. Solutions such as
personal firewalls, host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems, workstation
access control software, file integrity checkers, and patch management systems help
to secure workstations. However, we must realize that humans operate and control
workstations, and no technological solution alone can secure us if human and
organizational behaviors are not included in a comprehensive security strategy.
2.2.1.2 Limitations of the Technological Approach
What security technology does in information security is to “seal” the organization
perimeter and prevent outsiders (malicious outside attackers) from getting into the
system and wreaking damage. In retrospect, there are many reasons for this
technology-focused view.
In the early years of computers and Internet development (before the 1980s),
computers existed only in those “superior” organizations, such as academic and
government organizations, and were available only to experts who had the expertise
and were by and large virtuous. There was not much to worry about human errors or
violations or insider attacks. The major task of information security was to keep
malicious agents outside the system.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, with the widespread of personal computers and the fast
growth of the Internet, people who use computers and the Internet generally had little
knowledge about computers and the Internet, even less knowledge about information
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security. Human errors and violations have caused increasing number of computer
incidents. However, the impacts of such incidents were small compared with those
caused by malicious attackers. Human errors and violations normally generated minor
incidents, while the malicious attacks, if successful, caused extreme impacts.
Therefore, the information security focus was still on preventing attacks, which is
heavily dependent on technology improvement.
Nowadays, daily business operations are fully dependent on the Internet connection. It
is the case even for highly hazardous industries such as nuclear plants, chemical
refineries, and oil and gas productions. This changes the whole information security
paradigm because human errors and violations can lead to severe incident, huge
financial losses, and even injuries and loss of lives.
As Arce pointed out (2003),
“Information security—both as a practical discipline and as an academic
field—has steadily increased in complexity since the 1950s. A wider range of
problems must now be considered to devise effective security architectures
for today’s organizations. Security solutions should account for our IT
infrastructure’s technological challenges and the particular aspects of human
and organizational behavior.”
2.2.2 Managing Information Security: Human Aspect
The research on human error has long been in the realm of psychology research.
Human error research in the industrial setting started in the late 1950s and early 1960s
when formal methods for identifying and classifying human errors in missile
development systems were developed. The nuclear power accident in Three Mile
Island in 1979 raised the importance of human error, leading to better understanding
of its causes, manifestation, and consequences in the 1980s. The 1990s had seen a
maturing of some of the Human Reliability Assessment techniques and a broadening
of the models of human error to account for organizational influences on error.
Although it is widely accepted that human factors contribute to a large portion of
information security incidents, theory and know-how in this specific area are limited.
How to deal with human factors in information security and why people are such
obstacles are still not well understood (Sawicka 2004).
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In the current literature on human factors in information security, we can find three
main research lines: one concerning user interfaces of security-related systems, one
concerning counterproductive computer usage, and the other concerning human
behavior related to security risks.
The usability researchers believe that bad security is mainly caused by the poor design
of security applications. They are difficult to learn and use. Improving the usability of
security products can achieve better security. This kind of research is under a much
broader computer-human interaction (CHI) field. Although software applications
improved in effectiveness with better computer-human interaction design, how much
it would work for security products is still in doubt. The fundamental problem lies in
the difference of functionality in normal application and security application. A
normal application has functionality if things that are supposed to happen do happen.
But a security application has functionality if things that are not supposed to happen
do not happen. Security developers are interested in the latter, while end users tend to
be more interested in the former (Gutmann 2008). This is why Schneier emphasized
that “people cannot be trusted to implement computer security policies” (Schneier
2000).
At the extreme end of counterproductive computer use is “insider attack.” Insider
attacks are often found in security incidents, and they often cause high consequences.
Anderson argued, “We find that almost all attacks on banking system involved
blunders, insider involvement, or both. High tech attacks are rare…” (Anderson 1994).
A total of 671 respondents participated in the 2007 e-Crime Watch Survey conducted
by the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Carnegie Mellon University, Software
Engineering Institute’s CERT Program, and Microsoft Corporation. In cases where
respondents could identify the perpetrator of an electronic crime, 31 percent were
committed by insiders.
Software Engineering Institute’s CERT Program has devoted some of its research
capacity to study insider attacks. A study on 150 actual insider attack cases from 1996
to 2002 looked for common threads in insider attacks by asking the following:
Who did it?
What was stolen/modified?
How did they steal/modify it?
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Known Issues (Why did people do it?)
Many reasons that cause insider attacks are identified, such as problems with
supervisors, physical threat from outsiders, and the others. (Cappelli and Moore 2008).
The insights from this study are helpful, but it is still hard to prevent inside attack.
The recommended practices mainly concern improving security policies and security
awareness in organizations. The following are some examples:
 Enforce separation of duties and least privilege
 Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees
Human behavior related to security risks mainly focus on human compliance with
information security policies and security awareness. Sawicka devoted her Ph.D.
work to studying the dynamics of human compliance in IT-based environments
(Gonzalez and Sawicka 2002; Sawicka 2004; Gonzalez and Sawicka 2003). Based on
two established psychological theories, cumulative prospect theory of choice under
risk and behavioral regulation approach to instrumental conditioning, she assumed
that people compliance would drop until security incidents happen.
Figure 2-1 Basic behavior modes of compliance
Source: (Sawicka 2004 p. xv)
A system dynamics model of individual compliance was developed. The model
behavior-compliance pattern was tested with two series of laboratory experiments in
the context of a simple data registration task. The actual data registration patterns
provided some evidence in support of the proposed model. However, some observed
behaviors could not be explained by the model’s structure. Understanding the basic
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mechanism of individual compliance will lead to a major improvement in security and
safety.
Humans do err. However, most human errors have underlying social and
organizational reasons. As Clarke and Jr. Short stated, “The intellectual problem is
that as a theory of sociotechnical breakdown, human error presumes more than it
explains, obscuring the complexities of interaction between humans, machines, and
organization” (Clarke and Jr. Short 1993). They further pointed out that we can learn
more about how risks are produced by theorizing organizational factors such as
production pressures, managerial expectations, and regulatory effectiveness.
2.2.3 Managing Information Security: Organizational
Aspect
Today, many organizations have become so dependent on computers and
computer-based ICT that disruptions may cause outcomes ranging from in-
convenience to catastrophe. Protecting a corporation's information system and data
has gained increasing management attention (Loch, Carr, and Warkentin 1992). The
information security methods mostly used are checklists and standards, risk
management (RM), and others (Siponen 2005).
2.2.3.1 Information Security Checklist and Standards
The information security checklist and standards aim to capture the best practice and
put it in a list. Research from CERT pointed out the following:
“There are no widely accepted (de facto or de jure) standards of best practice
(with the possible exception of ISO 17799 [ISO 00b]), metrics for
characterizing security performance against some measure of adequacy, or
industry-accepted benchmarks. However, there is an ever-growing number of
guidelines and checklists that identify practices that are considered acceptable
by most professionals, thus passing the test of reasonable practice.” (Allen
2005)
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The International Standards Organization ISO/IEC 17799 is often cited as one of the
most authoritative sources for defining and deploying an enterprise-wide approach to
information security. According to ISO 17799,
“Critical success factors: Experience has shown that the following factors are
often critical to the successful implementation of IS within an organization:
Security policy, objectives, and activities that reflect business
objectives
An approach to implementing security that is consistent with the
organizational culture
Visible support and commitment from management
A good understanding of the security requirements, risk assessment,
and risk management
Effective marketing of security all managers and employees
Distribution of guidance on IS policy and standards to all employees
and contractors
Providing appropriate training and education
A comprehensive and balanced system of measurement which is used
to evaluate performance in IS management and feedback suggestions for
improvement.”
Among the critical successful factors listed above, risk assessment is a critical task
because measurement can help us to understand the problem with precision. As Tom
DeMarco stated, “You cannot control what you cannot measure.”
2.2.3.2 Risk Assessment
Risk is assessed by identifying the threats and vulnerabilities, and then determining
the likelihood and impact for each risk. As straightforward as it sounds, risk
assessment is a complex process. Most of the risk assessment processes fall in the
following framework, which is shown in Figure 2-2 (Stephenson 2004): first, identify
the purpose of risk assessment and the work scope; second, evaluate risks based on
threat and vulnerability identified and information of the likelihood of the occurrence
and impact of the risk; third, identify possible measures to reduce the risk and
evaluate them; finally, document the whole risk assessment processes for the review
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of a high management team and in support of the management decision on investment
in security.
Figure 2-2 Typical framework of risk assessment
Many different methodologies and tools exist for risk assessment. Some of them are
qualitative, while some are quantitative. The choice of a qualitative measurement vs. a
quantitative measurement is dependent on the organizations’ characteristics. Both of
the approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages.
Qualitative risk assessment
Here, we use the methodology developed by the NIST called the “National Institute of
Standards & Technology Methodology” as an example to illustrate how qualitative
risk assessment is conducted. This methodology requires nine steps for risk
assessment, as listed below (Stoneburner, Goguen, and Feringa 2002).
 Step 1 System Characterization
 Step 2 Threat Identification
 Step 3 Vulnerability Identification
 Step 4 Control Analysis
 Step 5 Likelihood Determination
 Step 6 Impact Analysis
 Step 7 Risk Determination
 Step 8 Control Recommendations




Identify threat, vulnerability, the
likelihood of the occurrence, and
the impact of the risk
Control
recommendation
Identify and select risk
reducing measures
Final report of the risk
assessment
Identify the purpose, scope,




We can see that these nine steps fit well with the framework. Step 1, Step 8, and Step
9 correspond to box 1, box 3, and box 4 in the framework respectively. Steps 2 to 7 all
work for risk identification, which correspond to box 2 in the framework. We will
look into the details of these steps.
Step 2 is to identify threat. Threat is identified from the source of threat, motivation,
and threat action. For example, the source of a threat is an insider; the motivation is
monetary gain; and the threat action is fraud and theft. For each threat source, the
vulnerability in the system is identified (step 3). To derive an overall likelihood rating
that indicates the probability a potential vulnerability may be exercised, the
implementation of current or planned controls must be considered. This is why step 4
is needed.
Having investigated threat, vulnerability, and the controls in the system, the likelihood
that a potential vulnerability could be exercised by a given threat-source can be
categorized as high, medium, or low. (Step 5)





The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and controls to
prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective.
Medium
The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that may
impede the successful exercise of the vulnerability.
Low
The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to
prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being
exercised.
(Source: “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems” from NIST)
Step 6 is to determine the adverse impact resulting from an incident. The adverse
impact of a security incident can be described in terms of loss or degradation of
integrity, availability, and/or confidentiality.
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Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the high cost loss of major
tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an
organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human
death or serious injury.
Medium
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly loss of tangible assets
or resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission,
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human injury.
Low
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the loss of some tangible assets
or resources or (2) may noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation,
or interest.
(Source: “Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems” from
NIST)
Based on the likelihood of threat and the magnitude of impact, a risk-level matrix can
be developed to measure risk.
Table 2-3 Risk-level matrix
Magnitude of impact
Likelihood of threat Low Medium High
High Low Medium High
Medium Low Medium Medium
Low Low Low Low
For high risk, there is a strong need for corrective measures. The existing system may
continue to operate, but a corrective action plan must be put in place as soon as
possible. For medium risk, corrective actions are needed and a plan must be
developed to incorporate these actions within a reasonable period of time. For low
risk, the management team could determine whether corrective actions are still
required or decide to accept the risk.
The main advantage of qualitative risk assessment is that it prioritizes the risks and
identifies areas for immediate improvement. The disadvantage is that it does not
provide specific quantitative information on the magnitude of the impacts, therefore
making cost-benefit analysis difficult. For business organizations, decisions on
investment are mostly based on cost-benefit analysis and return on investment (ROI)
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calculation. Quantitative measurement is needed to enable defensible management
decisions (Ryan and Ryan 2008).
Quantitative risk assessment
Quantitative risk assessment draws upon methodologies used by financial institutions
and insurance companies. The assumption is that the impact of an incident could be
measured in terms of monetary costs, and so could risk. Some impacts such as lost
revenue, cost of repairing the system, or expenses required to correct problems are
originally recorded as monetary cost. Other impacts such as loss of public confidence,
loss of credibility, or damage to an organization’s reputation are not directly measured
in cost. However, they can be translated into monetary cost with estimation of
revenue loss and cost required to make up for the adverse effect.
The process of quantitative risk assessment is similar to that of qualitative risk
assessment. The only differences exist in determining the “likelihood of occurrence”
and the “impact magnitude”: instead of qualitatively leveling them in qualitative risk
assessment, in quantitative risk assessment, the “likelihood of occurrence” and the
“impact magnitude” have to be determined with a numerical figure. The risk is then
quantified as: Risk = likelihood of occurrence * potential impact
The “likelihood of occurrence” should be measured for a certain period, in most cases
one year. It is sometimes referred to as the “Annualized Rate of Occurrence.”
“Potential impact” is the expected value of a single loss. As a product of the
likelihood of occurrence and potential impact, risk is measured as the “Annualized
Loss Expectancy.” If one investment in information security can reduce the
annualized loss expectancy more than its cost, then this investment is financially
justified. On the contrary, if one investment costs more than the reduction of
annualized loss expectancy, then this investment is financially unjustifiable.
The benefit of quantitative risk assessment is that it provides financial bases for
decision making. The disadvantage is the difficulty in evaluating the probability of
occurrence and impact magnitude.
We cannot know with certainty the probability of occurrence because it concerns
events that have not turned into incidents (most of such events go unnoticed).
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Although we can still estimate the probability of occurrence, for sure, there is an
estimation gap. If there are historical data, we will have more confidence on the
estimation. Unfortunately, historical data are rare in the information security area.
The way to measure impact magnitude is mostly asset based, that is, based on the
value of the asset, the potential impact of incidents can be determined. This requires
the identification and evaluation of the information system asset. The information
system asset could be an application, system, or information, which is hard to evaluate.
Even if it is possible to evaluate the information asset, the estimation of the impact of
an incident is quite uncertain. In this highly coupled system, an incident in one part of
the system may cause damage in other parts of the system and even in other systems.
It is hard to predict how many information assets will be damaged. Again, historical
data could be helpful but they are, in most cases, not available.
The current method of quantitative information security risks analysis is not reliable.
The evaluation of the frequency of incidents and consequence of incidents are both
difficult, if not impossible. Statistical data on threats, numbers of attacks, and the
consequences of attacks that are necessary reference for the evaluation are usually not
available. It is difficult to find historical data to support quantitative information
security risks analysis.
Workshop-based risk assessment
Faced with the data problem, some researchers have developed methods to involve
internal experts in risk assessment. The experience and knowledge of internal experts
are assumed to be more reliable sources for risk assessment.
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) of Carnegie Mellon University developed
the Operationally Critical, Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
process. OCTAVE is workshop-based rather than tool-based, which means that rather
than including extensive security expertise in a tool, the participants in the risk
assessment are the ones who understand the risk of the organization.
There are three phases in the workshop. Phase 1 gathers knowledge of the senior
management, operational area management, and staff to create threat profiles. Phase 2
gathers knowledge from the operational area managers to identify key components
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and evaluate selected components. Phase 3 gathers knowledge from the staff to
conduct risk analysis and develop protection strategy.
Going through these three phases is a demanding process with a series of workshops
involving a high, middle management team and operational staff. OCTAVE Allegro
offers a streamlined process that is specifically aimed at information assets and their
resiliency (Caralli et al. 2007).
Thomas Peltier has created a more cost-effective method for risk assessment: the
Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process (FRAAP) (Peltier 2005). This
methodology emphasizes that the external expert is only the facilitator, and it is the
user community who owns the risk analysis and assessment. Acting in the owner
capacity, the management and staff get the opportunity to see the risks in the business
process in the facilitated workshop.
The FRAAP’s main session (facilitated workshop) is only four hours with 15 to 30
client representatives. The final report will be ready in several working days after the
main session. The final report is a comprehensive risk assessment document wherein
the threats, risk levels, and controls are documented. It also includes an action plan
created by the owner of the problem.
The FRAAP requires fewer resources from the client, which is a big advantage.
Another advantage is that it creates ownership of security policy, which may help in
the implementation of the result. Attention is needed to avoid bias, which could arise
from choosing the participants for the workshop and during the main facilitated
workshop.
Nevertheless, such a workshop-based methodology is still an improvement. It
involves people within the organization who have experience and situational
knowledge (risk picture specific to this organization). As Stephenson said,
“The desired future state of risk management, given the practicalities of cyber
space as it exists today, is that we can be proactive in managing risk,
managing the elements of risk and managing incidents. A first step towards
that objective is to view the enterprise and its security measures holistically.
We must stop thinking in terms of risk analysis, vulnerability assessment,
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incident response, etc., as separate, mutually exclusive, functions. They are
not. Everything that impacts the enterprise impacts its security. Therefore, we
must deal with everything in the enterprise” (Stephenson 2004).
2.2.4 Information Security during Operation Transition
Stephenson’s observation “everything that impacts the enterprise impacts its security”
is probably true given the dependence we have on computers and networks to perform
daily routine tasks. In the case of this study, the organization’s operation is
transitioned from traditional, platform-centric, to Integrated Operations. The
organization will face many challenges during the operation transition. It is a complex,
long-term, and dynamic process with feedback, delays, and trade-offs (see section
3.1), among others. The risk picture will change along the way, which makes the
above-mentioned risk assessment methods even less relevant. The workshop-based
risk assessment needs experience and situational knowledge, which are not available
for this study. We are looking into a future situation which differs largely from the
current one. Even the internal staff and management do not have experience and
adequate knowledge about the future. We need a methodology that, instead of looking
at the existing behavior (experience and situational knowledge), can capture the
fundamental structure of the system. Thus, we can use this structure to investigate the
behavior of information security risks during the operation transition. We propose to
apply system dynamics to this research. System dynamics build simulation models are
based on the causal relationships, that is, the fundamental structure of the system
under study. Such structure rules system behavior. If the system structure is correctly
portrayed by the model, the simulated model behavior shows the future behavior of
the system with confidence. In such a way, we can study the future behavior of a
system. Therefore, system dynamics is a plausible candidate for this study. In the next
chapter, we will explain in detail the reasons why system dynamics is chosen as the
research methodology.
2.3 Closing Remarks for Chapter 2
As we have reviewed, the methods for mitigating information security risks have
evolved in the past five decades. More and more researchers have realized that
technology alone is not enough to address the problem. Human and organizational
factors play a big role in improving information security. The awareness of the
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importance of the economics of information security has emerged recently (Wang,
Chaudhury, and Rao 2008; August and Tunca 2008; Schneier 2008; Andersen and
Moore 2006; Anderson 2001). This is a young principle that established since year
2000. “People have realized that security failure is caused at least as often by bad
incentives as by bad design” (Andersen and Moore 2006). Therefore, the tools and
concepts of game theory and microeconomic theory are becoming a research interest.
At the same time, more and more organizations have recognized the need to improve
information security. Information security is becoming a factor that helps achieve an
organization’s mission. Various methods exist for assessing information security risks.
For different organizational situations, missions, and purposes, a different
methodology should be used. In our case, upon the start of a long-term transition to a
new operation, where no historical data is applicable for assessing risk, we find it
important to systematically understand the transition process and how it will affect
information security. System dynamics is a suitable method to investigate long-term
changing processes. Therefore, we propose to use system dynamics as a research
method. Reasons for choosing system dynamics is explained in detail in next chapter.
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3 Methodology
In Chapter 1, we described our case: the development of information security risks
during a transition from traditional to Integrated Operations, and raised our research
questions:
- What is an appropriate speed for the transition to Integrated Operations considering
the trade off between financial gains and information security risks?
- How does resource allocation during operation transition affect the effective use of
new technology and the information security risks?
- How do management decision rules on investment in incident response capability
affect the security risks?
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the existing literature on information security research. The
current research methods are not suitable for answering the research questions
because they do not consider the problem in a dynamic and integrated perspective. To
investigate the problem at hand, system dynamics, a method especially designed to
tackle problems in dynamic complex systems, is proposed.
The selection of a methodology is dependent on the nature of the problem being
investigated. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, we analyze the characteristics
of our case and explain how system dynamics could be used to address these features.
In such a way, we justify the selection of system dynamics as a research method. In
the second part of this chapter, we explain how this research is designed i.e. how
system dynamics is applied in the research.
3.1 The characteristics of the case under study
We study information security risks during the transition to Integrated Operations.
Repenning studied the literature that speaks to the question of what processes
determine the effective use of technological innovations. He concluded that all the
literature regard the implementation of new technology as a dynamic process
involving the complex interaction of multiple factors (Repenning 1999). Below we
will analyze the characteristics of the operation transition in detail and explain how
system dynamics can be used to tackle problems with such characteristics.
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3.1.1 Structural characteristics: Dynamic
The term dynamic is defined by the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary as “marked
by usually continuous and productive activity or change.” In other words, when a
system changes over time, it is a dynamic system.
In our case, the transition to Integrated Operations is a mechanism that causes changes:
twenty traditional work processes are to be replaced by new work processes. New
work processes and knowledge have to be introduced and integrated across both
onshore and offshore, and across the operators and vendors. Moreover, operation
information must be shared, in almost real time, with all related parties. The operators
offshore are not used to information sharing, as traditionally offshore platform has
been a closed production environment. Profound and continuous changes must take
place to realize the benefit of Integrated Operations (Integrated Work Processes:
Future work processes on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 2005). Thus, operation
transition is a dynamic process.
During the operation transition, new work processes are gradually introduced to the
operators and over time the operators get familiar with what to do in the new way of
operation. When the operators are familiar with new work processes and can work
with them unassisted, we say that these new work processes are mature. The mature
new work processes accumulate over time. Similarly, new knowledge is gradually
introduced and acquired by the operators over time. There is an accumulation of
mature new knowledge.
These changes and accumulations are best presented by the system dynamics concepts
of stocks and flows. Stocks are the accumulations. They represent the system’s state.








work processesmaturing new work
processes
Figure 3-1 New work processes transition
As new work processes are developed and implemented, traditional work processes
change into new work processes. At this stage, they are immature. It takes time and
44
effort for the new work processes to mature. The maturing of new work processes is a
learning process whereby the operators get familiar with what to do in Integrated
Operations.











Figure 3-2 New knowledge transition
When new work processes are implemented, new knowledge corresponding to the
new work processes is also introduced. Knowledge refers to the details of how to
work with the new work processes. At the beginning, the operators cannot grasp all
the details well. For example, they know what to do but do not understand why to do
in such a way. Such stage is named immature knowledge. The maturation of new
knowledge takes time and effort too. It is a learning process whereby the operators
grasp how to work efficiently, why to do in this way and how to handle different
situations in Integrated Operations.
The system dynamics stock and flow structure is fundamental to capture dynamics. It
represents how state of system changes over time. If there is no stock, there is no state
of the system. If there is no flow, there will be no change of the stock and thus, no
dynamics. The stock and flow structure is able to illustrate how different development
and maturation rates (developing new work processes, maturing new work processes,
developing new knowledge, maturing new knowledge) affect the state of the system
(traditional work processes and knowledge, immature new work processes and
knowledge, mature new work processes and knowledge) on the Brage platform. The
new work processes and knowledge and their maturity are identified as the key factors
influencing information security risks during operation transition. Therefore, using
system dynamics help us investigate the change of information security risks during
the operation transition.
3.1.2 Structural characteristics: Delays
Delays exist in most of the systems. It takes time to measure and report information.
Likewise, it takes time to make decisions and for decisions to affect the state of a
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system (Sterman 2000 p. 411). In our case of operation transition, for example, it
takes time to learn the newly implemented work processes and acquire the related
knowledge. Mature new work processes and mature new knowledge lag behind the
introduction of new work processes and knowledge.
In system dynamics, delay is defined as a process whose output lags behind its input.
Figure 3-3 Delay
There are two types of delay: material delay and information delay. A material delay
captures the physical flow of material through a delay process. An information delay
represents the gradual adjustment of perceptions or beliefs (Sterman 2000 p. 412-433).
In our case, an example of material delay is the building of incident response
capability. When the management has decided to recruit people to improve incident
response capability, it takes time to announce the opening, interview candidates, and
find the right person. It also takes time to train the new employee for the specific
work. Several months time is needed from the decision is made to achieve the
capacity (see Figure 3-4 left). An example of information delay is the change of risk
perception. In a traditional operation, the platform is a closed system and information
security risks are relatively low. When moving into Integrated Operations, with the
adoption of advanced ICT technology and network connection, information security
risks are much higher. However, the perception about information security risks will
not change immediately. When the staff on the platform observe incidents happening,
they will gradually realize the higher information security risks they are now facing
(see Figure 3-4 right).
DelayInput Output
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Figure 3-4 Examples of material delay and information delay
(NB: IR represents incident response)
The left part of Figure 3-4 is a material delay. The “Desired incident response
capability” is a management decision on how much incident response capability is
needed on the platform. It takes time (“Time to adjust IR capability”) to adjust the
actual “Incident response capability” to the desired level. As mentioned above, the
recruitment process usually takes several months. The lay-off process also takes
several months, deciding whom to lay-off, negotiating with the employee on lay-off
terms, providing time for hand over and etc. The right part of Figure 3-4 shows an
information delay. The “Perception of frequency of incidents” is formed based on the
“incident detected”. (Undetected incidents are latent, which will not affect perception).
The perception is gradually adjusted (over the “time to change perception”). The first
time that unusually many incidents are detected, the staff may consider such
occurrence as occasional. But when this happens again and again the staff will
perceive the increasing frequency of incidents.
As the decision to invest in incident response capability is based on perception of
risks (“Perception of frequency of incidents”), the information delay could cause
underinvestment or overinvestment. Moreover, the material delay of building incident
response capability additionally slows down the adjustment of incident response
capability. When incident response capability is inadequate, the delays in adjustment
will leave the Brage platform insufficiently protected for months, which increase the
possibility of severe incidents occurring.
Delay in building incident
response capability
Delay in change of perception
Desired incident
response capability
















Delays are important elements of a dynamic system. Delays create distance between
cause and effect in time and sometimes introduce instability and oscillation to the
system (Sterman 2000 p. 410). In our case, delays in learning new work processes and
acquiring new knowledge make the system vulnerable; and delays in perceiving
information security risks and building incident response capability can make incident
response capability inadequate, leading to severe incidents. Delays cannot be
neglected when we consider information security risks during the operation transition.
3.1.3 Structural characteristics: Feedback
Feedback is the process whereby an initial cause ripples through a chain of causation
to ultimately reaffect itself (Roberts et al. 1981). This chain of causation is sometimes
referred as a closed loop, or a feedback loop.
During the operation transition, the changing factors are interrelated by a relatively
large variety of relationships, many of which form feedback relationship. For example,
the more new work processes the operators learn, the more experience they have
working with new work processes; and the faster they could learn the new work
processes. This feedback loop works virtuously toward a successful operation
transition. However, there is another feedback loop that counteracts with this one: a
diminishing return on investment in learning. The more new work processes the
operators have learnt, the less new work processes is left for learning, leaving less
potential for further learning to take place. Thus, the learning of new work processes
will be reduced. Besides these two examples, there are other feedback loops.
Identifying these feedback loops is a key to understand the mechanism of the
operation transition.
The fundamental perspective of system dynamics is that the behavior of complex
systems over time is caused by the interrelationships among system components and
feedback loops within the system (Sterman 2000 p. 12). There are two types of loops,
namely reinforcing loop and balancing loop. Details are summarized in the table
below:
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Table 3-2 Reinforcing loop and balancing loop













Definition Trace the effect of a small
change in one of the variables
as it propagates around the
loop. If the feedback effect
reinforces the original change,
one has a reinforcing loop
(Sterman 2000 p. 144).
Trace the effect of a small
change in one of the variables as
it propagates around the loop. If
the feedback effect opposes the
original change, one has a
balancing loop.





These two types of feedback loops can be well understood for themselves. However, a
system may have many feedback loops, and their overall impact is often difficult to
predict with the unaided mind. The system dynamics model captures all the feedback
loops related to the problem under investigation, which helps to understand how the
system’s behavior arises from the interaction of these networks of feedback loops
(Sterman 2000).
3.1.4 Structural characteristics: Nonlinearity
In social organizational systems, nonlinearity is often observed. There are two types
of nonlinearity: the nonlinear effect of one variable on another variable and the
nonlinear interaction between variables.
Effects are often disproportional to causes under which they happen. For example,
when a new work process is implemented, learning takes place. The rate of learning is
not linear. It is greatest at first when “ignorance” is greatest; it decreases as ignorance
decreases. When most parts of the new work process have been learned, and there is
little left to learn, the learning rate approaches zero. This type of nonlinearities has
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been recognized for centuries; however, they are not widely used in models because
precise quantitative data for nonlinear functions do not always exist. Such non-linear
functions are mostly simplified as linear function by, for example, regression method.
Such simplification might work for research with short-term perspective. However, to
investigate the long-term development of a problem, such simplification might cause
problems.
In system dynamics models empirical nonlinear relations are mostly captured using
table functions, where the relationship is specified as a table of values for the
independent and dependent variables.
Table for effect of X on Y = ( ,1X 1Y ), ( ,2X 2Y ), … , ( ,nX nY )
There are ways to make the estimation of nonlinear relationship realistic and robust.
For example, identify reference points, check the extreme condition, specify the
domain for the independent variable, and discover the plausible shapes for the
function (Sterman 2000 p. 554-559).
The appropriate shapes and values for nonlinear functions draw on all available
information, both qualitative and quantitative. The information can be gleaned from
various sources, including statistical studies, fieldwork, interviews, considerations of
extreme conditions, and physical laws. The nonlinear relationship could also be tested
through sensitivity tests.
The other form of nonlinearity encompasses the non-linear interaction between
variables. For example, multiplication: C = A * B (see Figure 3-5). C is the
multiplication between two variables, A and B, where one of them, A, typically
originates from a part of a system (A-D-E) while B originates from a different system
(B-F-G). The implication is that the value of one variable, B, determines the impact
that the other, A, has (on C). Thus the value of C is an interaction of the subsystems
that gives to the values of A and B, respectively, - they synthesize in the production of






Figure 3-5 Subsystems interact through nonlinearity
For example, the incident cost is calculated as the product of frequency of incidents
and severity of incidents. Frequency of incidents is mainly affected by the operation
transition, which determines how vulnerable the system is; while the severity of
incidents is mainly affected by the incident response capability, which determines
how incidents are handled. Thus, the behavior of incident cost is the result of an
interaction of the subsystems that generate the values of frequency of incidents and
severity of incidents. Because the frequency of incidents and severity of incidents
change through different mechanisms, the cost of incidents shows non-linear
behavior.
A system dynamics model usually contains many feedback loops. Variables
belonging to different feedback loops can interact with each other. In this way, system
dynamics models are able to capture the non-linear interactions between variables.
3.1.5 Behavioral characteristic: Counterintuitive
Two structural reasons cause counterintuitive behavior. One is the existence of
non-linear relationships. Our intuitive thinking is related to linear relationship, where
effects are proportional to causes. For example, typically, people think that if the
operators use more time for production, the throughput will increase proportionally.
This is true in the cases where productivity is constant, such as production on
assembly line. The longer the operators work, the more products they produce.
However, during operation transition, the productivity is changing. Throughput is not
linearly related to the time for production. Throughput = time for production *
productivity. Productivity is determined by the subsystems of operation transition.
More time for production means less time available to learn new work processes and
knowledge. Without enough knowledge to operate the new work processes, operators
C=A * B
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cannot fully realize the benefit of the new technology. The long-term productivity will
be lower. Therefore, more time for production might cause less output in the long run.
The other structural reason that causes counterintuitive behavior is delay. Because of
the time delay, the real cause could be distant in time to the effect. Our intuitive
thinking is that efforts follow causes closely in time. For example, we often believe
that if investment is made to increase incident response capability, the incident
response capability will increase very soon and the severity of incidents will decrease
as more incident response capability in place. However, the building of incident
response capability takes time. As our analysis in section 3.2.2 shows, with
information delays in changing the perception of risks and material delays in actually
building up incident response capability, the adjustment of incident response
capability is far slower than immediate. During this delay time, management might
feel that their investment in incident response capability is not enough as the incidents
are still not timely handled, and thus, make more investment. This leads to
overinvestment in incident response capability. On the contrary, management might
feel their investment in incident response capability is not worthwhile because the
expected outcome has not been achieved. They might stop the investment. A right
policy might be suspended because the (intuitively) expected result has not been
achieved.
Without the understanding of the counterintuitive characteristics of a complex system,
policies based on naïve intuition (current experience, limited insight) often fail or
actually worsen the situation. This property of complex systems is known as policy
resistance. “All too often, well-intentioned efforts to solve pressing problems create
unanticipated side effects” (Sterman 2001 p. 3). System dynamics models capture the
non-proportional responses and responses that change over time as a consequence of
the state of the system itself. Using system dynamics models, we are able to reproduce
the counterintuitive behavior and investigate the reasons for them. This helps us to
form long-term sustainable policies.
3.1.6 Behavior characteristic: Trade-offs
The reason for the need of making trade-offs is mainly because the limited availability
of resources. In a highly competitive world, enterprises seek tight cost control.
Adding resources to one function, for example, production, probably means cutting
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resources in other functions, for example, training. The improvement of performance
in one function is at the expense of the performance drop (or less performance
increase) in other functions. An optimal resource allocation is a common pursuit of
most management.
The consequence of resource allocation decision might differ for short-term and
long-term because of delays in the system. The operators spending more time for
production will generate more output immediately. However, due to less time
available to develop knowledge, in the long run, productivity will not be as high as in
the scenario of having more time for learning. On the contrary, allocating more
resources to training could lead to immediate throughput drop. But in the long run,
productivity will be higher and so will the production throughput.
3.1.7 Other characteristics: Long-term perspective
Different time horizons dramatically influence the perception of the problem (Sterman
2000 p. 91). In this research, we are not assessing information security risks over a
short period of time, for example, the next quarter or next year, in which case,
traditional risk assessment method might be more suitable. Instead, we are concerned
with the changes in information security risks over the entire transition period, that is,
a 10-year time period. We are addressing policies that have long-term effects, such as
how to allocate resources, or how to choose a proper transition speed. Because we are
working with a long time perspective, we will need to include in our analysis
relationships that span over long periods of time, i.e. carry effects through the system
relatively slowly and that impact the system through feedbacks in the long run. In a
short-term perspective, these relationships could be ignored. This long-term
perspective contributes significantly to define the system we work with, its boundaries
and appropriate method to be used. System dynamics, capturing the mechanisms
(feedback, delay, nonlinearity) of how the states of the systems change over time, is
thus a proper method for this study.
3.1.8 Other characteristics: Multidisciplinary
Consider the managers who are concerned with planning and decision making in
matters of information security during the operation transition. To design policies and
strategies, they must use disciplines as varied as computer networks, wireless
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technology, information technology, cryptography, software, hardware, organization
science, psychology, and law (Gonzalez et al. 2005). Competence in technology or
any single discipline is insufficient for forming a high-leverage policy. The
information security problem involves the interaction of technology, organization, and
human behavior during the dynamic complex transition process. An integrated
(comprehensive) understanding of the problem should constitute the basis for decision
making. System dynamics has been used to investigate problems in various areas:
business strategy, urbane planning, environmental studies, and etc. A system
dynamics model is built on the causal structure of a problem. All the factors that are
important to the problem will be included in the model. The model combines the
knowledge of different disciplines. Therefore, system dynamics models can be used to
address multidisciplinary problems.
3.1.9 Other characteristics: Lack of historical data
Reliable, empirical data is required in order to investigate a problem. Such data
advance our understanding of the problem and serve as reference for our research
effort. However, in the information security area, we seldom find relevant data:
“Unfortunately, relevant data on cyber-threats does not always exist, nor is
existent data available, nor is available data without error or bias” (Rich et al.
2005).
Three reasons explain data shortage, reflecting a shortage of information for
information security incidents (Andersen et al. 2004).
First, successful information attacks depend, to some degree, on deception and
surprise. Thus, attackers must conceal as much information as possible on their
attacks in order to preserve the utility of their methods (Lipson 2002).
Second, defenders of information assets are often overburdened. They are not
motivated to do large-scale data collection activities. Data are generally
collected only if they are useful for a specific defensive task, for forensic
purposes, or for documenting relevant damage for legal proceedings.
Third, data on attacks may be withheld owing to concerns over publicity,
reputation, or worries about copycat activities.
Beyond the fact that scarce data exist for information security, in this case we are
concerned with the operation transition, where time series data on the past cannot be
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reference for future. What is more readily available is information on structure or
information on what assumptions can reasonably be made about the underlying
structure of the system at hand. This allows us to obtain a fundamental (structurally
founded) understanding of the problem we face and will constitute the predominant
information basis for this thesis.
System dynamics utilizes qualitative data to a great extent during the modeling
process. It is the structure information that system dynamics models are based on.
Below we will explain how qualitative information is used in different stages of
model building based on the research from (Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003).
The modeling processes can be grouped into four stages: model conceptualization,
model formulation, model testing, and implementation.
Table 3-1 Modeling process
Stages Qualitative data used
Model
Conceptualization
Qualitative information are used to understand the system and the
problem
Reference mode could be qualitative
Model
Formulation
Soft variable, non-linear relationship are formed based on
qualitative information
Some parameters are estimated based on qualitative information
Model Testing Direct structure validation is qualitative.
The evaluation of the model is qualitative
Implementation Policy formulation is sometimes qualitative
During the model conceptualization stage, the modeler focuses on understanding a
part of the real world where the problem is embedded. This is a highly qualitative
process. Interviews, oral histories, and focus group discussions are potential
techniques to be used. Sometimes, behaviors over time (reference modes) come in a
quantitative form. However, it is more likely that reference modes are in qualitative
forms. For example, the management might know that one variable will increase over
the next several years but they cannot be sure about how much exactly the amount
will be.
The model formulation stage is concerned with the mathematical representations of
the model, which requires more numerical data. In cases where exact numerical data
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do not exist, such as in soft variables4 and in some nonlinear relationships, the
measurement scale or table functions are built based on qualitative data. Some
scientific researchers omit soft variables and simplify nonlinearities into linear
functions because they feel unsettled with qualitative data. Yet, Sterman pointed out,
“Omitting structures or variables known to be important because numerical data are
unavailable is actually less scientific and less accurate than using your best judgment
to estimate their values” (Sterman 2002 p. 523).
Model testing can be categorized into direct structure tests, structure-oriented
behavior tests, and behavior pattern tests (Barlas 1996). Behavior pattern tests require
numerical data and use formal/statistics tools. Such tests are more appealing to the
general audience. However, experts in system dynamics have pointed out that
behavior pattern tests cannot separate spurious behavior accuracy (i.e., “right behavior
for the wrong reasons”) from true behavior validity. Therefore, the most important
tests are direct structure tests that assess if the model structure is consistent with the
real world. Such tests are highly qualitative in nature. “In most instances, the structure
verification test is first conducted on the basis of the model builder’s personal
knowledge and is then extended to include criticisms by others with direct experience
from the real system” (Forrester and Senge 1980 p. 416).
Finally, the last step in the modeling process is implementation, which deals with
policy design and evaluation. This is a qualitative process that requires discussion
more than changing parameter values. Policy design includes the creation of entirely
new strategies, structures, and decision rules.
Overall, system dynamics models largely depend on qualitative data, especially
during model conceptualization. Information from people’s mind (mental database) is
the largest source for model conceptualization in most cases. Early on, experts in
system dynamics have noticed the importance to use the qualitative information in
people’s mind and in written documents: not only because numerical data are scare
and cannot cover the related areas, but also because numerical data are more about
system behavior while qualitative data are more about system structure and policies.
4 Compared to hard variables that can be measured with little error, soft variables are those that involve greater
measurement errors or great measurement difficulties. For example, intelligence, happiness, satisfaction, and
morale are all soft variables.
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Figure 3-6 Mental, written, and numerical database
Source: (Forrester 1992)
During the model formulation, quantitative data play a more important role. However,
even with limited numerical data, there are ways to make estimation based on
qualitative data. Such estimation could be based on qualitative information from
written database or mental database. Sensitive tests could be used to test the reliability
of these estimated data. With the correct causal structure of the system, a system
dynamics model can be simulated based on estimated data and through behavior and
feedback analysis, one gets insights about the reasons behind the behaviors. Such
insights can help to form high-leverage policies. That is the reason why system
dynamics method still can be useful even if quantitative data are in scarce.
Moreover, experts in system dynamics have developed ways to use model-based
intervention to elicit data (both qualitative and quantitative) from clients. One
example is group model-building. It focuses on building system dynamics models
with teams to obtain information, enhance team learning and to foster consensus
(Vennix 1996; Vennix 1999; Vennix, Andersen, and Richardson 1997; Richardson,
Andersen, and Luna-Reyes 2005; Richardson and Andersen 1995; Andersen and
Richardson 1997; Andersen, Richardson, and Vennix 1997). Since we face severe
data shortage in the information security area, we apply model-based interventions for
model building and model validation. Below, we introduce the design of this research.
“As suggested by the figure, the amount of
available information declines, probably by many
orders of magnitude, in going from mental to
written information and again by another similar
large factor in going from written to numerical
information. Furthermore, the character of
information content changes as one moves from
mental to written to numerical information. In
moving down the diagram, there is a progressively
smaller proportion of information about structure
and policies.” (Forrester 1992 p. 72)
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3.2 Research Design
In this research, a system dynamics model is used to represent hypotheses regarding
the structural origin of the information security problem the client faces. The client is
involved in the model-building process as an expert on the problem and it is primarily
the client’s understanding of the problem that the model is intended to portray. For
that purpose, the model is used as a vehicle to elicit the client’s expert knowledge
(expertise), - so called model-based knowledge elicitation. The model not only
constitutes a knowledge repository. When subject to simulation it may be used to feed
the behavioral consequences of the structural assumptions, represented in the model,
back to the client. This process calls for a response from the client in the form of a
behavior recognition. A failure to recognize the simulation results is part of a model
validation process whereby the model must be modified until the client acknowledges
the model and its behavior as a representation of its problem understanding and, thus,
takes ownership of the model.
The process of this research will run iteratively. A series increasingly detailed model
will be developed in stages. Each stage, model-based intervention will be conducted.
With the elicited knowledge from the intervention, we will further develop the model.
We will use the client as a resource of model improvement. The further stages we
reach, the less changes of model behavior there will be—despite the fact that we will
add new variables, new sectors and better data to the model. In such an iterative way,
we prove the validity/robustness of the model. Below, we present the detail research
plan.
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Figure 3-7 Research plan
The first system dynamics group model-building workshop articulates the dynamic
problem that is to be addressed. “For a model to be useful, it must address a specific
problem and must simplify rather than attempt to mirror an entire system in detail”
(Sterman 2000 p. 89). In this process, the modeler seeks answers for questions such as,
“What is the real problem, not just the symptom of difficulty?” or “What is the
purpose of the model?” This is the most important step in the model-building process.
The second system dynamics group model-building workshop identifies the dynamic
hypotheses. Dynamic hypotheses are working theories of how the problem arises.
This means that the dynamic problem is explained with an endogenous view, that is, a
feedback structure. Based on the dynamic hypotheses, a conceptual model is formed.
A series of model-based meetings are arranged to improve the model. In these
meetings, we first present the structure of the model developed and its simulation
results. This serves as a base for discussion. The client raises questions/comments
about model structure and behavior. Some of them can be addressed immediately and
our explanation helps the client to better understand the model structure and behavior.
Some questions/comments point to additional structure for model development in the


























comments. When the model reaches to the next stage, another model-based meeting
will be held. The client’s recognition of the model structure and behavior is one of the
model validation procedures.
When the model is completed (reaching its boundary and no further development
required), we perform standard model validation procedures. The direct structure tests
and structure-oriented behavior tests are performed by the modeler. Due to the lack of
historical time series data, standard behavior tests are not applicable in the case. We
use interviews with experts as an alternative for model behavior tests. During the
interviews, the model behaviors of different scenarios are shown to the experts.
Recognition of the model behaviors adds confidence to the model, while failure to
recognize simulation result must lead to model modification.
Given all the model-based interventions and model development, policies to mitigate
information security during the transition to Integrated Operations are proposed. We
use model simulation to compare the long-term effect of different policies. By
analyzing these simulation results, we conclude the policies to reduce information
security risks during the operation transition.
3.3 Closing remarks for chapter 3
Davis, Eisenhardt, et al. pointed out, “Simulation is particularly useful when the
theoretical focus is longitudinal, nonlinear, or processual, or when empirical data are
challenging to obtain” (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2007). The case under this
study fits such profile. Information security risks issue arising during operation
transition is a problem characterized by accumulation processes (causing the
dynamics of the problem), associated delays causing the development to unfold at
various rates, and a variety of nonlinearly interacting feedback loops. The result is a
development over time that typically defies intuition and that includes trade-offs. This
problem is multidisciplinary, - technical as well as social (organizationally) and calls
for an integrated approach. Also it extends over a long time period and is therefore
comprehensive (encompasses a multitude of long-term feedback processes). Finally,
the problem domain is characterized by a scarcity of empirical time series and must be
investigated from a fundamental perspective, based on a structural understanding of
the system.
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Because of the characteristics of the problem, we choose to use system dynamics as a
research method. System dynamics is a method designed to cope with a dynamic
system, which could capture the structural characteristics of feedback, delay,
nonlinearity, and thus able to reproduce the behavior characteristics of
counterintuitiveness and trade-offs. System dynamics is an interdisciplinary approach
that offers a holistic view of the problem and with a long-term perspective. Moreover,
it is able to deal with the data scarcity problem through model-based intervention with
client.
We use system dynamics model-based intervention for the research to: 1) gather
information from the client for model building; and 2) convey model insights to the
client. The iterative process of model development and model-based intervention
helps elicit more and better data. Such process also enhances learning, fosters
consensus, and creates commitment (Qian and Gonzalez 2006).
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4 Group model-building workshops:
models and data
The design of this research is an iterative process of mode-based intervention and
model development. At the beginning of this research project, two sequencing group
model-building workshops were conducted to articulate problem and conceptualize
model. We record the activities and outcomes of these two workshops in detail in this
chapter.
The reasons for recording these two workshops in detail are two-fold. First, problem
identification and model conceptualization are two key steps during the model
building process. As the purpose of the model is to address the client’s problem, a
clear problem definition is the base for model building. The model should only
include the aspects that relevant to the problem. Model conceptualization forms basic
dynamic hypotheses of the problem, which will be the base for model structure. The
client is the one who knows the problem best. It is primarily the client’s
understanding of the problem that the model is intended to portray. Second, as we
have discussed in chapter 3, few data on information security incidents are available
and relevant to this research. As a result, we use group model-building workshops to
elicit information (both qualitative and quantitative information) from our client. Thus,
it is important to document the two group model-building workshops, illustrating
what data we obtained, how the problem was identified and how the model was
conceptualized.
4.1 Introduction to system dynamics group
model-building workshops
Almost since the inception of system dynamics, researchers in this area have involved
the client in the model-building process. In his first book on system dynamics,
Forrester pointed out the need to access the mental database of managers to be able to
construct system dynamics models of strategic problems in business (Forrester 1961).
Vennix summarized three reasons for client participation (Vennix 1996): first, to
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capture the required knowledge in the mental models of the client group; second, to
increase the chances of implementation of model results; and finally, to enhance the
client's learning process.
The concept of system dynamics group model-building emerged in 1980s, in two
different places at almost the same time. In the Netherlands, Vennix and Gubbels
started experimenting with the process of model construction that involved client
group. In a series of projects, several ways of working with client group emerged.
Meanwhile, in the United States, Richardson in University at Albany, State University
of New York (SUNY) worked with the Decision Techtronics Group to produce the
first case of what we now call group model-building (Andersen et al. 2007).
Since then, system dynamics group model-building has made considerable progress. It
has diffused from its origins in public sector to become a consulting practice used in
private, public, and not-for-profit organizations (Richardson, Andersen, and
Luna-Reyes 2005). Building models directly with client groups has become
increasingly common in the field of system dynamics.
The system dynamics group model-building practice has involved a cycle of
theoretical reflection, practice with client, and continuing updating of the method.
These efforts led to a more detailed description of the different roles in working with
teams (Richardson and Andersen 1995) and the notion of scripts for group
model-building, i.e., refined pieces of small group processes, which chained together,
direct the stream of group activity in group model-building sessions (Andersen and
Richardson 1997; Andersen et al. 1997). The five different roles in group
model-building facilitation are summarized in Table 4-1. For detailed information, see
Richardson and Andersen (1995).
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Table 4-1 Five different roles in group model building





Pays constant attention to group
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Helps frame the problem,
identifies the appropriate
participants, works with the
modeling support team to
structure the sessions, and
participates as a member of the
group






The facilitator and the modeler should be seasoned system dynamists. The recorder
should have enough knowledge about system dynamics so that he/she knows what to
record. The process coach does not necessary know system dynamics. Some of these
five roles may be combined, or distributed among the consultants and the clients in a
group model building project. But experience show that all five roles or functions
must be present for effective group support.
The different group activities in group model-building could be categorized into four
types of exercises. These exercises are summarized in Table 4-2. For more detailed
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information about these activities, see Andersen and Richardson (1997).
Table 4-2 Group model-building exercises
Depending on the purpose of the group model-building workshop, various activities
are undertaken. The schedule of the group model-building workshop is typically
planned out in 15 minute blocks, with the task and group technology specified in
overview and detail.
Assigning the five different roles to skilled persons and planning the schedule
carefully provides a more effective group process. However, executing a group
model-building workshop is like a football coach executing a game plan: after
compulsively detailed advance planning, there is always room for improvisation. The
facilitation skills are of great importance. Therefore, experienced experts from SUNY
Albany were invited as the facilitation team for the two group model-building
workshops we conducted in our project. Below, we will report on them.
4.2 First AMBASEC group model-building workshop
The first AMBASEC group model-building workshop was held on May 25 and 26,




Individuals or small subgroups
generating lists of ideas or
concepts
To obtain as many ideas as
possible from participants, such as
reference modes, policies, etc.
Convergent
tasks
Members work together as a
plenary group or as the need
arises; they work in big
subgroups first and then report to
the plenary afterwards
To form a consensual view





Each member is given a fixed
number of votes to cast in favor
of ideas, concepts, and tasks
To identify the important ideas
Presentation The modeler/reflector presents
and the clients sit and listen
To reflect on the achieved work
and recap the dynamic insights
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information security risks during the operation transition. But the problem had not
been clearly stated. Thus, we decided that the first AMBASEC group model-building
workshop should be devoted to gathering information and articulating the problem.
The AMBASEC team, together with the Albany team, designed the agenda for the
workshop, which included divergent and convergent exercises, ranking and evaluation
exercises, as well as presentation exercises, all of which were carefully sequenced to
make best use of the allotted two days so as to achieve the purpose of the workshop.
4.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of the first AMBASEC group model-building workshop was to articulate
the client’s problem. The main expected outcomes of the first group model-building
workshop were to answer questions such as “What is the problem?”, “What is the
structure of the system causing the problem?” and to elicit both qualitative and
quantitative information for further model development.
4.2.2 Participants
Fourteen persons from different parties, with different roles, participated in this
workshop.
Client group:
Hydro: Trond Lilleng (leader of the Integrated Operations project)
IRMA: Odd-Helge Longva, Stig O. Johnsen, and Maria B. Dahl (researchers in
information security)
AMBASEC: Jose J. Gonzalez, Agata Sawicka, and Johannes Wiik (researchers in
information security)
Facilitation group:
AMBASEC: Ying Qian (modeler), Stefanie Hillen, and Magne Myrtveit (process
coach), Maren Assev (secretary)
Albany: David Andersen (facilitator), George Richardson (modeler), and Eliot
Rich (recorder)
Trond Lilleng from Hydro, three experts from the IRMA team and three experts from
the AMBASEC project jointly served as client group in the workshop. The Albany
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team and four experts from the AMBASEC project jointly served as facilitation
group.
Only one person from Hydro (the leader of the Integrated Operations project) attended
the first group model-building workshop. The plan was to have four to five people
from Hydro. However, at a very short notice, Hydro informed us that not all of them
could attend, owing to extremely high work pressure. The IRMA team has been
working with Hydro for more than half a year on incident response management.
They have accumulated information about the operation transition and information
security issues in Hydro. The three experts from AMBASEC had extensive research
in information security. Before the workshop, the purpose of this workshop had been
clarified to the experts from IRMA and AMBASEC.
To prevent confusing the terms “client”, which refers to Hydro, with “client group”,
which refers to the group of experts both from Hydro and from research institutes
participating in the model-building workshop, we use the term “group members” or
simply “members” to refer to the “client group.”
4.2.3 Exercises and data obtained
In this part, we introduce the exercises we did in the first group model-building
workshop and the data we obtained from the exercises. We also provide an analysis
on the process of exercises and/or on the data we obtained.
Exercise 1: Presentation—General introduction about the projects
At the beginning of the workshop, representatives from AMBASEC, IRMA, and
Hydro spent several minutes each to briefly introduce their project. The presenters
were encouraged to classify their project goals, research methods and design, and
other related information.
Analysis: This introduction exercise was scheduled at the beginning of the workshop
to establish a common understanding of the interests and roles of the different parties
in the workshop.
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From the presentation, we obtained an overall view of the transition to Integrated
Operations: how the traditional operation was on the offshore platform, how the
Integrated Operations will be, the benefit of utilizing new technology and the
concerns for operation transition.
Exercise 2: Hopes and fears
“Hopes” and “fears” are expectations that participants have about the workshop. This
is a divergent exercise: the group members were given pieces of paper to write simple
phrases to express their hopes and fears (one on each piece of paper). The members
were invited to write as many “hopes” and “fears” as they could think of. Then the
pieces of papers were collected using the Nominal Group Technique—moving from
one person to another and collecting one idea at a time. The collection continued for
as many rounds as needed until all ideas are collected. The pieces of paper gathered
were clustered on the wall, with similar ideas near one another.
Analysis: This exercise helps in three aspects. First, it is a group-forming exercise,
allowing the group members to work and interact as a group. Second, it is important
to know the “hopes” and “fears” of the members at the start point. Some hopes and
fears concerned the rationale of the research project itself, providing clues on the
possible future direction of the research. For example, there was a “hope” to “get a
few really dynamically interesting cases” and a “fear” to “come up with artificial
cases”. This showed concerns over the case, whether it was real and whether it was
dynamically interesting. Some “hopes” and “fears” concerned the workshop process
itself. For example, one “fear” was “too little time to be successful” (related to the
workshop). For these, the facilitator would pay attention to. Third, “hopes” and
“fears” could serve as checkpoints. At the end of the day or at the end of the
workshop, the facilitator could return to this list to measure the progress of the
workshop against the original goals.
Exercise 3: Stakeholder mapping
Using a divergent exercise again, more than 40 stakeholders were identified. The
pieces of paper were clustered on the wall according to the stakeholder’s influence
and interest on the problem. The X axis and Y axis represents how much interest and
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influence these stakeholders have on the problem, respectively. The
high-influence/high-interest stakeholders, located at the upper right-hand corner of the
X-Y frame, are the stakeholders we need to keep in close contact with during this
project.
Figure 4-1 Stakeholder mapping
Source: OLF-IRMA-AMBASEC Group Model-Building Technical Report I May
2005 (Rich, Andersen, and Richardson 2005)
Then, a ranking exercise was conducted. The members were given five dots each, and
were asked to place them on those whom they would like to invite for the next
workshop. The stakeholders that got most dots were: the incident response team (6),
control room manager and the operator (5), the operator in the onshore support center
(4), chief information security officer (3), and management crisis team (3).
Analysis: The stakeholders who received most of the dots were located in the
upper-right corner. It supported our assumption that they were the persons we needed
to keep in contact with during our project. In the second workshop, the platform chief,
the chief information security officer, and the person responsible for the transition to
Integrated Operations, all attended. There was no crisis management team or incident
response team on the Brage platform. Such function only exists onshore. The
researchers in the IRMA team were investigating the issues of incident response
management for the Brage platform. Therefore, they could be regarded as
representatives for the incident response team on Brage. Stakeholders identified as
having a high-influence and high-interest on the problem attended the second
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workshop, which signified that we had the most relevant people for the second
workshop.
Exercise 4: Behavior over time
Using another divergent exercise, nearly 40 variables and their behavior over time
were identified.
Figure 4-2 Variables behavior on a time graph
Source: OLF-IRMA-AMBASEC Group Model-Building Technical Report I May 2005 (Rich,
Andersen, and Richardson p.9)
Figure 4-2 is a general overview of the results on the wall. The variables identified are
listed in Table 4-3. We do not discuss all the variables here, but only analyze those
that are important for future model building.
Table 4-3 Key variables and their behaviors over time
Power of attack tools Intrusions
Required attacker know-how Number of known vulnerabilities in the software
Migration to virtual organizations Migration to integrated operations
New technology and work processes Integration of ICT systems
Migration to integrated operations Net benefit
Number of incidents / per network Focus on information security in organizations
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Unsecured hosts Incidents vs. openness and learning
Number of incidents Average severity of incidents
Work load of CSIRTS Complexity of IT systems
CSIRT workload and its ability to respond
effectively
Danger of Internet break-down
Number of PCs connected to the Internet Number of e-mails sent
Involved stakeholders s in e-operations Government regulations on security
CRO’s compliance with security rules Knowledge gap
Interest/influence of the general public and media
economic actors
Organization’s average knowledge about the ICT
system
Density of vulnerability situational awareness Dependency of IT systems
CRO’s perceived risk Unintended human errors
Number of known vulnerabilities in software Density of vulnerability
Learning and forgetting Safety and security culture
Handoff awareness Threats
Analysis: Several variables describe the process of transition to Integrated Operations.
Figure 4-3 Variables related to the process of transition to Integrated Operations
The unit of the curves of 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, and 1F is either the percentage of operation
transition completed (as articulated in 1B) or the actual amount of new work
processes implemented. Regarding the shape of the curve, 1A is almost linear, similar
in shape with that presented on 1D. The difference of 1A and 1D lies in that 1D starts
from 0 at time earlier than 2005 and in years after 2015 1D showed a slightly




2005 and 2015. 1F shows a curve with increasing growth rate, starting in 2005. When
the operation transition ends in 2015, the curve becomes a horizontal line. 1B is an
S-shaped curve from 2005 to 2015. 1C shows an S-shaped curve similar to that of 1B.
At the same time, 1C also shows the idea that technology advancement was faster
than work process change. All these graphs show that the group members had
consensus on the time period of operation transition, that is, from 2005 to 2015. They
generally agree that the transition would start slowly, and then would speed up. Three
of them (1B, 1C, 1F) mentioned that the transition speed will be reduced towards the
end. 1E showed that in the first several years, the net benefit of Integrated Operations
is negative, while, in later years, the net benefit of Integrated Operations becomes
positive.
The following are variables on knowledge and vulnerability.
Figure 4-4 Variables related to knowledge and vulnerability
2A says that the organization’s average knowledge about ICT system will first drop
and then increase. This is because that the operation transition brings in new ICT
system that the operators do not know about. The knowledge about the new ICT
system will be acquired over time. 2B says that unintended human error increases in
the past; after 2005, there is hope that it could decrease, and at the same time, there is
fear that it could continue to increase. 2C shows that the density of vulnerability
started to increase after 2005, only to decrease sometime later. The pattern is related
to that of 1A. When the average knowledge of ICT is low, the density of vulnerability
will be high; and when the average knowledge increases, the density of vulnerability





required increases faster than the competence (knowledge) the operators acquire. As a
result, although the operators are gaining more competence, the knowledge gap
actually grows larger. Graphs 2E and 2F illustrate the vulnerabilities in software, both
showing an increasing pattern.
The following are variables related to incidents.
Figure 4-5 Variables related to incidents
3A and 3C show that the number of incidents and intrusions will grow with increasing
speed. 3B shows that the unsecured hosts will grow in an S-shape. 3D shows an
increased focus on information security in organizations, especially oil companies. 3E
and 3F both expresses the view that the number of incidents would increase and then
decrease. 3F also shows the reason for the decrease, which is openness and learning.
If people could openly discuss incidents and learn from them, the number of incidents
would decrease. We found that what 3A suggests is different from what 3E and 3F
suggests. One possible reason could be that the definition of “incident” for 3A is not
the same as that for 3E and 3F. 3A defines it as similar to threats or intrusions, which
might become incidents and might not. Threats will always increase as more people
are using computers and Internet and the tools for attacks advances, while with proper
protection, incidents might be reduced, as shown in 3E and 3F.
This exercise provided information important to our understanding of the transition to
Integrated Operations, as well as the change in average knowledge, vulnerability, and
incidents during the operation transition. Some graphs served as the reference modes




example, learning and forgetting develops over a time scale of several weeks. This
research focused on the process of operation transition that would take place in a
10-year period, and these short-term dynamics should, therefore, not be included.
Government regulations, and human compliance were not the focus of this research.
During the exercise, group members sometimes came up with the same variable but
with different behaviors over time. It could be that the same-named variables refer to
different concepts. It could also be that different ideas about the time trajectory
(behavior) of this variable existed. There were discussions about the behavior and
definition of such variables. Identifying the disagreements, presenting different views
from different members, and reaching a consensus through discussions altogether
comprise a learning process. Even if consensus was not reached during the workshop,
the discussion still pointed out where disagreements exist and where further research
effort would be needed.
Exercise 5: Policy mapping
Using another divergent exercise, the group members identified more than 30 policies,
which were clustered on the wall.
Then a ranking exercise was conducted. The highest-ranking policies identified were
monitor/measure risk change (auditing) (4), create formal CSIRTS (4), improve
incident reporting (4), annual awareness champions measures on security culture (3),
and higher level of security (3).
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Figure 4-6 Policy lever mapping
Source: OLF-IRMA-AMBASEC Group Model-Building Technical Report I May
2005 (Rich, Andersen, and Richardson 2005 p.17)
Analysis: The group members came up with more than 30 policy statements. Some
policies were technology solutions, such as “Invest in survivability solutions,” “Build
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) to systematically gather information,” “Perform
HazOp of the e-operation (Integrated Operations) solution of 2010,” and “a warning
system for the communication network.” However, most policies were related to
human and organizational issues. Two policies were related to training: “Training to
close knowledge gap” and “Continuous training.” This implied that knowledge
building during the operation transition might not be sufficient for the operators to
work effectively. Three policies were related to the incident response team: “Create
formal CSIRTS,” “Establish CSRS,” and “Increase CSIRTS authority”, which pointed
out the need to establish a formal incident response team on the platform. It indicated
the worry that the current incident response capability might not be sufficient to
handle increasing incidents. Some of the above policies are tested using our model,
which is documented in Chapter 8.
Not all proposed policies are the focus of this research. Two policies for risk
assessment “Risk assessment in change processes (continuously)” and
“Monitor/Measure Risk Change (Auditing)” were the research focus of the IRMA
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team. Several policies were directed at incidents reporting: “Improve incident
reporting,” “Increase the amount of incident reports from IRT & CEO,” “Be open
about security incidents,” and “Establish a common system for incident report
management.” This implied that incident reporting was not satisfactory. We
confirmed this weakness during later communication with Hydro and IRMA.
However, incident reporting is not the focus of this study. Another member of our
research cell, Finn Olav Sveen, devoted his PhD work on incident reporting.
Exercise 6: Dynamic stories
After several divergent exercises, a convergent exercise was conducted. The members
were divided in two groups. Each group was asked to pick several pieces of paper
from previous divergent exercises “stakeholders”, “behavior over time”, and
“policies” to form a picture on how the operation transition develops. The story
should have two versions—one “base run” without policy intervention and the “policy
run” with policy intervention.
After intensive discussions, each group developed one dynamic story (two versions).
The outline of the dynamic stories was written on a large piece of paper and was stuck
on the wall, together with the associated stakeholders, behavior over time, and
policies. A representative of each group presented the story to the plenary group.
The two stories developed were “Virus exposure in a virtual organization” and
“Suppliers as Trojan Horses.” Both of these dynamic stories will be presented below.
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Dynamics Story 1—Virus Exposure in a Virtual Organization
Figure 4-7 Dynamic story 1—Virus Exposure in a Virtual Organization
Base Run:
A new technology is introduced, followed by organizational changes. The change
creates a knowledge gap, leading to increased vulnerabilities and low situational
awareness, which might lead to severe incidents.
Policy Run:
A new technology is introduced, with organizational changes following suit. The
change creates a knowledge gap, leading to increased vulnerabilities and low
situational awareness. Investing in awareness raising and continuous training reduces
the knowledge gap and increases situational awareness, which in turn reduces the
probability of the occurrence of incidents. Nevertheless, when incidents do happen,
the knowledge, as well as the formal CSIRT, helps resolve incidents quickly.
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Dynamic Story 2—Suppliers as Trojan Horses
Figure 4-8 Dynamic story 2—Suppliers as Trojan Horses
Base Run:
An organization becomes increasingly vulnerable as it migrates to virtual operation.
Suppliers and other stakeholders pose a risk if procedures in the control room are lax
or if available technology is underutilized. The occasional virus, Trojan horses, and
spyware lead to a temporary increase in perceived risk and compliance. Moreover,
this perception is soon forgotten due to unmindful and inappropriate incident
reporting. Over time, the knowledge gap increases, and the organization becomes
more vulnerable.
Policy Run:
Vulnerability detection, increased reporting and analysis would make the system less
vulnerable. Common security requirements reduce exposure to suppliers in the form
of imported threats. Less human error and compliance erosion lead to fewer viruses
and minimal damage.
Analysis: Both stories were derived from real incidents that had happened on the
Brage platform. The key message conveyed in the two stories was the same, that is,
the organization becomes increasingly vulnerable because the operation transition
brings new technology and generates knowledge gap. As a result, a common
understanding of the problem emerged.
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Exercise 7: Modeler’s reflection
The modelers delivered a presentation to the plenary group to reflect on the
information gathered from the group members. The presentation was supported by a
series of diagrams in overhead transparencies. The diagrams were developed in
different layers, using different transparencies and different colors. The transparencies
were placed sequentially one over the other on an overhead projector, to illustrate the
accompanying explanation.
The first presentation reflected on the information about Integrated Operations: the
inner blue circle represents the traditional operation, where offshore controls the
operation and has the data to itself; the outside red circle says that as the oil
production depletes and unit cost increases, there are pressure to move to Integrated
Operations and investment is made; this leads to the green lines and variables where
data are shared to onshore control room and operation control become remote.
Figure 4-9 Illustration of operation transition
Then there was a reflection on the two dynamic stories.
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Figure 4-10 Reflection on the first dynamic story
Figure 4-11 Reflection on the second dynamic story
Analysis: The reflection on the dynamic stories shows that both of them were focused
on a structure of operations transition, changing from operations using old technology
to operations using new technology. In this process, the vulnerability increased when
the technology is new to the operators. When the new technology matured, the
vulnerability would be reduced. However, whether the vulnerability could be reduced
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to less than the original level (when using old technology) is uncertain. (Therefore,
there is a question mark above “vulnerability” beside -/+ on Figure 4-11).
The modeler’s reflection clarified emerging ideas. During the presentation, the
modeler frequently checked with the group members whether the diagrams
represented their ideas. Confirmation from the group members enhanced consensus.
Moreover, the modeler expressed the ideas using a language that is similar to that
used by system dynamics. This made it easier for the group members to move on to
the subsequent exercise on system dynamics concept model.
The first day of our group model-building workshops ended after the modeler’s
reflection. Thanks to the scheduled activities, all the participants felt they had
increased their knowledge about the operation transition and issues related to it.
Exercise 8: Review the work from the previous day
As the first exercise in the second day, the recorder led the group members to review
the work from the previous day. This exercise not only helped the group members
remember what had taken place the previous day, but also checked consensus,
detecting possible discrepancies and resolving them.
Exercise 9: Concept model presentation
Concept models are preliminary models that are visually very simple and contain
easy-to-understand algebra. They serve to lead the group members in the direction of
building system dynamics models for the problem at hand (Andersen, Richardson
1995).
The modeler drew the concept model on the wall. While drawing, he explained the
concept model using common language, just like telling a story of what was going on:
we have capacity to work in traditional operations on the platform; now we are going
to change them into capacity to work in integrated operations. The speed of the
transition to Integrated Operations is affected by the potential traditional capacity that
is available for the transition. The capacity in traditional operations and capacity in
Integrated Operations associate with different risk level. Therefore, overall risk level
for the platform changes as the operation transition continues.
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Figure 4-12 Stock-and-flow diagram
Then the modeler built the concept model in a system dynamics application, Vensim
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Figure 4-13 Concept model stage (a)
Three additional links were added to create concept model stage (b) (see Figure 4-14):
the accumulation of new capacity in Integrated Operations brings experience with
them. Such experience will speed up the operation transition. The behavior of the
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New capacity in Integrated ops : transition2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 4-14 Concept model stage (b)
Again, small pieces of structure were added to form concept model stage (c): the
capacity in Integrated Operations is separated in two stages: new capacity and mature
capacity. Once again, the model behavior of “New capacity in integrated Ops”
changed. Using this model, we also simulated how “risk” and “cost per bbl” changed
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0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
Time (Month)
Capacity in Traditional ops : transition3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New capacity in Integrated ops : transition3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mature capacity in Integrated ops : transition3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Behavior of stage c
Figure 4-15 Concept models stage (c)
Analysis: The concept model introduced the language used in system dynamics to the
group members. Some group members might not have anticipated that the outcome of
the workshop would be a simulation model. Simulation models are sometimes
perceived as complicated, black-box, difficult-to-understand products. In comparison,
the system dynamics concept models have an easy-to-understand, simple structure
and variables that are familiar to the group members. The behaviors of model
variables are generated by the model structure and can be explained by it. The group
members can build such a model with their knowledge of the problem structure using
hand drawings as illustrated by the modeler.
The simulation behavior was analyzed in such a way as to clearly communicate that
system behavior was determined by system structure: adding pieces of new structure
would change model behavior. Presenting the model in three stages demonstrated the
iterative nature of the model-building process. Normally, modelers start from a key
concept. As more information about the problem is identified, the model will be
extended. This process continues until the model boundary is reached.
Finally, the concept model was a primary model, and sometimes, deliberately a
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how the model could be extended and corrected. It was used to start the conversation
about the problem in dynamic terms.
Exercise 10: Elicitation of model structure
After presenting the concept model, the group members had basic ideas about system
dynamics models and also they had in their minds what to add to the model. Thus, the
exercise to elicit model structure with the group members started.
Based on the concept model and information from previous exercises, the facilitation

















Figure 4-16 Backbones on the wall for model structure elicitation
Then the facilitator asked the group members to identify the variables that “help”
open or close the faucet of these stocks. The group members began to suggest causal
relations linked to these initial stocks and their corresponding rates. The facilitator
recorded the added variables and linkages, and constantly reminded the group
members to think of additional causal relationships. When some variables and causal
relations were added, the facilitator would summarize by telling the story embedded
in the model so far, asking the group to add further causal explanations. The story
telling was predominantly used when a feedback loop was identified. For example,
the group members suggested that the new technology could create a “collaborative
arena” where people work together in virtual space. The effective use of a
“collaborative arena” could help people learn new work processes and acquire new
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knowledge, therefore increasing the speed by which they mature. The mature new
work processes and knowledge would enhance a more effective use of the
“collaborative arena.” The facilitator told the story to the group members and
double-checked with them whether the loop correctly represented the reality.
After working with the group members for three hours, several feedbacks, many
variables and causal relationships were identified. We present the final picture
resulting from this exercise in Figure 4-17.
Figure 4-17 Model structure elicitation finished
Analysis: It was not easy for the group members to think in terms of feedback loops.
Although many variables and links were added to the wall graph, only several loops
emerged with the help of the facilitator. These loops concerned the operation
transition and incident response. For those variables that didn’t form feedback loops,
it was still important to record them and their linkages. The group members suggested
that they are related to information security risks during the operation transition and
further research might close the feedback loops for them. This way, we could gather
as many ideas from the group members as possible.
Pen and eraser were utilized during the process of eliciting model structure. The group
members felt free to make additions and corrections to the model. Therefore, the
group members felt involved in the model-building process. Simulation models are
often perceived as requiring advanced or sophisticated competencies and they are
seen as difficult to comprehend. Consequently, many people are unwilling to use them.
However, in this exercise, the group members took an active part in building models
using a language and the tools they were familiar with. This created an ownership in
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the model: the model was built by the group members themselves. They fully
understood the structure of the model; thus, it would be easier for them to analyze
model behavior and suggest policy recommendations for the model.
This exercise also helped build consensus. Before one variable was added, the group
members would debate on the meaning of the variable and the nature of its causal
linkages. The facilitator would add the variable when consensus was reached. If not,
such variables would be recorded on a list indicating that further research was needed
on the variable. Therefore, what was recorded on the wall was agreed by the group
members. We copied the graph on the wall into the Vensim software and asked the
group members to check the correctness of the copy. Together, the group members
checked each variable and each linkage to ensure we got everything right in the
computer.
Exercise 11: Modeler’s reflection
The modelers again offered a reflection section on the second day of the workshop. A
series of transparencies were prepared beforehand. First of all, the three loops
identified in the structure elicitation exercise were revisited as shown in Figure 4-18
and Figure 4-19.
Figure 4-18 Two reinforcing loops emerged from the structure elicitation
The first two reinforcing loops concerned the effective use of the collaborative arena:
the more the operators work with collaborative arena, the faster the maturation of new
work processes; the more mature the new work processes, the more people work with
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collaborative arena; the same mechanism works for maturation of new knowledge.
Figure 4-19 The third reinforcing loop emerged from the structure elicitation
The third reinforcing loop concerned the investment in incident detection capability:
the more investment made, the more detection capability available, and the more
events detected, which resulting higher perceived need for detection capability and
more investment again.
Another two dynamic hypotheses based on the outcome of group discussions were
presented in Figure 4-20 and Figure 4-21.
Figure 4-20 Dynamic hypothesis about incident response knowledge
This one concerned learning from damage that was caused by incidents. When
damage occurs, learning about incident also occurs. This learning increases the
knowledge about damage incidents. When damage resolves, learning about fixing
damage also occurs. This learning increases the knowledge about damage response.
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Figure 4-21 Dynamic hypothesis about resistance to change
The second hypothesis concerns the information security: newly implemented work
processes reduce information security, leading to more unexpected events, which
cause resistance to change and reduce the speed of maturation of new work processes.
This results in fewer mature new work processes and more new (immature) work
processes. Thus, the information security is lower than it otherwise would have been.
Finally, the problem was articulated: the operation transition will introduce new work
processes and knowledge to the platform. Time and resources are required for new
work processes and knowledge to mature. A knowledge gap will be generated as new
knowledge takes longer time to mature. New (immature) work processes, new
(immature) knowledge and the knowledge gap all make the platform vulnerable, thus,
generate high information security risks (see Figure 4-22)
Figure 4-22 Problem articulation
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The foremost question is the speed of the operation transition and the speed of
maturation (related to resources availability). All the group members agreed on this
problem definition.
4.2.4 Model development after workshop
Following Wolstenholme’s approach, we developed five archetypes after the first
group model-building workshop. Archetypes are short-hand version of more complex
models. Archetypes are almost never detailed enough to facilitate a formal simulation,
but they are for communicating knowledge about the dynamics of a system. They can
be easily understood by people who have little or no training in system dynamics
(Wolstenholme 2003; Wolstenholme 2004). Wolstenholme suggests that problems
arise from the unintended consequence of human actions. Therefore, his problem
archetypes contain feedback loops with intended consequence and unintended
consequence. The solution archetype adds a further feedback loop that inhibits the
unintended outcome.
In the following section we present the problem archetypes that describe information
security problems associated with the transition to Integrated Operations; these
problems in turn feed back on the performance of Integrated Operations as unintended
consequence. We also sketch potential solution archetypes.
Table 4-4 Five archetypes identified











































































































































































Here, we will not go into a detailed analysis of these archetypes. For more
information, please refer to the paper (Qian, Gonzalez, and Sveen 2005).
4.3 Second AMBASEC group model-building workshop
The second group model-building workshop was held on September 7-8, 2005 in
Hydro, Bergen. Again, experts of group model-building workshops from the
University at Albany were invited to facilitate the workshop. Based on the results of
the first workshop, the AMBASEC team, together with Albany team, decided that the
purpose of the second group model-building workshop should be to elicit more
system structures and identify reference modes for further model development. Again,
the agenda for the two-day workshop was designed with different exercises carefully
sequenced to achieve the target in the best possible manner.
4.3.1 Purpose
The purpose of the second group model-building workshop was to elicit more system
structures and identify reference modes for further model development. Likewise, we
aimed at gathering qualitative and quantitative data for the model formulation. The
expected outcome was an improved model with more representative structures that
could serve as a starting point for model formulation. We also expect to identify areas
for further model building.
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4.3.2 Participants
Twenty persons from different parties, with different roles, participated in the second
workshop.
Client group:
Hydro: Trond Lilleng (leader of the Integrated Operations project), Trond
Ellefsen (CISO), Anders Bjørsvik, and Lars Grøteide (ICT department),
Bjørn Holst (the Brage platform Chief)
IRMA: Odd-Helge Longva, Stig O. Johnsen, and Maria B. Dahl (researchers in
information security)
AMBASEC:Jose J. Gonzalez, Agata Sawicka, and Johannes Wiik (researchers in
information security)
NTNU: Tor Onshus (researcher in cybernetics)
Facilitation group:
AMBASEC:Ying Qian (modeler), Stefanie Hillen, and Magne Myrtveit (process
coach), Jaziar Radianti, and Felicjan Rydzak (process observer)
Albany: David Andersen (facilitator), George Richardson (modeler), and Eliot
Rich (recorder)
Five key personnel from Hydro, including the Brage platform chief, the chief
information security officer (CISO) and the leader of the Integrated Operators,
participated in the second workshop, indicating greater client engagement.
Interestingly, the participants were mostly those with high interest/high influence
listed on the stakeholder map (see Figure 4-1), such as the platform chief and the chief
information security officer. We like to believe that the stakeholder map attracted the
attention of the most significant actors and that they perceived the group
model-building workshop as relevant to their professional interests and work.
4.3.3 Exercises and data obtained
Exercise 1: Presentation
Representatives from Hydro presented detailed information about the transition to
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Integrated Operations. The presentation included the vision of the Integrated
Operations, the executive plan, and the current stage. It also included information
about the setting of collaboration room onshore and offshore, which offered an
understanding of how people work in Integrated Operations.
One of the most important new work processes, daily production optimization, was
introduced to all the participants in detail: it included collaborative meetings that were
organized in the morning, noon, and afternoon. During these meetings, staff from
onshore and offshore, from different departments, sat together in a videoconference to
review related data and decide on what to do next and how to implement that decision.
Besides these fixed meetings, a videoconference could be called whenever required.
Experts could be consulted for a discussion of a particular situation or a particular
problem. This could cause a larger portion of the oil-in-reserve to be retrieved, -
implying higher revenue.
Members of the Hydro team also presented Brage’s Information System architecture.
They explained how information (data) flows from the platform to the control center
and vice versa.
Members of the IRMA team presented the risk matrix that they had previously
developed for the Brage case. The two dimensions of the matrix are the frequency and
consequences of incidents, respectively. The figure below shows various incidents,
represented by different points in the matrix.
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Table 4-5 Risk matrix from IRMA
Frequency F5 F4 F3 F2 F1
Consequences From 100
year and up
Between 10 to 100
year
























































Source: OLF-IRMA-AMBASEC Group Model-Building Technical Report II (Rich,
Andersen, and Richardson 2005)
Analysis: The presentations provided us with important insights into the transition to
Integrated Operations: the details of how people are expected to work in Integrated
Operations, the settings of their new working environment and the information flows.
IRMA’s presentation provided information about different types of incidents that
were occurring and their frequency and consequence. The final system dynamics
model includes variables as the frequency of incidents and severity of incidents. The
IRMA’s risk matrix offered quantitative information for model building.
Exercise 2: Review of the previous workshop
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The facilitator led the group members to review the result of the first workshop. First
the model structure elicited in the first workshop was presented to the group (Figure
4-17). Some of the important feedback loops and causal relationships were explained.
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Figure 4-23 Concept model
A ready-built open-loop model (Figure 4-23) that represented the origin of work
process and knowledge gaps served as the concept model for this workshop. Instead
of presenting the concept model step by step, this time the group members were
invited to experiment with the concept model.
The group members were divided into three subgroups. Each subgroup was asked to
invent a policy with the intention to improve the operation transition. The policies are
implemented in the model by changing the value of one or more of the parameters.
Each subgroup should tell a story of what these parameters mean, identify their
dynamic impact, and predict what would happen.
All subgroups engaged in lively discussions. After they submitted their policy, told
the story and stated their prediction, the modeler simulated the concept model in
Vensim using the parameter values suggested by each of the subgroups. The predicted
results were similar to the simulation results for two groups but not for the other one.
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Analysis: After several presentations, this exercise made the group members more
actively involved in the workshop. During the exercise, the group members were
asked to predict the result for their policies. This stimulated the understanding of the
model structure and helped the participants to relate the observed (or desired)
behavior to the underlying model structure.
The group members were also challenged to tell a story about what a parameter
change means in reality. For example, a policy targeting to reduce the time needed to
mature new work processes and knowledge would mean to have more training
programs. In this way, the group members related the model to reality. Sometimes,
people conceive models to be very theoretical and find it difficult to apply insights
gained from model to reality. That is one reason some people are reluctant to use
modeling methods. This exercise demonstrates that system dynamics models are
closely linked to the real world.
New work processes implementation timeframe
The three subgroups were asked to participate in the exercise for developing ideas
about the rate at which work processes would be implemented and matured. We
obtained three different ideas from the three different subgroups, presented in the
following Table 4-6.
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Table 4-6 Ideas of work processes development timeframe
Presented by Bjørn Holst, the Brage platform
chief.
The lower curve represents the rate of new work
processes implementation. The curve ends high
shows the accumulation of new work processes on
the platform.
In this scenario, five new work processes are to be
implemented in short-term, followed by two new
work processes per year, ending with a total of 20
new work processes implemented at around 2010.
This figure focuses on the implementation
schedule. It doesn’t have information on the
maturation of new work processes.
Presented by Lars Grøteide, from ICT
department
The solid line represents the new work processes
implemented. The dashed line represents the new
work processes matured.
In this scenario, the introduction of 20 new work
processes will take place at a constant rate over
one and half years. Maturation of new processes
follows with a time lag of around one year.
Presented by Trond Lilleng, the head of
operation transition project
The curve that ends up at level of 20 represents the
new work processes implemented. The other curve
with fluctuation shows mature work processes.
In this scenario, 5 new work processes are to be
implemented in 2005. In the best case, 20 processes
are to be implemented in late 2007. 
As processes are reviewed and matured, some of
the processes may be withdrawn and
re-introduced, delaying the maturation of new
work processes.
Analysis: the Brage platform chief forecasted that it would take more than five years
to implement all the new work processes: five new work processes in the short-term
and then two to three new work processes per year afterwards. The other two groups
estimated a shorter time for the implementation of new work processes. Lars Grøteide,
from ICT department, estimated that 20 new work processes could be implemented in
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one and a half years. In his mind, the implementation of new work processes is more
related to get the technology ready in place, which could happen fast. Trond Lilleng,
the leader of the operation transition project planned that twenty new work processes
should be implemented in 3 to 4 years time. This could be a sign that the management
hoped for a fast transition to Integrated Operations, but they might have
underestimated the amount of time and effort actually required to implement new
work processes and did not consider the possibility (implicitly stated by the platform
chief) that this implementation could not be completed successfully too hastily.
We chose to use the timeframe provided by the Brage platform chief as our reference
mode for modeling. The platform chief best knows the platform and the local
implementation schedule. During policy analysis, we also tried scenarios with fast
implementation of the new work processes as suggested by Trond Lilleng.
Model structure elicited
Together with the group members, we spent much time identifying and drawing
feedback loops. This resulted in a more complete model structure. To summarize, we
simplified some of the linkages and shaped them into round circlers to form a general
model structure. In that way, it is easy to view the whole picture of the feedback
processes that govern the operation transition at Brage.
Figure 4-24 General model structure derived from the second workshop
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The stocks and flows characterize the operation transition. The three circles,
representing organizational change, incidents, and learning from incidents, all
illustrate the key issues that the model should capture. The future modeling work will
address the issues implied in these circles.
We formed a more complete dynamic hypothesis as follows: The introduction of new
technologies facilitates new work processes that require new knowledge. It takes time
for new work processes to mature and even longer time for knowledge to mature.
Thus, knowledge gap is generated, leading to higher vulnerability. Immature new
work processes and immature new knowledge also contribute to higher vulnerability.
Maturing new work processes and knowledge reduce vulnerabilities. Attention to
incident response will reduce damage from incidents.
4.3.4 Model development after workshop
After the second group model-building workshops, a prototype model was developed.
It includes four sectors: work processes, knowledge, vulnerability, and incidents. The
“work processes” sector captures the transition from traditional to Integrated
Operations work processes; the “knowledge” sector captures the transition of
knowledge for traditional operation to knowledge for Integrated Operations. These
two sectors corresponded to the work processes chain and knowledge chain in the
general model structure; the “incident” sector in the general model structure was also
included in the prototype model with key variables as the “frequency of incidents” and
the “severity of incidents” affected by the operation transition. “Learning from
incidents” is also included in the “incidents” sector.
Figure 4-25 The prototype model developed after the second workshop
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4.4 Following model-based interventions for model
development
After the second workshop, we, the AMBASEC project team, arranged a series of
model-based meetings for model improvement.
In the first teleconference with Hydro and IRMA, the prototype model was presented.
We first clarified the model structure, the relationship of the sectors, and the input and
output of each sector. We then showed the simulation results based on the data we
plotted into the model. The client gave their consent to the model structure and
showed interest in the model behavior. It was then arranged that the Brage platform
chief would provide the specific data based on the Brage platform so that the model
could better represent the Brage case.
The interview with the platform chief, Bjørn Holst, was conducted through a
structured process. The interview protocol we developed was sent to Bjørn Holst
before the interview. The questions were not only about specific data on Brage but
also about the definitions of the key variables. The interview helped us quantify many
of the model variables. At the same time, this interview enhanced the understanding
of the abstracted variables for both parties.
Another teleconference with Hydro was arranged, wherein we presented the model
using the Brage data, the analysis of the model structure and behavior, and several
different scenarios. In the latter part of discussion, we agreed on the steps to be
undertaken to develop the model further. This interactive process of model-based
communication, model development, and model-based communication continued
until the model was fully developed. When Hydro was not available to participate in
the consultations, meetings with the IRMA team were arranged instead.
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Figure 4-26 Model formulation process
After these model-based communication processes, the model was extended to seven
sectors. The sectors added were ‘incident response capability’, ‘learning from
incidents’, and ‘production and profit’. We will introduce the model in details in
chapter 5.
4.5 Closing remarks for chapter 4
The two group model-building workshops helped shape our ideas. The problem
definition was gradually revealed through various exercises in the first group
model-building workshop. The transition to Integrated Operations brings new work
processes, new knowledge and knowledge gap to the platform. They cause the
platform to be more vulnerable, resulting in more incidents and severe incidents. This
is Hydro’s main concern. On the second workshop, we scouted for more details, such
as the specific work process and IT architectures. Through the discussions, more data
were collected.
More importantly, through the workshop, our client started to trust us. At the
beginning of the first workshop, the leader of Integrated Operations project said he






















he expressed his interest in our approach. He told us that what he did not like was the
“black-box” modeling which showed simulation results without properly
demonstrating and explaining the logic behind the model. However, he realized that
system dynamics was different. He liked the discussion and felt ownership of the
model. He was quite convinced that the approach could address Brage’s problem and
promised to assign more people to participate in the second workshop. In the second
workshop, several high influence/high interest stakeholders participated. We had
intensive discussions about the operation transition, technology, incidents, and other
concerns. Needless to say, the information they provided were of great importance.
Our research project made significant progress during the two group model-building
workshops. Below we present the summary of these two workshops.
Table 4-7 Overview of the two group model-building workshops
First group model-building
workshop
Second group model-building workshop
Purpose Problem identification Model conceptualization
Data
- Stakeholder map
- Policy lever map
- Key indicators and their behavior
over time
- Dynamic stories (with stakeholders,
policies, and key indicators)
- Overview of the transition to Integrated
Operations
- Information about one concrete work
process flow
- Risk Matrix
- New work process implementation
timeframe
Insights
-Basic problem: transition to Integrated
Operations generates security risks
-Inadequate knowledge in relation to
work processes causes system
vulnerability
- New technologies enable new work
processes but also introduce new
vulnerabilities
- Maturing technologies, work processes,
and knowledge reduce vulnerabilities




- Some feedback loops
- Archetypes
- General model structure
- Prototype model (four sectors)
Client
attitude
- From skeptical to supportive
- Positive remarks about the approach
- Positive remarks about the approach
- Committed to act as model reference
group
Results on the two group model-building workshops are reported in (Qian and
Gonzalez 2006; Gonzalez et al. 2005; Qian, Gonzalez, and Sveen 2005).
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5 Model of Brage's Transition to Integrated
Operations
In this chapter, we present the model addressing the change of information security
risks during Brage’s operation transition. This model will be referred to as the Brage
model. This chapter starts with a model overview showing the model sectors and their
interrelationships. Next, the meanings of the key model concepts are explained. Then
the major causal loops are presented, both with causal loop diagrams and with a
verbal explanation. These loops are the driving forces underlying the model behavior.
Thereafter, the formal model is described sector by sector, accompanied by
explanation of the main structures, equations, and variables. Finally, we present the
model behavior to facilitate the understanding of the model structure.
5.1 Model Overview
5.1.1 Model sectors
The Brage model contains seven sectors: Work Processes, Knowledge, Vulnerability,
Incident cost, Incident Response Capability, Learning from Incidents, and Production
and Profit. Their linkages are shown in Figure 5-1 as follows:

























The Brage model is largely based on the general model structure derived from the
second workshop. Here, we will first explain how the Brage model is related to the
general model structure.
Figure 5-2 General model structure
The two sectors in the Brage model in Figure 5-1, “Work Processes” and
“Knowledge” are grouped under “Operation transition” because both are
encompassed by that concept. Both capture the development and maturation of new
work processes and knowledge, respectively. They correspond to the two stock and
flow chains of work processes and knowledge transition in the general model
structure in Figure 5-2 (lowest two stock flow chains). There were discussions about
the transition of technology during the group model-building workshop, resulting in
the stock and flow chain of technology transition in Figure 5-2 (second stock flow
chain from the top). However, in the Brage model, there is no technology sector. New
technology is associated with new work processes. The implementation of new work
processes is a prerequisite for using new technology. Therefore, the technology
transition is embedded in the transition of new work processes and knowledge. There
is no separate technology sector in the Brage model. It was suggested in the workshop
that the maturation of the security procedures would increase the resilience of the
Brage platform, resulting in the stock and flow chain of security procedures in the





“Resilience”. Resilience is defined as an ability to recover from or adjust easily to
misfortune or change5. Further discussion with our client showed that the ability to
recover from incidents is mostly related to the incident response capability. Therefore,
in the Brage model, the security procedures are replaced by the “Incident response
capability” sector (see upper right part in Figure 5-1).
The circle “organization change” on the left side of Figure 5-2 is mainly represented
by the concept “new initiatives burden” in the Brage model inside the work processes
and knowledge sector. New work processes require a new organizational structure.
The organizational change disrupts the social structure and “know-who” network. Not
knowing who to contact, or not knowing the contact person well, causes difficulties in
communication, and leads to extra work load for the operators. The difficulties for
communication are named as “new initiatives burden”, which reduces the
effectiveness of learning the new work processes and acquiring new knowledge.
Concerning the “resistance to change” in the circle of “organization change” in Figure
5-2, we had several discussions with our client on this topic. Hydro representatives
suggested that the operators’ resistance to the operation transition was mainly due to
the fear of losing their job and reducing their salaries when reallocated from offshore
to onshore. Such resistance does not have a dynamic feature. One solution is to have
clear communication with the operators about the operation transition plan and its
impact on them. Another solution is to have dialogs with the union about position
reallocation and change of income level. Therefore, the “resistance to change” is not
included in the Brage model.
The sector “incidents” on the right side of Figure 5-2 includes the frequency of
incidents and severity of incidents. Both variables are endogenously included in the
“incident cost” sector in the Brage model (see Figure 5-1). The frequency of incidents
is related to the threats to the Brage platform and the vulnerability of the platform.
Both threats and vulnerability are affected by the operation transition. Severity of
incidents is mostly influenced by the incidents response capability, and also by the
operation transition.
As mentioned above, the sector “incident response capability” in the Brage model
(upper right in Figure 5-1) is a replacement of “security procedures” in the general
5 see http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience
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model structure (Figure 5-2). In the first group model-building workshop, there was
discussion about how an investment decision in incident response capability was
made and a feedback loop was identified. The modeling of the incident response
capability is mainly based on this feedback loop (see Figure 4-19).
At the right-hand side of the general model structure (Figure 5-2) is a sector for
“learning from incidents”, which affects the maturation of new work processes and
knowledge. In the Brage model (lower right in Figure 5-1), we have included a sector
for “learning from incidents”, but it only affects the incident response capability, not
the maturation of new work processes and knowledge. Learning from incidents is
limited as information of incidents is normally not shared among the operators unless
they are severe incidents. However, severe incidents do not occur frequently.
In addition, the Brage model has a simplified financial sector (upper left of Figure 5-1)
including revenue, cost of production, cost of incidents, and cost for incident response
capability. Revenue is related to production, which is dependent on the resources
available for production, and the productivity of the resources. Productivity is related
to operation transition. New technology is supposed to improve productivity, but this
can only be achieved with sufficient knowledge. Similarly, cost of production is
related to operation transition. Meanwhile, cost of incidents and cost of incident
response capability are the output from the “incidents” and the “incident response
capability” sectors, respectively.
5.1.2 Concepts of work processes and knowledge
The transition to Integrated Operations is represented by the chains of work processes
and knowledge; - from “traditional” work processes and knowledge, through























Figure 5-3 Aging chains for operation transition
For the purpose of this study, work processes are those completed in accordance with
formal descriptions developed to guide the processing to a successful completion.
These formal descriptions are “abstracted from actual practice. They inevitably and
intentionally omit the details” (Brown and Duguid 1991). Knowledge is comprised of
insights and experience, embodied in individuals or embedded in organizational
processes or practice6. It includes all the details that help complete the task effectively.
Basically, work processes are related to “what to do,” while knowledge is related to
“how to do.” In another paper by Brown and Duguid (2001), they summarized Ryle's
famous contrast between know that (what) and know how. “Acquiring know that
(what) does not lead to being able to use it. Know how, moreover, is not acquired like
know that, which may circulate as precepts and rules. It is, Ryle insists, quite different.
‘We learn how,' he argues significantly, ‘by practice’”. This statement echoes our
concept of new work processes (know what) and new knowledge (know how). As
Ryle pointed out, without knowledge, work processes alone cannot achieve the
desired improvements. To adopt new technology, operators not only need to learn
what to do (new work processes), but also how to do (new knowledge). Only when
operators have fully learnt what to do and how to do can they work effectively with
the new technology and achieve the desired improvements.
Table 5-1 Work processes and knowledge
Work processes Knowledge
About What to do How to do
Feature Abstracted Detailed
How to acquire Circulate as precepts and rules Learn by practice
Having summarized the definition of work processes and knowledge from the
literature, we can now have a look at what the model variables mean in reality.
Developing new work processes: This process encompasses reviewing traditional
work processes, identifying necessary changes, and documenting new work processes
so that this documentation is ready to be disseminated as an operator’s guide to new
work processes. The persons from the management team on Brage are responsible for
6 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_management
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developing new work processes. This variable concerns the rate at which new work
processes are being developed.
Maturing new work processes: This process encompasses obtaining familiarity with
what to do, and memorizing them. The operators on Brage are responsible for
maturing new work processes. This variable concerns the rate at which the operators
on the platform familiarize themselves with the new work processes.
Immature new work processes: When new work processes are implemented, the
operators are not used to them. Sometimes, the operators unintentionally switch back
to old work habits. They need instructions, typically in the form of their supervisors’
guidance, colleagues’ reminders, or a manual for operations. Work processes in such
a stage are named “immature new work processes.” The productivity at this stage is
lower than desired. Immature new work processes accumulate as new work processes
are implemented and deplete when they mature.
Immature new work processes =
dtprocessesworknewmaturingprocessesworknewdeveloping )(∫ −
Mature new work processes: When the operators have familiarized themselves with
the new work processes and can work with them unassisted, we label these new work
processes “mature new work processes.” The productivity at that stage is higher than
when the new work processes are immature. However, whether the desired
productivity is achieved, depends on the level of maturity of new knowledge.
Mature new work processes = dtprocessesworknewmaturing )(∫
Developing new knowledge: This process encompasses developing information
material and training programs for new work processes. The persons from the
management team of Brage are responsible for developing new knowledge. This
variable concerns the rate at which new knowledge is developed and made accessible
Maturing new knowledge: This process encompasses learning how to work with the
new processes, why to work in such way and how to react when deviation happens.
The operators on Brage are responsible for maturing new knowledge. This variable
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represents the rate at which the operators on the platform learn the details of how to
work with the new work processes.
Immature new knowledge: When new knowledge is introduced together with new
work processes, the operators do not know well how to work. They might work
suboptimally, for example, contact the wrong persons for information, or not interpret
appropriately the data available. Therefore, their productivity would be lower than
what is desired. Knowledge at such a stage is named “immature new knowledge.”
Immature new knowledge accumulates as new knowledge is developed and depletes
as it matures.
Immature new knowledge =
dtknowledgenewmaturingknowledgenewdeveloping )(∫ −
Mature new knowledge: When the new operation details have become routine, and
there is no explicit effort to think about them, we label such knowledge as “mature
new knowledge.” At this point in time, the desired productivity is achieved. Mature
new knowledge accumulates as new knowledge matures.
Mature new knowledge = dtknowledgenewmaturing )(∫
Figure 5-4 contains a horizontal timeline illustrating the change in work processes and
knowledge over time.
Figure 5-4 Timeline of the evolvement of operation transition
When the new work processes and knowledge are being developed and introduced,


































processes and knowledge are immature. As the operators work with new work
processes, they gradually learn what to do and how to do. It takes longer time to learn
how to do than what to do. Therefore, new knowledge matures more slowly than new
work processes. When both of them have matured, the desired productivity of the
Integrated Operations is reached.
Knowledge gap:
In the model, we assume that one new work process corresponds to one set of new
knowledge, and that acquiring that knowledge (getting to know how to work and why
to work in this way) is a prerequisite for working effectively in accordance with the
new work process. When new work processes are being introduced, corresponding
(i.e. relevant) mature new knowledge is desired. Yet knowledge maturation takes time.
The gap between the desired mature new knowledge and the actual mature new
knowledge is named the “knowledge gap”. See the below equations:
Knowledge gap = Desired mature new knowledge - Mature new knowledge
Desired mature new knowledge = New work processes * Mature knowledge per
work process
New work processes = Immature new work processes + mature new work processes
Time to mature new work processes:
From the interview with the platform chief, we learned that, on the average, it takes
around four months to mature one immature new work process. Common sense
dictates that people might need several weeks to memorize what to do if new work
processes are implemented. However, an oil platform has its own special working
schedule. People on the Brage platform work continuously for two weeks at a time
and then take four weeks of time off. Three groups of people work in shifts. After four
weeks of time off, the operators typically forget some of the new work processes they
have learned previously. When they come back to work on the platform, they have to
be guided once more on the procedures of the new operation. The platform chief
suggested that, after three rotations, people could memorize the entire new work
processes quite well, and there is no need to remind them of what to do. One rotation
takes six weeks; hence, three rotations will take eighteen weeks, which is equal to
four months.
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Time to mature new knowledge:
The literature points out that it takes much longer time to learn knowledge than to
learn work processes. Attewell (1992) argues that, although one can readily buy the
machinery that embodies an innovation, the knowledge needed to use modern
production innovations, is acquired much more slowly and with considerably more
difficulty. He also cites Arrow’s study result that manufacturers using new process
technologies are "learning by doing"—their productivity improves for several years
after adopting a new technology, as they gradually learn to use the technology to its
best effect. However, quantitative information regarding how much time it takes to
mature knowledge is not available. In the model, we assume that, given enough
resources (the operators’ time), it takes the operators six rotations, that is, eight
months to learn all the details necessary to achieve the desired productivity for
Integrated Operations. In this study, this (estimated) parameter has been the subject of
a sensitivity test (See Appendix IV Sensitivity tests, S10).
5.2 Major causal loop diagrams
In system dynamics we work under the assumption that the behavior of a system is
governed by the internal mechanism that constitute causal relationships that form
non-linear feedback structures and use causal loop diagrams to represent such
structures. In this paragraph, we will outline some of the causal loops that form the
major feedbacks in the system we study.
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Figure 5-5 Causal loop diagram for the transition to Integrated Operations
In Figure 5-5 we portray a causal loop diagram of the processes of work processes
and knowledge maturation resulting from the introduction of immature new work
processes (upper left).
B1 and B2: New work processes and knowledge facilitate the maturing process
B1 and B2 constitute the maturation processes that drains (converts) immature work
processes and knowledge (to produce mature ones).
The introduction of more new work processes and associated knowledge mean that
there is a higher potential for the incorporation of new work processes and for
learning about those processes. The maturation processes drains this potential
(immature new work processes and knowledge) by incorporation and learning, i.e. to
produce more mature work processes and knowledge. As more immature new work
processes and knowledge mature, fewer immature new work processes and less
immature new knowledge will be left to mature next time around, - causing a lower
rate of maturation of new work processes and knowledge to take place. So these
balancing loops tend to match the demand for maturation and slow down the process
as this demand (potential) erodes.
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R1 and R2: Experience assists the maturing process
R1 and R2 constitute the maturation processes that produce mature work processes
and knowledge, based on the accumulation of experience (incorporated work
processes and mature knowledge).
When more new work processes and knowledge are matured, the operators have
accumulated experience in working with the new work processes and the new
technology embedded in them. Such experience facilitates the process of maturing
additional new work processes and knowledge and accumulation of additional
experience. So these reinforcing loops tend to speed up the process of maturation as
experience builds.
R3 and R4: New initiatives burden slows down the maturation of new work
processes and knowledge
R3 and R4 constitute the maturation processes that produce mature work processes
and knowledge, affected by the organization change (associated with the immature
new work processes and knowledge).
New work processes require new organization structure. People generally prefer to
work with those they know well. Unfamiliar contact persons often cause difficulty in
communication, which leads to extra work. This concept is represented by the “new
initiatives burden” which reduces the speed of learning new work processes and
acquiring new knowledge. As the operators learn to work in the new way, immature
new work processes and knowledge are gradually matured and then new initiatives
burden is reduced, leading to even faster maturation of the remaining new work
processes and knowledge.
R5: Resources constrain the maturing of new knowledge
R5 constitutes the resource allocation that constrains the maturation of new work
processes and knowledge.
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When immature new work processes increase, the resources required to mature them
also increase, resulting in fewer resources available to mature new knowledge. This
leads to a slower maturation of new knowledge and more immature new knowledge
will be accumulated than it otherwise would be, which will result in a higher new
initiatives burden and will in turn reduce the rate of maturing new work processes,
causing more immature new work processes than it otherwise would be. Therefore,
fast introduction of new work processes causes slow maturation not only because of
the new initiatives burden but also because of the resource constraint.







































Figure 5-6 Causal loops for incident response capability
In Figure 5-6 we portray a causal loop diagram of building incident response
capability (lower middle) which results from the investment decision (middle left) and
learning from incidents (middle in the circle). The grey variables with brackets are
those generated in the sectors of operation transition. The “frequency of incidents”
and “severity of incidents”, which characterize incidents, are affected by variables
from operation transition and incident response capability.
R6: Incident response capability raises risk perception
R6 constitutes the investment processes that build up incident response capability,




High incident response capability improves the detection of incidents. As more
incidents are detected, risk perception increases, leading to more investment in
incident response capability, which will result in higher incident response capability.
The effect of this reinforcing feedback loop could be overinvestment in incident
response capability. However, the more serious problem would be if the reinforcing
loop operates in the opposite sense—the risk perception trap: inadequate incident
response capability leads to low detection of incidents, which causes low risk
perception and underinvestment in incident response capability. Inadequate incident
response capability might lead to improper handling of incidents, which causes severe
incidents.
R7: Learning from incidents increases incident respond capability
R7 constitutes the learning from incidents that build up incident response capability,
based on the experience of incident handling.
Considering the incident response team, the more they learn from an incident, the
higher the incident response capability will be. Therefore, the incident response team
can detect more incidents, handle more incidents and acquire more knowledge about
incidents. This loop will generate higher incident response capability. However,
during our interview and meetings with related experts, we found that there is no
deliberate learning process: incidents are not properly reported and the information
about incidents is seldom shared. Incident response team learns little from incidents.
Thus, this reinforcing loop is currently weak.
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Figure 5-7 Causal loops from incident cost to operation transition speed
In Figure 5-7, we portray a causal loop diagram of changing the operation transition
speed (upper left), that is, the speed of introducing new work processes. The operation
transition speed is affected by the incident cost (upper middle).
B3 and B4 High incident cost reduces operation transition speed
B3 and B4 constitute the change of operation transition speed (speed of introducing
new work processes), based on the incident cost.
When incident cost is high, the management considers the Integrated Operations risky
and decides to reduce the transition speed, which means slow down the introduction
of new work processes and knowledge. As the immature new work processes and
knowledge mature over time, there will be fewer immature new work processes and
knowledge in place. This will reduce vulnerability and thus lower frequency of
incidents. Under certain incident response capability, fewer incidents mean that more
response capability is available to handle each incident, leading to better incident
handling and reduced severity of incidents. With fewer incidents and reduced severity
of incidents, the incident cost will be lowered.
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5.3 Formal model description
In this section we present detailed information about the model structure sector by
sector. Given the level of complexity, it is not possible to explain every variable and
equation. We will discuss pieces of structures as well as key equations and variables.
For detailed information on equations and variables, please refer to Appendix I: List
of Equations (p. 249). Additional information on how lookup functions are formulated
is available in Appendix II: List of lookup functions (p. 266).
5.3.1 Sector 1—Work processes
This sector represents the work processes transition. The stock and flow chain in
Figure 5-8) captures the transition of work processes from traditional ones
(“traditional work processes”) to newly implemented ones (“immature new work
processes”) and finally, to mature ones (“mature new work processes”).
Some short forms are used in the model:
IO represents Integrated Operations;
WP represents Work Processes;














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The left part of Figure 5-8 focuses on the flow “developing new work processes.”
Developing new work processes = Management time to develop new work
processes * Effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes *
Effect of incident cost on transition to IO
The “Management time to develop new work processes” (located above the flow) is a
decision variable based on the operation transition schedule. A tight schedule will
require more management time to develop new work processes. As suggested by the
platform chief, heads of several key departments are involved in new work processes
development. These persons are in management and supervision roles. The time they
allocate to develop new work processes will not affect the production output.
The “Effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes” (located below
the flow), is affected by the “Effect of traditional WP on new WP development”, the
“Effect of new initiatives burden on new WP development” and the “Effect of
changed WP on new WP development” (changed work processes include both
“immature new work processes” and “mature new work processes”). More
traditional work processes mean more potential for new work processes development,
which increases the “Effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes”.
New initiatives burden represents the communication difficulties related to
organizational change that lead to extra work load. Extra work load requires resources.
Thus, fewer resources can be allocated to develop new work processes. As a result,
the rate of developing new work processes is slowed down. In the Brage model, we
do not go into the details of modeling the resources that are shared for the extra work
load from new initiatives burden, but simplify the model in the way that new
initiatives burden reduces the “Effectiveness of resources in developing new work
processes”. More changed work processes mean more experiences in developing new
work processes, which increase the “Effectiveness of resources in developing new
work processes”.
The “Effect of incident cost on transition to IO” is another decision variable. This
variable links the incident cost to operation transition speed, which forms the
feedback presented in section 5.2.3 (p. 116). When the incident cost reaches a certain
level, the management might feel it is too dangerous to continue the operation
transition. The management might decide to suspend the operation transition. The
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idea of delaying operation transition has been brought up several times during our
communication with the client. Yet, the client does not have a clear idea about the
quantitative measure: it is not clear under what circumstance the client will decide to
suspend the operation transition, or how long the delay will be. There is no preset rule.
On the one hand, this effect that adjusts the rate of developing new work processes
and knowledge, has a major impact on the model behavior. On the other hand, there is
no information available that we can utilize to quantify this variable. Under such
circumstances, we choose to first simulate the model without consideration of the
“effect of incidence cost on transition to IO” (this parameter is set to 1) to study the
transition speed, resource allocation and investment in incident response capability.
Then, in a separate section (section 8.3), we will investigate several scenarios
specifically testing how management’s response to incident cost affects the operation
transition and information security risks (“Effect of incident cost on transition to IO”
will be assigned different values).
The right part of Figure 5-8 focuses on the flow of “maturing new work processes.”
Maturing new work processes = Immature new work processes / Time to
mature new work processes * Effect of resources on maturing new work
processes * Effect of the new initiatives burden on maturing new WP * Effect
of mature new WP on maturing new WP
The “maturing new work processes” is a process of learning, which converts
immature new work processes into mature ones. The learning curve is in diminishing
return shape: rate of learning is greatest at first when “ignorance” is greatest; rate of
learning decreases as ignorance decreases. The function “Immature new work
processes / time to mature new work processes” represents this curve. When more
immature new work processes exist, the rate of learning is high. When learning occurs,
immature new work processes are converted into mature ones, leaving fewer
immature new work processes, and the rate of learning is reduced. At the same time,
learning is also affected by the “Effect of resources on maturing new work processes”,
“Effect of the new initiatives burden on maturing new WP”, and “Effect of mature
new WP on maturing new WP”. If the resources to mature new work processes is not
sufficient, meaning the operators do not have enough time to learn new work
processes, the rate of maturation process will be reduced. The “new initiatives
burden” requires resources. As a result, “new initiatives burden” will slow down the
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maturation process. On the other hand, when mature new work processes accumulate,
meaning people have experience working with the new work processes and the new
technology embedded in them, the maturation process will speed up.
The upper right part of Figure 5-8 captures the resources allocation. Here, resources
refer to the operators’ time. It is measured as a percentage of the total operators’
working time. “Total operator resources” is, by definition, 100% of operators’
working time. The operators work 12 hour/day on the platform. The absolute amount
of “Total operator resources” equal to 12 hour/day or 360 hour/month. The
“Minimum operator resources for production” is a policy variable—the management
could decide what percentage of the operators’ time to reserve for production based
on its production target. As suggested by the platform chief, 10%-15% of the
operators’ time is allocated to learn new work processes and acquire new knowledge.
In the base scenario, the “Minimum operator resources for production” is set to 90%,
which means 324 hour/month in absolute amount. The “Operator resources available
for maturing new WP and knowledge” is, then, 10% of operators’ working time,
36hour/month, about 1.2 hour/day.
Operator resources available for maturing new WP and knowledge = Total
operator resources - Minimum operator resources for production
The platform chief estimated that 4% of the operators’ time is needed to mature one
new work process. Therefore, the “operator resources for maturing each WP” is 4%
of operators working time/process (equal to 0.48 hour/day/process). The overall
operators’ resources required to mature new work processes is the product of
“operator resources for maturing each WP” and “immature new work processes”.
When one new work process is implemented, 4% of operators working time are
needed to learn this new work process. As time goes by, the operators have learnt part
of the new work process, and then less time is needed to mature the remaining
immature part. When the new work process is completely matured, there is no need of
time for learning.
Operator resources required to mature new WP = Operator resources for
maturing each WP * Immature new work processes
If many “immature new work processes” are in place, then the “Operator resources
required to mature new WP” will be high. However, there is a constraint on resources
122
that is the resources available, - “Operator resources available for maturing new WP
and knowledge.” It is not possible to have more resources than what is available. On
the other hand, it is not necessary to have more resources than what is required.
Therefore, the actual operator resources to mature new work processes are the
minimum of the two variables, “Operator resources required to mature new WP” and
“Operator resources available for maturing new WP and knowledge.”
Operator resources to mature new WP = min (Operator resources required
to mature new WP, Operator resources available for maturing new WP and
knowledge)
When the “Operator resources required to mature new WP” is higher than the
“Operator resources available for maturing new WP and knowledge,” meaning
not enough resources are available to mature all the “immature new work
processes,” then the rate of maturation is reduced, which result in longer time to
mature all the immature new work processes.
5.3.2 Sector 2—Knowledge
The sector of knowledge transition has a similar structure as the sector of work
processes transition. The stock and flow chain captures the transition of knowledge
from the traditional one (“Traditional knowledge”) to the newly acquired one
(“Immature new knowledge”), and on to the mature one (“Mature new knowledge”).
The left part of Figure 5-9 focuses on the flow of “developing new knowledge.”
Developing new knowledge = Management time to develop new knowledge *
Effectiveness of resources in developing new knowledge * Effect of incident













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The right part of Figure 5-9 focuses on the flow of “maturing new knowledge.”
Maturing new knowledge = Immature new knowledge / Time to mature new
knowledge * Effect of resources on maturing new knowledge * Effect of new
initiatives burden on maturing new knowledge * Effect of mature knowledge
on maturing new knowledge
These two pieces of structure are analogous as those for the work processes transition.
Hence, we will not go into the details.
The upper right hand side of Figure 5-9 captures the resources allocation. The
allocation of the operators’ time is in the following order: first a certain percentage of
their time is reserved for production; the remaining time is then prioritized to mature
new work processes; after that, the available time is to mature new knowledge. This is
because knowledge is mostly tacit, - its development is not so observable. Therefore,
the operators tend to ignore knowledge development when resources are not available
to mature both new work processes and knowledge.
Operator resources available for maturing new knowledge = Total operator
resources - Minimum operator resources for production - Operator resources
to mature new WP
The remaining structure is analogous to that of the work processes transition. The
operators’ resources for maturing each knowledge unit is estimated to be 4% of
the total operators’ resources, which is the same as that needed to mature each
new work process. The overall resources required to mature new knowledge are
the product of “Operator resources for maturing each knowledge unit” and
“Immature new knowledge”.
Operator resources required to mature new knowledge = Operator resources
for maturing each knowledge unit * Immature new knowledge
However, it is not possible to have more resources than what is available.
Operator resources to mature new knowledge = min (Operator resources




When the “Operator resources required to mature new knowledge” is more than
“Operator resources available for maturing new knowledge,” meaning not enough
resources are available to mature new knowledge, the rate of knowledge maturation is
reduced and thus, the maturation of new knowledge will be prolonged.
The assumption of resources allocation used in this model (first to production, then to
mature new work processes, and finally to mature new knowledge) was presented to
client and related experts. All of them agreed to this assumption.
5.3.3 Sector 3—Vulnerability
This sector of the model represents the overall vulnerability level of the Brage
platform during the operation transition. We use the term “Vulnerability Index” to
express how vulnerable the platform is. This term reflects the fraction of events (those
have the potential to become incidents) that actually turn into incidents. For example,
receiving an email with a virus in attachment is an event. If the receiver has the
knowledge that an attachment can contain a virus, and does not open the email, than,
this event will not turn into an incident. On the other hand, if the receiver doesn’t
have that knowledge and opens the attachment and the computer is affected by the
virus, then, this event becomes an incident.
The vulnerability index will increase if operators do not know what to do, - the
fraction of immature new work processes affects vulnerability index. The
vulnerability index will increase if operators do not know how to do, - the fraction of
immature new knowledge affects vulnerability index. The vulnerability index will
increase if operators do not understand why to work in this way. “Knowledge gap” is
an indicator for the amount of new work processes that operators do not know why to
work in this way. Therefore, the knowledge gap affects vulnerability index.
The vulnerability index could be reduced by getting to know what to do (mature new
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Figure 5-10 Vulnerability Index
Vulnerability Index = Maximum Vulnerability Index * Effect of immature
new WP on Vulnerability Index * Effect of immature new knowledge on
Vulnerability Index * Effect of knowledge gap on Vulnerability Index
“Maximum Vulnerability Index” is a reference point based on the theoretical worst
case, in which every event turns into an incident. Therefore, it is 100%. However, in
reality, this theoretical worst case will never be reached no matter how bad the
situation is, “luck” prevents some events from turning into “incidents”. We use
multiple factors to set the range (upper and lower limits) of vulnerability index. These
factors are, as shown in the above equation, “Effect of immature new WP on
Vulnerability Index,” “Effect of immature new knowledge on Vulnerability Index,”
and “Effect of knowledge gap on Vulnerability Index”.
There are no numerical data for these three factors. We have to make our own
assumptions for them. We use table functions to quantify these effects. The way we
formulate these table functions involves two steps: first, identify the range of the
output variable, and second, determine the shape of the curve.
Table 5-2 summarizes the formulation of these three effects, followed by the detailed
verbal explanation. Figure 5-11, Figure 5-12, and Figure 5-13 show the graphic image
of these three effects respectively.
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Table 5-2 The effects on the vulnerability index
Lower level Upper level Shape
Effect of immature
new WP on 
Vulnerability Index
40% of the maximum
when all the work
processes are mature
90% of the maximum





new knowledge on 
Vulnerability Index
40% of the maximum
when all the
knowledge is mature
80% of the maximum







40% of the maximum
when the knowledge
gap is 0 
80% of the maximum




The low level: In the best situation, when the operators are familiar with all the work
processes and knowledge and there is no knowledge gap, the vulnerability index will
be low. We assume that it is lower than 10%. Each of the three effects would equally
contribute on the vulnerability index. Therefore, we set the low level of each of the
three effects on vulnerability index as 0.4, resulting vulnerability index at 6.4%.
The high level: In the worst situation, we assume that around half of the events will
become incidents. During our interview, all experts thought that the immature work
process has the biggest impact on the vulnerability index, while the immature
knowledge and the knowledge gap impact on the vulnerability index similarly.
Therefore, we set the “effect of immature new work processes on vulnerability index”
at 90% of maximum level, while “effect of immature new knowledge on vulnerability
index” and “effect of knowledge gap on vulnerability index” at the 80% of maximum
level. These maxima lead to a 57.6% of events turning into incidents.
The shape of the curves, the “effect of immature new work processes on vulnerability
index” and the “effect of immature new knowledge on vulnerability index” are similar.
They are both in diminishing return shape. Introducing new work processes and
associated new knowledge increases vulnerability index. The rate of the increase is
decreasing because all the new work processes and knowledge are based on advanced
ICT that connect offshore platform to the onshore control center and other facilities.
The basics of what to do and how to do in Integrated Operations have similarities.
Additional new work process and knowledge has a decreasing impact on the
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vulnerability index. Therefore, the curves have a marginal decreasing shape. The
shape of the curve, the “effect of knowledge gap on vulnerability index”, is linear.
Each new work process has its specific reasons why the new work process is arranged
in this way and how to react to deviations. Since we do not differentiate work
processes, one knowledge gap will have the same effect as another knowledge gap.
Therefore, the “effect of knowledge gap on vulnerability index” is linear.
Figure 5-11 Effect of immature new WP on
the vulnerability index
Figure 5-12 Effect of immature new
knowledge on the vulnerability index
Figure 5-13 Effect of mature knowledge
adequacy on the vulnerability index
To sum up, the vulnerability index ranges from lowest at 6.4% (0.4*0.4*0.4), when
there are no immature new work processes, no immature new knowledge, and no
knowledge gap, to highest at 57.6% (0.9*0.8*0.8) when all the new work processes
and all new knowledge are immature and the knowledge gap is the greatest. The
highest point of vulnerability is 9 times as high as the lowest point. Sensitivity tests

































































































































































































































































































































































This sector of the model focuses on incident. The key variables are the “Frequency of
incidents”, “Severity of incidents” and “Expected incident cost”. “Frequency of
incidents” represents how frequently incidents happen. This variable is measured as
incident/month. “Severity of incidents” represents how severe incidents are. This
variable is measured as NOK/incident, the total cost incurred because of the incidents.
“Expected incident cost” represents the average incident cost per month. This
variable is the product of “Frequency of incidents” and “Severity of incidents”,
measured as NOK/month.
Expected incident cost = Frequency of incidents * severity of incidents
“Frequency of incidents” is the product of the “Vulnerability Index” and the
“Frequency of events.” The “frequency of events” represents the threats to the
computer system. Only those threats that successfully exploit the vulnerabilities
become incidents.
Frequency of incidents = Frequency of events * Vulnerability Index
“Frequency of events” is affected by the operation transition.
Frequency of events = Initial frequency of events * Effect of new work
processes on events
Figure 5-15 Effect of new work processes on events
The formulation of “effect of new work processes on events” is based on the rationale
that when there is no operation transition there is no change of the “frequency of
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events”, - meaning “effect of new work processes on events” should be 1. When the
operation transition starts, there is a sharp increase of “frequency of event” since the
platform starts to connect to the office LAN and from there to the Internet. Many
threats on the Internet and office LAN that originally could not affect offshore
platforms now can. After a period of fast increase, “frequency of events” enters a
period of slow and steady increase. This increase is due to that more parties are
gradually involved in Integrated Operations, bringing with them new threats. At the
end, the threats are three times as high as that in traditional operation. Common sense
might point to even higher threats. However, as suggested by our client, several layers
of technical security defenses have been put in place so that not so many threats
actually reach the operation system on platform.
“Severity of incidents” represents the average cost of an incident. This cost includes
the cost of loss of production and the cost to restore everything back to its normal
state. “Severity of incidents” is affected by the resilience of the system, the new
initiatives burden, and the incident response capability.
Severity of incidents = Normal severity of incidents * Effect of resilience on
severity * Effect of new initiatives burden on severity of incidents * Effect of
adequacy of IR capability on severity of incidents
The more resilient an organization is, the quicker it would recover from the incidents,
lowering the cost of loss of production, thus, reducing the severity of incidents. The
new work processes are supposed to increase the platform’s resilience because the
new technology enables quick access to experts. In traditional operations, experts
have to be transported to the platform using helicopters, which takes time and is costly.
In the Integrated Operations, experts can access the visual information and data
information of offshore platform via net connection. Therefore, experts can
investigate the offshore problem in their local place. The access to experts is much
faster and less expensive in Integrated Operations than in traditional operation. As a
result, the cost of handling incidents will be reduced. However, when new work
processes and knowledge are immature, the new initiatives burden (not knowing who
to contact) will add difficulty to incident handling. Meanwhile, the adequacy of the
incident response capability is also a key factor affecting the severity of incidents. If
incident response capability is inadequate, some incidents are not detected and
handled in time. This gives them the opportunity to develop into more severe
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incidents.
As discussed in the Literature Review, Section 2.2.2 (p. 22), risk is defined as the
probability that a damaging incident happens (when a threat occurs because of
vulnerability) multiplied by the potential damage: “Risk = Threat * Probability of the
threat penetrating the vulnerability * Potential impact”. Therefore, the “expected
incident cost” represents the overall information security risks.
5.3.5 Sector 5—Learning from incidents
























Figure 5-16 Learning from incidents
How much the incident response team can learn from incidents depends on the
number of incidents detected (- it is not possible to learn from undetected incidents.)
and how much is learned from each incident “learning per incident”. Learning takes
time. After the incidents, people need to reflect on what has happened, find out the
causes, develop documentation, and share information. We assume that the learning
takes place in the course of a three-month period (“time to learn from incidents”)
after the incidents happened. Therefore, we use a smoothing function7 to represent
7 Smooth functions are to present information delay. Instead of having an immediate impact at full height, smooth
functions gradually reach the full height of the impact.
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the process “learning from incidents.”
Learning from incidents = SMOOTH(Learning per incident * Incident
detected, Time to learn from incidents)
“Learning per incident” is affected by how severe the incident is. Experience
shows that one learns more from severe incidents and tends to ignore minor
incidents. Our client believes this is true also in the client organization.
Learning per incident = Normal learning per incident * Effect of severity on
learning
5.3.6 Sector 6—Incident response capability
This sector of the model represents the incident response capability. This capability is
defined as the number of incidents (with normal severity, which is 500,000
NOK/incident) that could be handled in a month (unit: incident/month). A less severe
incident needs less response capability while a more severe incident requires more
response capability. The incident response capability has two aspects: one is how
many resources (people*time/month) are devoted to the work, and the other is how
productive these resources are (incident/(people*time)). A decision to increase
incident response capability could be to add more resources to this work or to
improve the productivity of the existing resources. In either way, financial investment
is needed. According to IRMA, the work scope of the incident response capability is
mainly to detect incidents, handle incidents and learn from incidents.
The incident response capability becomes obsolete over time. New attack tools, new
vulnerabilities, and new viruses, emerge quickly in the area of information security. In


















































Figure 5-17 Incident response capability
The lower part of Figure 5-17 focuses on the change of incident response capability.
Learning from incidents improves incident response capability. However, as
suggested by the IRMA team, as the incident response team is ad hoc, there is no
deliberate learning process in place. Thus the positive effect to improve incident
response capability from “learning from incidents” is weak. The increase in incident
response capability is mainly from the management’s investment. The management
decides the desired level of incident response capability and makes investments to
reach that level. The desired incident response capability is based on the perception of
the frequency of incidents.
The upper part of Figure 5-17 focuses on formulation of the perception of frequency
of incidents. This perception is based on incident detected. Management only knows
about those incidents that have been detected. Those undetected ones go unnoticed. It
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is common that some incidents are not detected. The fraction of incidents that could
be detected is dependent on the adequacy of incident response capability.
Incident detected = Frequency of incidents * Effect of adequacy of IR
capability on incident detected
Adequacy of incident response capability = Incident response capability /
Frequency of incidents
If the adequacy of incident response capability is high, a higher fraction of incidents
will be detected. If the adequacy of incident response capability is low, a lower
fraction of incidents will be detected. Figure 5-18 shows the formulation of the “effect
of adequacy of incident response capability on incident detected”.
Figure 5-18 The effect of adequacy of incident response capability on incident detected
The “effect of adequacy of incident response capability on incident detected” is given
by an S-shaped curve, starting from (0, 0.2), which means even there is no incident
response capability, 20% of the incidents will be detected. When the adequacy of
incident response capability reaches 90%, then all the incidents could be detected (0.9,
1). At the low end, when the adequacy of incident response capability is so low,
adding additional incident response capability will not lead to major improvement in
incident detection. Therefore, the output increases slowly. At the high end, when most
of incidents could be detected, adding additional incident response capability, leads to










































































































































































































































































































































































































This sector of the model represents the production and profit resulting from the Brage
operations. As introduced in Chapter 1, the Integrated Operations is expected to
generate an 10% increase in revenue and a 30% reduction in production cost. These
benefits will gradually be realized as the transition to Integrated Operations continues.
The “Monthly profit” is in line with its definition as a financial term. It is
formulated as “revenue” minus “product cost and expenditures”, “incident cost”
and “cost for incident response capability”.
Monthly Profit = Revenue - Product cost and expenditure - Expected incident
cost - Cost for incident response capability
“Expected incident cost” and “cost for incident response capability” are outputs
from the “incident cost” sector and the “incident response capability” sector,
respectively. “Revenue” and “Product cost and expenditure” are affected by the
operation transition:
Revenue = Normal revenue * Fraction of resources for production * (1 +
Effect of new work processes on productivity * Effect of knowledge adequacy
on productivity)
“Normal revenue” is a constant. There is no consideration of oil price change. This is
because, first, oil price is an external factor; and moreover, we would actually like to
exempt the effect of oil price on revenue and profit. This way, we can observe the
change of production and profit that is caused solely by the mechanism of operation
transition. Revenue is only related to production, which is affected by the resources
for production and the productivity change during the operation transition. When new
work processes are implemented, there is a potential to raise the productivity.
However, this potential cannot be fully realized without maturing the related new
knowledge. Here, we do not take into account the production change due to the
change of oil reserve for the same reason as why we do not consider the oil price
change.
Similar to “revenue”, “product cost and expenditure” is also affected by the new
work processes and knowledge implemented and by the maturity of them. The change
in salary and other raw material prices are not considered. We only focus on the effect
of operation transition on product cost and expenditure.
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Product cost and expenditure = Normal product cost and expenditure * (1 -
Effect of new work processes on cost reduction * Effect of knowledge
adequacy on cost reduction)
The outputs of this sector, revenue, product cost and expenditure and monthly profit,
are most important indicators for business organizations. High profit is always
desirable. Moreover, the purpose of the transition to Integrated Operations is to
generate high profit. By using the model for simulation purposes, we may investigate
how profit changes during the operation transition.
5.4 Model behavior
We now present the model behavior. This scenario is called the base run scenario. All
other scenarios, either for model testing or for policy testing, are compared with this
base run scenario. In some studies, model behavior analysis is also regarded as one
way of model validation (Andersen et al. 1983). In this study, we present it to foster
the understanding of the model structure. We will present our model validation in the
next chapter.
In the base run scenario, the operation transition speed is according to the real plan on
the Brage platform: 5 new work processes are implemented in the first year and 2 new
work processes each year after that. There are more management resources to develop
new work processes and knowledge in the first year and fewer in the following years.
In the base run, the minimum of the operators’ resources reserved for production are














































Traditional work processes : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Immature new work processes : Base 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mature new work processes : Base 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5-20 Work processes transition
In Figure 5-20, the “traditional work processes” (blue line with number 1) decrease
according the operation transition plan. The “immature new work processes” (red line
with number 2) increase in the first year and then decreases. This is because in the
first year, there are not enough resources for maturing all 5 of them at the rate they are
introduced. Around 2.5 new work processes are matured and leaving around 2.5 new
work processes immature. From the second year on, when the transition speed lowers
to 2 new work processes a year, the “immature new work processes” decrease. The
“mature new work processes” (green line with number 3) increase slowly at the
beginning because no previous experience exists for Integrated Operations. After year
one, it increase steadily, reaching more than 19 mature new work processes by the end
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Traditional knowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Immature new knowledge : Base 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mature new knowledge : Base 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5-21 Knowledge transition
In Figure 5-21, the “traditional knowledge” (blue line with number 1) decreases
according the operation transition plan. The “Immature new knowledge” (red line
with number 2) increases to almost 5 during the first year and remains at that level
until month 48 after which it decreases gradually until month 96 (reaching around 2).
During the last two years, it decreases slowly, approaching 0. The “Mature new
knowledge” (green line with number 3) increases slowly during the first two years
(reaching around 2 at the end of year 2) and then increases progressively until month
96 (reaching around 17). In the last two years, it approaches 20 with a decreasing
speed. The behavior is a typical S-shape behavior.
The behavior of “Immature new work processes” and “Immature new knowledge”
were quite different. There are several reasons for that. First of all, knowledge
maturation was slower than work processes maturation. It took 4 months for new
work processes to mature, while 8 months for new knowledge to mature. Therefore,
the “immature new knowledge” accumulated to a higher level.
The second reason was the shortage of resources to mature knowledge, especially
during the first year, when 5 new work processes were introduced. In Figure 5-22, the
lower part in blue color represents the resources to mature new work processes and
the upper part in red color represents the resources to mature new knowledge. We can
see that when more and more new work processes and knowledge are introduced,
there are not enough resources to mature both of them. Since the operators prioritize
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the maturation of new work processes, the time available to mature new knowledge is
reduced, reaching the lowest at the end of year 1 when there are so many immature
new work processes that little time is left for maturing new knowledge. After year 1,
when the implementation speed reduces to 2 new work processes per year, the
immature new work processes are reduced and more resources could be allocated to
mature new knowledge.
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Operator resources to mature new WP : Base
Operator resources to mature new knowledge : Base
Figure 5-22 The operators resources to mature new work processes and knowledge
The third reason for the slow development of mature new knowledge during the first
two years is the reinforcing loop R4 (see section 5.2.1). With more immature new
knowledge, the initiatives burden is high, thus reducing the speed to mature new
knowledge. The other loop R2 (see section 5.2.1) is weak at that point because not
much knowledge has matured yet. Therefore, not much experience to facilitate
knowledge maturation. After the first two years, the mature knowledge has gradually
accumulated, which facilitates the maturation of new knowledge, - the speed of new
knowledge maturation is increased. After month 96, the maturation of new knowledge
slows down again. This is because the effect of the balancing loop B2 is significant at
that point: when only little knowledge remains immature, the further maturation of
























Vulnerability Index : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-23 The Vulnerability Index
The vulnerability index sharply increases during the first year because “immature new
work processes,” “immature new knowledge,” and “knowledge gap” make the
platform vulnerable. During the second year, “immature new work processes” drops
to about half its value (see Figure 5-20). This leads to the decrease in the vulnerability
index. However, the decrease is not much because “immature new knowledge” (see
Figure 5-21) and “knowledge gap” (see Figure 5-24) still are increasing. The
vulnerability index drops slowly during year 3 and 4, as “immature new work
processes,” “immature new knowledge,” and “knowledge gap” decrease slightly.
From year 5 on, as more knowledge mature, the “immature new knowledge,” and



























Knowledge gap : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-24 Knowledge gap
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The “expected incident cost” is the product of the “frequency of incidents” and the
“severity of incidents”. Since both “frequency of incidents” and “severity of
incidents” increase sharply in the first year, so does the “expected incident cost”. It
peaks around the end of the first year and drops quickly to a relatively low level after
month 48. This is because of the decrease in the “severity of incidents”. After that,
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Severity of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-25 Frequency of incidents, Severity of incidents, and Expected incident cost
The “frequency of incidents” increases sharply in the first year. This is mainly due to
the rapid increase of the “Vulnerability Index” during the first year (see Figure 5-23).
Despite the fact that the “Vulnerability Index” decreases from the second year on, the
“frequency of incidents” remains high until end of year 5. This is because of the
increasing threats as the platform moves into the Integrated Operations. Until when,
after year 5, the vulnerability index decreases increasingly, and the “frequency of
incidents” starts to decrease.
144
The “severity of incidents” increases sharply during the first year because the
“adequacy of incident response capability” (see Figure 5-26) decreases significantly.
In traditional operation, the “incident response capability” is very low because there
are few information security incidents. With a rapid increase in incidents during year
1, there is not enough incidents response capability to handle the work load. Therefore,
the “severity of incidents” rises quickly. It takes time to realize the inadequacy of
incident response capability and to build up incident response capability. As the
“incident response capability” builds up from year 2, the “adequacy of incident
response capability” increases, and the “severity of incidents” starts to decrease. The
“adequacy of incident response capability” stabilizes after year 5, and so does the
“severity of incidents”.
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Adequacy of incident response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-26 Adequacy of incident response capability
The sharp decrease in the “adequacy of incident response capability” is caused
mainly by the sharp increase in “frequency of incidents” during the first year (green
line with number 3 in Figure 5-27), while the “incident response capability” (blue
line with number 1 in Figure 5-27) remains low during the first year. The slow
increase of “incident response capability” during the first two years is caused by the
reinforcing loop R7 (see section 5.2.2). When the “incident response capability” is
low, the fraction of incidents that could be detected is low, which means few incidents
are being detected (red line with number 2 in Figure 5-27). Thus, the management’s
perception of the frequency of incidents is low and the investment in “incident
response capability” is insufficient. Therefore, despite the rapid increase in incidents,
the “incident response capability” increases slowly. As “incident response
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capability” gradually builds up, more incidents are detected, leading to a decision for
more investments in “incident response capability.” The reinforcing loop then causes
the “incident response capability” to increase at an increasing rate. After month 60,
as the decrease of “frequency of incidents” leads to fewer “incident detected”, fewer
investments in “Incident response capability” are being made, and a decrease in the














































Incident response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incident detected : Base 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Frequency of incidents : Base 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5-27 Incident response capability, incident detected, and frequency of incidents
The “monthly profit” (the upper one in Figure 5-28) decreases during the first year
mainly due to the drop in revenue (blue line with number 1 in the lower one in Figure
5-28). The revenue drop is because resources are allocated to learning activities that
mature new work processes and knowledge. As the benefit of Integrated Operations is
gradually realized, “revenue” increases, and “product cost and expenditure” (red line
with number 1 in the lower one in Figure 5-28) decreases. Therefore, the “monthly





























Monthly Profit : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Revenue : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Product cost and expenditure : Base 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 5-28 Profit, revenue, and product cost and expenditure
After month 92 or seven and a half years, the “monthly profit” increases more rapidly.
This is because with fewer immature new work processes and less immature
knowledge on the platform, resources are released from the maturation activities to
focus on production (see Figure 5-22). Therefore, production has picked up, leading
to higher revenue.
We have thus far explained the behavior of the base run scenario. We see that the
most dangerous period is the first two years of the operation transition. Many
unfavorable indicators peak during this period, such as the vulnerability index and the
severity of incidents. This is because 1) Integrated Operations, which extensively
utilizes advanced ICT technology, is something totally new to the platform and
introduces new threats and vulnerability to the platform; 2) the tight operation
transition schedule for the first year generates many immature new work processes
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and knowledge; and 3) the severity of incidents increases sharply because the incident
response capability is very low in the traditional operation and cannot handle the
increasing incidents adequately. The monthly profit decreases at the beginning mainly
because the operators’ time is allocated to mature new work processes and knowledge.
This kind of decrease in profit at the beginning of the operation transition is often
observed for a new technology adoption process. However, in the long-term, the
operation transition generates a huge financial benefit.
5.5 Closing remarks for chapter 5
This chapter introduces the Brage model. First, the causal loop diagrams are presented.
The loops identified are the basic driving forces underlying the model behavior. Then
the formal Brage model is explained sector by sector, with key model variables and
equations. The model structure is based mostly on the information we obtained from
the group model-building workshops. The values of some of the parameter are
obtained from interview with our client. Others are estimated based on qualitative
information. In the following chapter, these estimated variables will undergo
sensitivity tests. We present our model behavior as a way to help readers to
understand the model structure.
Preliminary insights focusing on the operation transition (resulting from the first four
model sectors, work processes, knowledge, vulnerability and incident cost) have been
reported in (Rich et al. 2007). Findings from the incident response capability part has
been reported in (Qian et al. 2009).
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6 Model Validation tests
This chapter focuses on model validation. First, we introduce theories on the subject.
Unlike data-driven models whose validation mainly involves statistical tests, system
dynamics models are causal descriptive. Their validation lies not only in reproducing
behavior but in explaining the way it is generated and possibly in suggesting ways of
changing the existing behavior as well. Barlas suggested three categories of tests:
direct structure tests, structure-oriented behavior tests, and behavior pattern tests
(Barlas 1996). Following his theory, we perform direct structure tests in the second
part and structure-oriented behavior tests in the third part of this chapter. We do not
have data for normal behavior pattern tests. Therefore, we decided to interview
experts to obtain their opinion about the model behavior as alternative for behavior
test. This will be reported in a separate chapter following this one.
6.1 Introduction to model validation
In relation to the notion of validity, Barlas argued that it is crucial to distinguish
between models that are “causal descriptive” and those that are “correlational” (Barlas
1996).
Table 6-1 Comparison of causal and correlational models




Postulated causal relations Observed association
Model representation How certain aspects of a real
system function/ theories about
that system
Statistical correlations among
various elements of a real
system
Purpose of the model Prediction and explanation Prediction only
Validation Both qualitative and
quantitative methods apply
Statistical testing
Examples System dynamics model Econometric models
8 A model that is based on causal relationship forms a theory about how certain aspects of the system function.
149
Since there is no claim of causality in structure, correlational models place a premium
on the model output, which should match the “real” data within a certain range.
Therefore, the most commonly utilized model validation method is the statistical test.
However, causal models, being a “theory” for the real system, must not only
reproduce behavior but also explain the way it is generated and possibly suggest ways
of changing the existing behavior as well. System dynamics models fall within this
category.
The validation of system dynamics models involves two aspects: tests of model
structure and tests of model behavior. Model behavior tests, which compare the
model-generated behavior with the observed reference behavior, are generally “weak”
in the system dynamics context because they cannot separate spurious behavior
accuracy (i.e., “right behavior for the wrong reasons”) from true behavior validity.
Such tests provide no structural information (Barlas 1989). Validity of the model’s
internal structure is crucial (Barlas 1996). Meanwhile, structure tests are “strong” tests
because they directly evaluate the model structure. The essence of model validity lies
in structural validity: “right behavior for the right reasons.”
However, judging the validity of a model’s internal structure is difficult and in most
cases, qualitative and informal; hence, it is difficult to communicate. In papers
discussing system dynamics model validation, one common criticism has emerged:
the insufficient utilization of formal and impartial quantitative procedures for testing
the quality of models (Grcic and Munitic 1996).
In response, Barlas proposed to distinguish between two types of structural testing:
direct structure testing and indirect structure testing, also referred to as
structure-oriented behavior testing (Barlas 1996; Barlas and Kanar 2000). Direct
structure tests assess the model structure validity by direct comparison with
knowledge on real system structures. There is no simulation involved, and these tests
are qualitative in nature. Indirect structure tests, on the other hand, indirectly assess
the structure’s validity by applying certain behavior tests on model-generated
behavior patterns. These tests are quantitative and involve simulation.
Structure-oriented behavior tests can provide information on potential structural flaws
(Barlas 1989). Their main advantage over direct structure tests is that they are suitable
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to formalize and quantify (Barlas and Kanar 2000). Barlas summarized the validation
procedures for system dynamics models in three categories: direct structure tests,
structure-oriented behavior tests, and behavior pattern tests (see Figure 6-1).
Figure 6-1 System dynamics model validation
Sources: Formal Aspects of Model Validity and Validation in System Dynamics
(Barlas 1996)
All tests should be designed with respect to the model purpose. The sequence of the
model validation is to first test the model structure validity and then the model
behavior accuracy. Accuracy of model behavior reproduction is only meaningful after
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 Behavior sensitivity test
 Modified-behavior prediction
 Boundary adequacy test
 Phase relationship test








6.2 Direct structure tests
Direct structure tests include assessments for structure, parameter, boundary, and
dimension (Forrester and Senge 1980; Fang and Lim 2009). We summarize the
purpose of these tests and the tools for these tests in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2 Direct structure tests
Test What to Test Common Tools and Procedures
Structure
Assessment
Model structure is consistent
with relevant descriptive
knowledge of the system
Use causal diagrams, stock and flow maps, or
direct inspection of model equations;
Use interviews, workshops to solicit expert
opinion, archival materials, and direct




with and reasonable to
descriptive and numerical
knowledge of the system
Use statistical methods to estimate
parameters;
Use judgmental methods based on interviews,




The important concepts for
addressing the problem are
endogenous to the model
Use model boundary charts, variable list,
and/or causal loop diagram to explicitly





consistent without the use of
parameters having no real
world meaning
Use dimensional analysis software;
Inspect model equations for suspect
parameters.
Structural assessment is employed to examine the model structure validity via
theoretical and empirical comparison with knowledge on the real system structure.
Several factors add to our confidence on the model structure.
First, in this study, the model was conceptualized in two group model-building
workshops that deeply involve the client. It was the client representatives who
provided related information, created dynamics stories, which finally led to a
consensus understanding of the problem definition. it was also the client
representatives who elicited the model structure, adding variables to the model and
pointing out the relationships between variables based on their knowledge of real
system. In this way, we ensure that the model address the problem the client facing in
reality.
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Second, after the group model-building workshops, we further developed the model
based on the basic model structure derived from the workshops. In this model
development process, we had series of meetings with the client. During those
meetings, we presented our model structure to our client representatives and consulted
their opinion about it. The client representatives confirmed where they thought was
correct, questioned where they felt uncertain, and suggested where to adjust and
further improve. Thus, we further built the model. It was in this iterative process that
we developed our model to the current stage. This process strongly suggests that the
model portrays the real system as it is based on information from client. Besides, the
clients’ confirmation of the model structure during the meetings serves as direct
structure validation of our model.
Finally, when the model was completed, we invited four experts from the IRMA team
to review the model structure and behavior. They all agreed on the model structure
(the model validation interview is documented in the next chapter). Through these
efforts, we have developed confidence in the model structure.
Parameter assessment evaluates the constant variables against knowledge of the real
system, both conceptually and numerically (Forrester and Senge 1980). We conducted
an interview with the platform chief during model formalization. During the interview,
we first discussed the definition of the key variables. We agreed on the meaning of the
variables before trying to quantify them. Next, the platform chief assisted us in
quantifying a number of parameters based on his experience and knowledge of the
platform. The remaining parameters were based on experts’ opinion, literature, and
our estimation. We have summarized the model constants and their validity in Table
6-3.
Table 6-3 Model constants
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Time to build up Time needed from investment Month Suggested by
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The parameters listed above are model constants. They are suggested by the client or
estimated based on literature or experience. The initial values of stocks are also model
constants. We summarize them in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4 Initial value of stocks
Initial value of
stocks
Description and value Unit Validity
Traditional work
processes
The amount of traditional work







The amount of immature new








The amount of mature new work







The amount of traditional






The amount of immature new






The amount of mature new






The amount of incident could be









amount of incident happening in a
month (=0.125)
Month on experience
The initial value of work processes and knowledge is fixed based on the case. For
incident response capability and perception of frequency of incident, their value is
estimated based on experience.
Boundary adequacy test verifies if the important concepts for addressing the problem
are endogenous to the model. As discussed in the literature review, Section 2.2.2,
(p.22) Risk = Threat × Probability that the threat exploits the vulnerability ×
Potential impact. In this model, threat is represented by the “frequency of events”,
which has the potential to develop into incidents. It is endogenously affected by the
progress of operation transition. The probability that the threat exploits the
vulnerability is represented by the “vulnerability index”, the fraction of events that
become incidents. The “vulnerability index” is affected by new work processes and
knowledge in the system and the knowledge gap generated by the operation transition.
The potential impact is represented by the “severity of incidents”, affected by the
operation transition and the incident response capability. The incident response
capability, which has a big impact on the “severity of incidents”, is also an
endogenous variable decided by the investment mechanism. Thus, we conclude that
the most important variables are endogenous to the model.
Table 6-5 summarizes what is endogenous and exogenous to the model and what is
excluded from the model for inspection.
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Table 6-5 Model boundary
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded
- Mature new work processes
- Mature new knowledge
- Vulnerability index
- Frequency of events
- Frequency of incidents
- Severity of incidents
- Incident response capability
- Revenue
- Product cost and expenditure
- Monthly profit
- Management time to
develop new work processes




- Average cost per incident
response capability
- Change of oil price
- Change of production
resources price





Dimension consistency test assesses whether the dimensions of the right-hand side
and left-hand side of the equation are internally consistent (Barlas 1996). Every
variable contains a unit that identifies its meaning in reality and suggests ways to
measure it. Every equation should be consistent in units. This ensures that the
equation is in accordance with the physical or logical rules of reality. We are not
adding apples to pears. For example:
Expected incident cost = Frequency of incidents * Severity of incidents
(NOK/month) = (incident/month) * (NOK/incident)
Here, we will not present all the equations. The software Vensim (Ventana Simulation
Environment), wherein the model is built, offers a dimension consistency check. The
model passes the unit check using Vensim V5.7.
Above all, we have assessed model structure, parameter, boundary, and dimension
with satisfactory result.
6.3 Structure-oriented behavior tests
Direct structure tests, although powerful in concept, are too qualitative and informal.
Structure-oriented behavior tests combine the strength of structural orientation with
the advantage of being quantifiable; thus, they become an important part of model
validation. Structure-oriented behavior tests include extreme condition test, sensitivity
test and integration error test. The purpose of these tests and their tools are
summarized in Table 6-6.
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Table 6-6 Structure-oriented behavior test







Test response to extreme values of each input,






Test response to a set of varying numeric values
and see if model-generated behavior is
consistent with the real system
Integration
Error
How model responds to
the choice of time step
Cut the time step in half and test for changes in
behavior
Extreme condition test involves assigning extreme values to selected parameters and
comparing the model-generated behavior to the anticipated behavior of the real
system under the same extreme condition (Barlas 1996). We have chosen those
variables that are involved in feedback loops and set their value to zero, or extremely
large (compare to the base scenario). Before simulating the model, we make a forecast
of how the system will behave in reality under such extreme condition. Then we
simulate the model and compare the model-simulated behavior with our expectation.
If the model behavior fits our expectation, then, the extreme condition test is passed.
If not, we will have to investigate the reasons that generate unexpected behavior and
may need to improve the model structure.
Table 6-7 List of Extreme tests performed
Test name Variable change
Variable name Base run Test
Ex 1 – No operation
transition
Management time to develop
new work processes














Ex 3 – Extreme long time to
mature new work processes
Time to mature new work
processes
4 40
Ex 4 – Extreme long time to
mature new knowledge
Time to mature new
knowledge
8 80




Ex 6 – Extreme long time to
build incident response
capability
Time to adjust IR capability 3 30
Ex 7 – Extreme long time
for incident response
capability to obsolete
Time to obsolete IR
capability
12 120
Ex 8 – All resources






The Brage model has passed the above extreme tests. For detailed behavior of these
extreme tests, please refer to Appendix III Extreme Tests (p. 275).
Sensitivity test determines the parameters to which the model is sensitive and verifies
if the real system would exhibit similar sensitivity to the corresponding parameters
(Barlas 1996). Sensitivity tests are performed on two types of variables: first, table
functions; second, constants. Table functions are used to capture the nonlinear
relationship of two variables. The table functions in the model are formulated based
on empirical knowledge or theoretical information from literature. Both of these
methods provide more qualitative information than quantitative information. In most
cases, we have two reference points (the starting point and the end point of the curve
for the table function), and other points in between are based on our estimation of the
shape of the curve. In the sensitivity test, we will change the shape of the curve to see
how model behavior changes. In this way we test the sensitivity of the table functions.
For model constants, we differentiate them into three types: 1) initial level of stocks; 2)
reference points; and 3) other constants. The initial levels of stocks are fixed in the
Brage model. For example, there are 20 traditional work processes to be changed into
new work processes. Therefore, the initial traditional work processes is 20. The initial
level of immature new work processes and mature new work processes is 0. For this
type of variables, sensitivity test is not needed. The reference points are also fixed.
For example, the “Maximum vulnerability Index” is 100%, meaning in the worst
situation, whatever could go wrong will go wrong. For this type of constants,
sensitivity test is not needed either. The remaining constants are subject to sensitivity
tests. We will run the model 200 times within certain range of the constant. We
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inspect the distribution of the simulation results and investigate whether the
sensitivity of model behavior is reasonable.
There are two kinds of sensitivity: behavior pattern sensitivity and numerical
sensitivity. Behavior pattern sensitivity occurs when change of the variable value
causes the model behavior pattern change. In cases when model behavior pattern does
not change, and only the numerical value of the model variables change, we say it is
numerical sensitivity. Normally, the value change of the model variable causes other
variables to show numerical sensitivity. If behavior pattern sensitivity is observed,
investigation should be made to see if there exists inappropriate model structure. Or
otherwise, this variable presents a leverage point, which changes the dominance of
loops and thus the model behavior pattern. If so, more research and investigation for
this variable is needed to ensure its value, and this variable could be a good candidate
as policy variables.
Table 6-8 List of sensitivity tests performed
Test name-variable Sensitivity test
S1- Effect of the new initiatives
burden on maturing new work
processes
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S2 - Effect of mature new WP
on maturing new WP
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S3- Effect of new initiatives
burden on maturing new
knowledge
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S4- Effect of mature knowledge
on maturing new knowledge
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S5- Effect of knowledge gap on
vulnerability index
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S6- Effect of immature new
knowledge on vulnerability
index
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S7- Effect of immature new WP
on vulnerability index
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S8- Effect of resilience on
severity
Three different shapes of table functions are tested
S9- Time to mature new work
processes
Base run value: 4
Test: Range: 3-5;Random Uniform; 200 Runs
S10- Time to mature new Base run value: 8
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knowledge Test: Range: 6-10; Random Uniform; 200 Runs
S11- Operator resources for
maturing each WP
Base run value: 4%
Test: Range: 3%-5%; Random Uniform; 200 Runs;
S12- Operator resources for
maturing each knowledge unit
Base run value: 4%
Test: Range: 3%-5%; Random Uniform; 200 Runs;
S13- Time to adjust IR
capability
Base run value: 3
Test: Range: 2-4; Random Uniform; 200 Runs;
S14- Time to obsolete IR
capability
Base run value: 12
Test: Range: 10-14; Random Uniform; 200 Runs;
S15- Extending the run time of
the model
Base run: run time=120
Test: run time=240
The Brage model has passed the above sensitivity test. For detailed behavior of these
sensitivity tests, please refer to Appendix IV Sensitivity tests p. 291.
Integration error test is conducted to assess whether the results are sensitive to the
choice of time step (Sterman 2000). System dynamics models are formulated in
continuous time with integration method. The model behavior should not be sensitive
to the choice of the time step. The way to test the integration error is to cut the time
step in half and run the model again. If the result changes in ways that matter, the time
step is too large. For this model, when cutting the time step into half, the model
behavior remains consistent with the base run, thus passing the integration error test.
6.4 Behavior tests
Once enough confidence has been developed in the model structure validity, we can
begin applying behavior tests — designed to measure how accurately the model can
reproduce reality. In normal cases, the behavior test consists of comparing the
model-generated behavior with historical data using statistics tools to assess the
point-by-point fit. However, this research concerns information security risks during
operation transition. Historical time series data are not always available. For example,
the vulnerability index has not been evaluated. For some other variables that might
have historical data, the data might not be precise. For example, there are historical
data about frequency of incidents and severity of incidents. However, the incident
reporting is not well regulated and most minor incidents are not recorded. Such data
are not suitable to serve as a base for behavior tests. Therefore, the standard behavior
test is not applicable in this case. Alternatively, we invited the experts from the IRMA
team to review the model behavior. During the interview, several different scenarios
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were presented to the experts. Their recognition of the model behavior increased the
confidence in the model behavior validity. This model validation interview will be
reported in the next chapter.
6.5 Closing remarks for chapter 6
Model validation is an ongoing process throughout the model building process.
According to Sterman, “Testing begins as soon as you write the first equation.” He
emphasized that testing involves far more than the replication of historical behavior, -
every variable must correspond to a meaningful concept in the real world, and every
equation must be checked for dimensional consistency. The sensitivity of model
behavior and policy recommendations must be assessed in light of the uncertainty in
assumptions, both parametric and structural (Sterman 2000).
With the group model-building workshops, validation starts even earlier. During the
system conceptualizing stage, the modeller must start the validation by asking
questions such as “Do we have the right person for the workshop?”, “Does the
dynamic problem definition represent the reality?”, “Are we at the right level of
aggregation?” and so on. The answers to such questions cannot be achieved by formal,
objective validation process; they are social, judgment beliefs.
A wide range of tests help modellers to understand the robustness and limitations of
the models. A wide range of data, both numerical and qualitative, provides
opportunities for confirming or challenging the model. However, no model can be
fully validated. Never ask whether a model is true or false, but ask whether the model
is useful in relation to its purpose.
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7 Model Validation Interviews
This chapter presents the interviews with information security experts from the IRMA
project reviewing the Brage model simulation results. The first section of this chapter
explains the goals for the interviews. The next section focuses on the interview design.
It includes the rationale that led to the choice of a structured interview to obtain expert
feedback and reflection, a description of the booklet for the structured interview, and
the test of the booklet. The third section describes the administration of the interviews
including the selection of informants and the arrangement of the interviews. Finally,
the interview results are analyzed along with a summary of the indicated strengths and
weaknesses of the Brage model.
7.1 Purpose of the Interviews
As discussed in chapter 6, the Brage model does not have historical time series data
which we can compare with the model-simulated behavior. Hence, a standard
behavior validation of the model is not possible. We thus have to find an alternative
way to validate the model behavior. The plan is to use interviews with experts so as to
seek their opinion on the model-simulated behavior. Their acceptance of the
model-simulated behavior adds our confidence to model.
The foremost goal for the interviews is to determine if the model-generated behaviors
are credible. Under the given assumptions of the model, would experts expect to see
the behaviors generated by the model? If the behaviors are found to be in accordance
with the expectations, they could provide support for the model’s results and in part,
for the underlying structure. If the behaviors are found to be in contrast with the
expectation, they would stimulate discussions on how the results have been obtained
and what changes should be considered (Rich 2002).
The second goal for the interviews is to check the soundness of the model structure.
As mentioned, the recognition of the model behavior implied a support for model
structure. Moreover, we also conducted direct inquiries about the model structure.
Prior to the interviews, the model structure was presented to the chosen informants.
During the interview, the informants were firstly asked about their opinions on the
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model structure. Then we checked with them whether specific causal links and certain
parts of the model were a good representation of the reality. Finally, we also asked
whether there are any missing links. These are questions directly related to model
structure. This process served as direct structure validation.
Third, the interviews could aid in the assessment of the model parameters. This was
done in part, through the acceptance of the model behavior. At the same time, we
directly queried the informants about some of the model parameters during the
interviews. This was a process which served as the parameter assessment.
Another goal of the interview is to seek experts’ advice on future model development.
There were questions about additional model structure, variables, and scenarios. The
answers to these questions helped us shape policy designs and future research
direction.
7.2 Interview design
7.2.1 The rational for using a structured interview
Interview research is a frequently used method for data collection in the social science.
Interviews can be conducted either in person or over the phone. These can either be
structured (based on a carefully worded interview script) or unstructured (allowing the
interviewee to tell stories and give examples). The former is often used as a means to
collect data for specific questions, while the latter is often used as a means to unearth
issues that the interviewer finds novel or counterintuitive.
Conducting interviews with experts has long been utilized in various stages of system
dynamics model development. We summarize the following table based on a study
conducted by Luna-Reyes and Andersen (Luna-Reyes and Andersen 2003).
Table 7-1 The objectives of using interviews during model development
Model development stage Purpose of use interview
Model conceptualization Used to identify problem and elaborate dynamic hypotheses
Model formulation Used to obtain parameters and policies
Model testing Used to obtain expert judgment about model structure and
behavior
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In most cases, the unstructured interview is more suitable for model conceptualization,
while the structured interview is more suitable for model formulation and model
testing. For model testing, Vennix described an approach based on “workbooks” to
conduct model assessment with individuals or groups (Vennix 1996). The workbooks
contain questions on causal relations and model behavior. Rich used interviews to
validate the model behavior of knowledge management in his dissertation. Our
foremost intention is also to validate the model behavior. Therefore, we follow the
procedures taken by Rich (2002). A model review booklet was developed to facilitate
the interview. We will introduce the booklet below.
7.2.2 The interview booklet
An interview booklet was prepared to support the interview for this study. It included
three parts:
1. The first part presented the introduction and background information, and was
required be read by the informants before the interview. The introduction contained
interview instructions for the informants, while the section on background
information presented the model structure, a brief summary of scenarios to be seen,
and the key variables and their definitions. At the end of this part, an indicator pointed
out that the informants should stop reading.
2. The second part was the main body of the interview. It showed the behavior of the
key variables of six scenarios: 1) Base, 2) Focus on production, 3) Focus on
knowledge, 4) Quicker to build IR capability, 5) Higher initial IR capability, and 6)
Delay transition. For each scenario, the informants were asked to rate the key
variables as plausible (P), uncertain (U), or not plausible (N), under the conditions of
the scenario. When these terms were not used explicitly, we made judgments for the
rate based on what is implied by the content of the informants’ comment. The
informants were then asked to provide their reasons for the model behavior. After
describing their own mental models of the scenario, they were then asked to evaluate
a prepared analysis based on the causal constructs of the simulation. Again, they were
asked to rate the analysis with plausible (P), uncertain (U), or not plausible (N). Since
the informants provided their own mental model before learning of the
simulation-based explanation, it became possible to consider how their mental models
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differed from that of the simulation. The final questions for each scenario were to
identify missing causal factors and policy actions.
3. The third part consisted of the closing questions. It compared related scenarios,
asking the informants to evaluate the differences in the model-generated behavior.
The outcome of the evaluation was rated as plausible (P), uncertain (U), or not
plausible (N). This part also includes questions asking the informants about where the
model could be extended through additional structure, variables, or scenarios. The full
interview booklet was attached at Appendix V Model validation interview p.318.
7.2.3 Booklet testing
We conducted extensive testing of the booklet before releasing it to the informants.
Nine volunteers participated in the booklet testing. They were consultants and
researchers in universities (see Table 7-2). Four of them had experience with
information security management.
Table 7-2 Volunteers who participated in the interview booklet testing
Occupation of the participants Numbers
Consultants (from IBM, KPMG, Deloitte) 6
PhD students (in information security research) 2
Assistant Professor (in information system) 1
The first test interview provoked many changes in the booklet. The introduction part
was shortened, eliminating the detailed information on model structure. The chosen
key variables were also reduced from eight to six, because the interview took a much
longer time than we expected.
The following several test interviews led to minor revisions, such as changing the
scenario sequence, improving the wording, and adjusting the closing questions. After
the first five test interviews, further suggestions for changes were seldom encountered,
indicating that the interview booklet had achieved maturity.
Most volunteers agreed with the model behavior under different scenarios. Only a
single respondent found the base run behavior difficult to understand, which led to a
difficulty in giving opinion for different scenarios. The other eight persons showed
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positive opinions to the model behaviors. Two of them explicitly mentioned that they
had encountered cases in reality that corresponded to the model behavior. One
volunteer reported an incident occurred in a company which was implementing an
SAP system in the finance department. The company failed to allot sufficient
resources to allow its employees to learn new the work processes and gain knowledge;
thus, people were unable to work efficiently under the new system. This gave rise to
numerous errors and unsettled accounting treatments that finally led to the resignation
of the entire accounting team. The company had to temporarily outsource its
accounting tasks to clean up the old unsettled treatments while recruiting a new team,
costing the company millions of dollars in expenditures. This case was similar to what
was presented in the second scenario – focus on production. The other volunteer had
experience consulting on safety management for a big Chinese oil and gas company.
She felt that the company has been in the loop presented in scenario 5: the
management investment in safety was low, and fewer safety problems were detected
leading to a misperception of being safe, leading to even lower investment in safety
management. This underinvestment in safety is a latent danger for the company. Thus,
she strongly agreed with the reinforcing loop in scenario 5 and thought it represented
the reality very well. And she commented that it was crucial to bring the organization
into the positive side of the reinforcing loop: more investment in safety, more safety
problems detected and reported and even more investment in safety until the system
become robust.
7.3 Interview Administration
7.3.1 Recruitment of subjects
The ideal informants should be persons from Hydro. However, Hydro’s formal
engagement in this project was terminated at the end of 2006. Moreover, at the end of
2006, Hydro merged with another big Norwegian oil and gas company, Statoil,
forming the new company StatoilHydro. This led to organizational restructuring, and
we could no longer obtain support from those who originally participated in our
workshops. Alternatively, the IRMA team had expertise in incident response
management in Hydro. They were thus good candidates for the model review
interview. We contacted IRMA team in July 2008, and obtained their continued
support for the project. Four experts from the IRMA were confirmed to participate in
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the model validation interview. Each participant was asked to schedule two sections
on the same day for the interview, with 90 minutes allotted for each section. Four
consecutive days were scheduled for the four experts respectively.
7.3.2 The process of the interview
The interview booklet was sent to the IRMA experts when the testing of the booklet
was completed, two weeks before the interview with them started. The informants
were instructed to read the first part of the booklet before the interview. The
interviews were structured in three blocks.
1. Background: The first block included confirming consent orally, asking permission
for taping the interview, and verifying that the informants had read the background
materials. All four informants had read the background material beforehand. We then
asked the experts whether they agree with the model structure presented in
background information. We discussed any questions the informants had about the
interview, the model, the variables, and others.
2. Simulation Scenarios: The second block presented the model behavior of six
scenarios (Base, Focus on production, Focus on knowledge, Quicker to build IR
capability, Higher initial IR capability, and Delay transition). Each simulation was
presented individually using a specific sequence of steps:
Step 1: A short description of the situation was read to the interviewee. A
graph of each of the behavior of the six variables was presented, after which a
description of each was read aloud by the interviewer. The Base Run behavior for
each variable was included in the other five scenarios to facilitate comparisons.
The booklet contained both the graph and the text description to enable the
interviewee to follow along.
Step 2: After the description of the behaviors, the informants were asked if
they believed the behavior of each individual variable was plausible (P), uncertain
(U) or not plausible (N), within the constraint of each scenario. Comments and
questions were encouraged.
Step 3: The informants were then asked to craft an explanation of how the
model behavior was generated. This explanation could include the causal factors
in the model or additional factors deemed important to understanding the
outcomes.
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Step 4: After describing their own mental model of the scenario, the
informants were asked to consider a prepared analysis of the situation. This
analysis was drawn from the causal constructs of the simulation model. They were
asked to evaluate the plausibility of the prepared analysis and provide any other
reactions to this alternative explanation, along with other factors that should be
added. Care was taken in the wording of the questions and instructions to reduce
any implications of correctness of the prepared analysis.
3. Closing questions: the final part of the interview included two types of questions.
First, after going through six scenarios one by one, questions were raised to compare
the behavior of relevant scenarios. Presented with the graph of the key variables in
different scenarios, the informants were asked whether they thought the difference
was reasonable, what were the reasons that generated the behavior, and whether such
behavior was realistic. The second type of questions asked the informants to identify
any model structures, variables, or scenarios that would be in the interest for future
model development.
7.3.3 Data capture
With the consent of the subjects, all four interviews were taped. The tapes were not
made into transcripts because we were not to make coding of the obtained information.
We used tapes just to ensure informants opinions and comments were correctly taken.
After the interview, we listened to the tapes several times to collect the informants’
opinions and comments, and to ensure a correct understanding of their ideas. The key
messages are listed in the following section.
7.4 Result of the model review interview
The interviews were conducted in November 2008. In this section, we present the
informants’ response to the model behaviors presented to them.
7.4.1 Interview results—scenario review
Scenario 1. Base Run: Reactions to the behaviors of Base Run were mixed (see Table
7-3). Consent agreement was reached for two variables, namely, severity of incidents
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and incident response capability. For other variables, at least one informant showed
uncertainty or disagreements.
Table 7-3 Base Run
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes U P P P
Mature new knowledge U N P P
Monthly profit P P P N
Frequency of incidents P U P N
Severity of incidents P P P P
Incidents response capability P P P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
 Mature new work processes. Three informants (A2, A3, A4) thought that the
development of the mature new work processes was plausible. One of them
commented that a period of four months for the new work processes to mature seemed
long, but he could understand that it was because of the work swift on the oil platform.
The other informant (A1) felt that she did not have enough knowledge about the
Industry to be certain.
 Mature new knowledge. Two informants (A3, A4) believed that the model reflected
the development of mature new knowledge. Of the two other informants (A1, A2),
one felt that she did not have enough knowledge about the Industry to be certain,
while the other respondent thought that the mature knowledge would follow the shape
of mature new work processes more closely.
 Monthly profit. Three informants (A1, A2, A3) agreed with the pattern of the
monthly profit—a drop at the beginning and then a gradual increase thereafter.
Among them, one informant felt that the increase in the latter years seemed too big.
She amended “Of course, it depends on the business. Maybe it could be that big and
that is why they (Hydro) have invested so much on it.” The informant (A4) disagreed
with the pattern of the monthly profit. He thought there would be no drop in the
monthly profit. He argued that the benefits brought by Integrated Operations were so
huge that from the beginning, the increase of revenue could off-set the negative
effects of operation transition on production.
 Frequency of incidents. Two informants (A1, A3) agreed with the pattern of
frequency of incidents. One of them pointed out, “It is likely to have more incidents at
the beginning and stay there for a while and hopefully it will drop later as we know
well about the new work processes.” For the two other informants (A2, A4), one felt
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uncertain that frequency of incidents would stay at such a high level for so long. He
thought it might drop sooner after reaching a high level. The other informant
disagreed with the behavior because he learned from a survey about incidents on a
platform adopting Integrated Operations that the number of incidents before and after
the use of advanced ICT had not changed. He agreed that the system is more
vulnerable in Integrated Operations, because it is much more complex than the
traditional operation. Higher vulnerability meant higher probability of incidents
happening. However, whether or not incidents really occurred in reality was affected
by many other exogenous factors. We also thought that minor incidents might not be
reported and included in the survey results. However, the informant disagreed with
the sharp increase of frequency of incidents. He thought it could be that the company
had prepared for increasing risks so that the frequency of incidents did not increase
that much.
 Severity of incidents. All four informants agreed with the behavior of the severity of
incidents. One informant commented, “Quite realistic. The increase in the beginning
is because the increase of frequency of incidents, and the decrease is mainly because
the increase of incidents response capability.”
 Incident response capability. All four informants indicated that the incident
response capability was likely to gradually increase and then fall. One informant
commented, “People will become more capable to respond to incidents, and when
frequency of incidents drops, it (the capability) will drop too.”
Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants were able to present a systematic explanation: when new
work processes and knowledge were implemented, the frequency of incidents
increased sharply as the system became more vulnerable and faced more threats. Later,
when people learned to work with the new work processes, the frequency of incidents
dropped. The severity of incidents increased at the beginning as there was not enough
response capability. As the level of incident response capability gradually increased,
the severity of incidents decreased. One reason that the informants could come up
with such quality explanations could be that three of the four informants had
participated in the group model-building workshops and had knowledge about the
model.
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Then, the prepared analysis of the scenario was read to the informants, which was
similar to what they had explained. The prepared analysis also pointed out that the
sharp increase of the frequency of incidents at the beginning was also due to the
ambitious plan of changing five traditional work processes into new work processes in
the first year. All the informants agreed that the causal explanation of the base run
was plausible.
Scenario 2. Focus on production: The second scenario shown to the informants was
named focus on production, where more resources were reserved for production,
leaving fewer resources available to learn new work processes and knowledge. The
reaction to the behavior of this scenario was still mixed (see Table 7-4). Compared to
the base run, all of the informants agreed with the behavior of mature new work
processes, but for the other variables, at least one informant had doubts on their
plausibility.
Table 7-4 Focus on production
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes P P P P
Mature new knowledge P P U P
Monthly profit P P U N
Frequency of incidents U P U P
Severity of incidents P U P U
Incidents response capability P U P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
 Mature new work processes. All four informants thought that the development of
mature new work processes was plausible. They all felt that the development of
mature new work processes should be slightly slower than the base run.
 Mature new knowledge. Three informants (A1, A2, A4) believed that the model
reflected the development of mature new knowledge. One of them commented, “I
agree with the behavior. When there is very little time spent on maturing new
knowledge, it will mature very slowly.” The other informant (A3) thought the mature
new knowledge dropped too much. He thought people could mature new knowledge
by working with the new work processes.
 Monthly profit. Two informants (A1, A2) thought the behavior was plausible. The
other two (A3, A4) had different opinion. One of them thought that the drop of the
monthly profit in the later years was too big. The other thought that the monthly profit
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should behave similar to the base run. He argued that although the operators had less
productivity (because of less knowledge), more resources were focused on production.
Therefore, the production should be similar to the base run and the monthly profit.
 Frequency of incidents. Two informants (A2, A4) agreed with the behavior of this
variable. One of them commented, “This is surely true. People make more mistakes
with less knowledge.” For the other two informants (A1, A3), one felt that the pattern
was right but the difference seemed too big; the other one felt that the frequency of
incidents would not increase to such a high level.
 Severity of incidents. Two informants (A1, A3) agreed with the behavior of the
severity of incidents. One of them commented, “Under such a scenario, you will have
more severe incidents at the beginning, and it takes more time to reduce severity.”
The other two informants (A2, A4) thought the pattern was likely but that they both
felt that the severity of incidents might even be higher as people did not have mature
knowledge.
 Incident response capability. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) indicated that
incident response capability was likely to increase as the frequency of incidents had
been increasing throughout the simulation time. One informant (A2) thought that
although the number of incidents increased, as their severity stabilized, investments in
incident response capability might stop, and it might not increase in the latter years.
Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants explained quite systematically: With less time available for
learning, knowledge would mature very slowly. The monthly profits dropped less at
the beginning as more resources were reserved for production. However, since it took
longer to learn the new work processes, the monthly profits would be lower in the
long run. The frequency of incidents increased because people did not have enough
knowledge. The severity of incidents also increased. At the same time, IR capability
increased due to the increased occurrence of incidents. All of them agreed with the
prepared analysis of the scenario we read to them.
One informant made additional comments that this was a very realistic scenario. From
his observation, the oil and gas company had been focusing on production
optimization and not enough training had been conducted for the operators. He
expressed concern about this production-orientated management view. If operators
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were not trained to react to different situations, they would not know how to perform
when deviation happens.
Scenario 3. Focus on knowledge: The third scenario shown to the informants was
named focus on knowledge, where fewer resources were reserved for production,
leaving more resources available for knowledge building. The reaction to the behavior
of this scenario was improved (see Table 7-5). Compared to the base run, all of the
informants agreed with the behavior of mature new work processes and mature new
knowledge. The other variables are questioned by one or two informants.
Table 7-5 Focus on knowledge
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes P P P P
Mature new knowledge P P P P
Monthly profit P N P P
Frequency of incidents P P U P
Severity of incidents P P P U
Incidents response capability P U P N
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
 Mature new work processes. All four informants thought that the development of
mature new work processes was plausible. They all felt that the development of
mature new work processes should not be greatly affected since it already had enough
resources in the base run.
 Mature new knowledge. All four informants believed that the model reflected the
development of mature new knowledge. One informant’s comment was “the
knowledge should be better than base run.”
 Monthly profit. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) agreed with the model-simulated
behavior of the monthly profit, which they deemed worse than the base run at the
beginning but better than the base run in the latter years. The other informant (A2)
thought the monthly profit should increase quicker in the later years so that “It reaches
14M earlier and stays there.”
 Frequency of incidents. Three informants (A1, A2, A4) agreed with the
model-simulated behavior of frequency of incidents. One of them pointed out that
“You will have fewer incidents with more knowledge, and in the end, it will converge
with the base run.” Although the other informant (A3) agreed with the pattern, he felt
that the difference should not be so big.
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 Severity of incidents. Three informants (A1, A2, A3) agreed with the behavior of
the severity of incidents. One of them commented, “I think it will reduce severity of
incidents as you have more knowledge.” The other informant (A4) thought the pattern
was likely but he felt that the severity of incidents might be reduced to an even lower
level.
 Incident response capability. Two informants (A1, A3) indicated that incident
response capability was likely to be lower as the frequency of incidents became
reduced. For the other two (A2, A4), one thought “It will follow the shape of the base
run more closely.” The other was of the opinion that “Having more mature knowledge
could lead to high IR capability”.
Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants explained quite systematically that with extra resources, the
knowledge matured quicker. The profit was lower in the beginning because of the
extra effort to mature knowledge, and the profit was higher in the later years as people
have more knowledge of the new operation. There would be fewer incidents due to
more knowledge people have. The severity of incidents would be reduced for the
same reason, and the incident response capability would be lower because of the
reduced frequency of incidents. All of them agreed to the prepared analysis of the
scenario we read to them.
Scenario 4. The fourth scenario shown to the informants was named quicker to build
IR capability, where time to build IR capability is reduced from three months to two
months. Among the six scenarios, the reaction to the behavior of this scenario was the
best. Two informants totally agreed with the behavior of six variables, and the other
two had doubts with one variable (see Table 7-6).
Table 7-6 Quicker to build IR
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes P P P P
Mature new knowledge P P P P
Monthly profit U P P P
Frequency of incidents P N P P
Severity of incidents P P P P
Incidents response capability P P P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
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 Mature new work processes. All four informants thought that the development of
the mature new work processes was plausible. The policy for this scenario will not
affect the maturation of new work processes. Therefore, it was easy to understand that
mature new work processes behave exactly the same as the base run.
 Mature new knowledge. All four informants believed that the model reflected the
development of mature new knowledge. For the same reason as mature new work
processes, the behavior of mature new knowledge was the same as the base run.
Monthly profit. Three informants (A2, A3, A4) agreed with the model-simulated
behavior of the monthly profit, which is a little better than the base run. The other
informant (A1) thought that “If you increase a reasonable amount on incident
response capability, and spend the money wisely, then it is beneficial. But if you
spend a lot on the incident response capability, it probably will not be cost effective.”
 Frequency of incidents. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) agreed with the
model-simulated behavior of frequency of incidents. The other informant (A2)
thought that the frequency of incidents should be different considering the side efforts
of this change.
 Severity of incidents. All informants agreed with the behavior of the severity of
incidents. One of them commented, “The severity of incidents should be lower than
the base run.”
 Incident response capability. All informants indicated that incident response
capability was likely to be higher than the base run. One of them commented, “There
will be more incident response capability because of more investments made.”
Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants explained quite systematically: with a shorter time to build
up incident response capability, you have more incident response capability that
reduces severity of incidents; thus, the management will gain more than they lose. All
of them agreed with the prepared analysis of the scenario we read to them.
Scenario 5. Higher initial IR capability: The fifth scenario shown to the informants
was named higher initial IR capability, where the initial incident response capability
was raised from 0.1 to 0.3. The reaction to the behavior of this scenario was quite
good. One informant totally agreed with the behavior of the six variables, and the
other three had doubts on one variable (see Table 7-7).
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Table 7-7 Higher initial risk awareness
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes P P P P
Mature new knowledge P P P P
Monthly profit U P U P
Frequency of incidents P N P P
Severity of incidents P P P P
Incidents response capability P P P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
 Mature new work processes. All four informants thought that the development of
the mature new work processes was plausible, and that the policy for this scenario
would not affect the maturation of new work processes. Therefore, it was easy to
understand that mature new work processes behave exactly the same as the base run.
 Mature new knowledge. All four informants believed that the model reflected the
development of mature new knowledge. For the same reason as mature new work
processes, the behavior of mature new knowledge was the same as the base run.
 Monthly profit. Two informants (A2, A4) agreed with the model-simulated
behavior of the monthly profit, which is a little better than the base run. The other two
informants (A1, A3) felt uncertain as to whether the incident cost reduced would be
more than the investment in incident response capability. According to the general
economic theory on diminishing marginal return, one informant thought that there
should be a point before which the investment in incident response capability would
be cost effective and after which the investment in it would not be cost effective.
 Frequency of incidents. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) agreed with the
model-simulated behavior of the frequency of incidents. The other informant (A2)
thought that considering the side efforts of this change, the frequency of incidents
should be different.
 Severity of incidents. All informants agreed with the behavior of the severity of
incidents. One of them commented, “You will have less severe incidents because you
are able to handle them better.”
 Incident response capability. All four informants indicated that incident response
capability was likely to be higher than the base run. One of them commented, “There
will be more incident response capability since more investment is made.”
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Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants explained quite systematically: with more investments on
incident response capability, the incident response capability will increase and then
the severity of incidents will be reduced.
We further explained the mechanism that the increase in incident response capability
at the beginning helped detect more incidents, which could then lead to more
investment in later years. That is the reason why the incident response capability had
been higher than the base run for several years until the frequency of incidents began
to drop. All the informants agreed to this line of reasoning.
Scenario 6. Delay transition: The sixth scenario shown to the informants was named
delay transition. In this scenario, additional structure was added to the model: when
the incidents cost reached five times higher than the initial level, the transition speed
will be reduced to half, and when the incidents cost reaches 10 times higher than the
initial level, the operation transition will stop. The reaction to the behavior of this
scenario was mixed. One informant totally agreed with the behavior of the six
variables, while the other three had doubts on some of the variables (see Table 7-8).
Table 7-8 Delay transition
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mature new work processes P U P P
Mature new knowledge P U U P
Monthly profit P P U U
Frequency of incidents P U P P
Severity of incidents P P P P
Incidents response capability P N P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
 Mature new work processes. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) thought that the
development of the mature new work processes was plausible. The mature new work
processes was delayed in this scenario. The other informant (A2) thought the delay
seemed too small.
 Mature new knowledge. Two informants (A1, A4) believed that the model reflected
the development of mature new knowledge. One of them pointed out, “As you do not
implement new work processes that fast, you have more time to build knowledge at
the beginning. But in the long run, still it is behind schedule.” For the other two
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informants (A2, A3), one thought the pattern of mature new knowledge was likely,
but that the crossing of the two lines might occur earlier. The other thought that the
difference between mature new knowledge in this scenario and in the base run should
be bigger: “since the implementation of new work processes was delayed, more
knowledge should be able to mature.”
  Monthly profit. Two informants (A1, A2) agreed with the model-simulated
behavior of the monthly profits. The two other informants (A3, A4) felt uncertain.
One of them thought the monthly profits should be reduced more, while the other
thought the lowest point of the monthly profits should be delayed too.
 Frequency of incidents. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) agreed with the
model-simulated behavior of the frequency of incidents. The other informant (A2)
thought that frequency of incidents should be reduced but not that much. He felt it
should still be at a relatively high level.
 Severity of incidents. All informants agreed with the behavior of the severity of
incidents. They all thought that it should be lower than the base run scenario at the
beginning and approach the same level in the end.
 Incident response capability. Three informants (A1, A3, A4) indicated that
incident response capability was likely to be higher than the base run. The other
informant (A2) thought that it should be more similar with the base run.
Scenario Reviews. When asked to analyze the underline mechanism that caused these
results, all the informants explained quite systematically: the slower implementation
of new work processes gave people more time to acquire knowledge, resulting in
fewer incidents and less severe incidents. Moreover, the incidents response capability
did not need to be very high. The profit behaved similar as the base run in the
beginning, but as the IO had been slowed down, it became far less in the latter years.
All of them agreed with the prepared analysis of the scenario we read to them.
7.4.2 Interview results—closing questions
There were two types of questions in the closing section. Questions 1 to 5 still focused
on model structure and behavior, while Questions 6 to 8 asked informants for
additional model structure, variable, and scenarios.
Questions 1 to 5 summarized the counterintuitive behavior results in the above
scenarios (e.g., “more focus on production, less the monthly profit” and “higher
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incident response capability, more incident cost”) and asked the informants whether
such counterintuitive behavior was surprising to them (a “no” answer would be coded
as the model behavior was plausible). They were then asked to explain the reasons for
their answers and relate the model behavior to reality. The reactions of the informants
to these five questions are summarized in Table 7-9.
Table 7-9 Closing questions
A1 A2 A3 A4
Q1 P P P P
Q2 P P P P
Q3 P P P P
Q4 P P P P
Q5 P P P P
Legend: P: Plausible, U: Uncertain, N: Not Plausible
None of the informants thought the counterintuitive model behaviors were surprising.
When asked to explain, they gave the right reasons for the behaviors difference. One
reason of such consensus would be that after previously going through the six
scenarios, the informants had already gained an understanding of the model structure
that caused the model behavior. The experts’ answers gave support for the model
behavior and structure.
Questions 6 to 8 asked informants for additional model structure, variable, and
scenarios that they felt necessary for future model development. Below, we
summarize their responses.
 Human compliance. Two informants mentioned that the model might consider
adding more human factors in such a way that “When people get used to new work
processes, they could start to look for short cuts.” They hoped this piece of structure
could be developed in future modeling work.
 Preventive efforts from incident response capability. One informant stated that
some of the incident response capability might be allocated to work on incident
prevention, which could reduce the frequency of incidents. In the current situation, on
Brage, the incident response team was ad hoc, gathering only when an emergency
arose, and preventive function did not exist. However, it would be good if the model
could show the effect of preventive work.
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 Incident reporting. Two informants declared that incidents were not properly
reported. One informant pointed out, “Top management has no idea of small incidents
that were happening; they only knew about those incidents that disrupted production.”
This could lead to misperception of risks and underinvestment in incident response
capability. The other informant commented that incidents happening in one part of the
system were not typically shared with other parts of the system. There had been no
learning from incidents and similar incidents could still occur. If the model could
show the benefit of incident reporting and learning from incident, it would be of great
interest.
 Investment in incident response capability. One informant mentioned that the
decision to make investments in incident response capability might not be based on
frequency of incidents, but on the severity of incidents. The top management team did
not show concern about small incidents; they only knew about severe incidents.
Another informant suggested that the incident cost might affect decision on incident
response capability. These two types of decision rules on investment in incident
response capability are tested in chapter 8.
 Learning from incidents. One informant thought that learning from incidents could
help people build mature new work processes and mature new knowledge. Although
learning from incidents was quite limited in reality, if the model could show its effects,
it would encourage the management to promote learning from incidents.
7.5 Closing remarks for chapter 7
This chapter presented the review of the Brage model. Four experts from the IRMA
team reviewed six different scenarios. The base run scenario produced a great deal of
discussions of the model structures that supported it. Understanding this scenario
helped the informants to analyze the other scenarios. Some scenarios (such as
scenario 4 and 5) were easier than other scenarios (such as scenario 1 and 6), and had
more consensus. In general, the informants agreed to most of the patterns generated
by the model. They had some uncertainty about the amount of increase/decrease for
some variables. Only nine disagreements arose from the total 164 evaluations (Table
7-3 to Table 7-9). Over all, the interview results serve as indicators that the model
passed its behavior tests. It also implied that the feedback structure of the model was
plausible. In this manner, we completed our model validation. In the next chapter, the
model will be used to analyze different scenarios for policy formulation.
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8 Policies
Based on the validated Brage model, we investigate different policies to seek answers
to our research questions, listed in Chapter 1 Section 1.3 (p. 13): (1) What is an
appropriate speed for the transition to Integrated Operations on oil and gas platform
considering the trade off between financial gains and information security risks? (2)
How does resource allocation during operation transition affect the effective use of
new technology and information security risks during the operation transition? (3)
How do management decision rules on investment in incident response capability
affect information security risks?
In the first part of this chapter, we address each of these questions separately. The
Brage model is used to simulate different policy settings. The simulation results are
compared and analyzed. Based on the insights from such analyses, we identify the
best policies. In the second part, we simulate the Brage model combining these
individual policies. The analysis of individual policies leads to insights on how these
policies can complement each other to best mitigate information security risks during
operation transition. In the final section, we add the link that incident cost will affect
the operation transition speed to the Brage model. In such a way, it is possible to
study how management’s response to increasing incident cost will influence the
operation transition and information security risks.
The policies tested in this chapter all come from the model-based interventions: Some
are introduced by our client in the group model-building workshops while others are
suggested by the informants in the model validation interviews.
8.1 Single Policy
In this section, we address each of the three research questions separately using the
Brage model. We first analyze the model behavior of several different policy settings,
and end with a summary of the rule to achieve a sound policy.
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8.1.1 Transition speed
There are twenty new work processes to be introduced for the transition to Integrated
Operations. Management desires a fast operation transition in order to reap the
benefits from Integrated Operations as soon as possible. However, a fast introduction
of many new work processes and knowledge might cause trouble. We make a
comparison between four policies with different transition speeds, the settings of
which are listed in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1 Transition speed policies
Base run
(Policy 1)
Implement five new work processes in the first year, and afterwards, two new work
processes each year until twenty new work processes are completed
Fast transition
(Policy 2)








Implement two new work processes in the first year, and afterwards, three new
work processes each year until twenty new work processes are completed
The base run policy is formulated based on the real plan for the operation transition
on Brage. Policy 2, “fast transition” is based on the idea that emerged in the second
group model building workshop. One team of experts thought new work processes
could be implemented at a relative stable speed in 3-4 years (see Figure 8-1)
Therefore, we test the policy that five new work processes are introduced per year, -
implying 4 years to complete the implementation of twenty new work processes.
Figure 8-1 Experts opinion on the new work processes implementation
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During our communication with the client, we often heard concerns about too fast
transition to Integrated Operations. That is the reason we investigate the third
policy—to see what would happen if we slow down the speed of operation transition.
The introduction of twenty new work processes are evenly distributed in the course of
10 years time, which means two new work processes be implemented in one year.
During our model validation interview, one informant noticed that the “frequency of
incidents” and “severity of incidents” both increased sharply in year 1. This led the
informant to ask how the situation would be in case of a slow transition speed at the
beginning and an increased speed in later years. Thus, we investigate a fourth policy,
implementing two new work processes in the first year and then three new work
processes per year thereafter.
8.1.1.1 Simulation results analysis
In this section, we present the model-simulated results of these four policies along
with the analysis of the model behavior. The base run (policy 1) is represented by the
blue line numbered as 1; the fast transition (policy 2) is represented by the red line
numbered as 2; the slow transition (policy 3) is represented by the green line
numbered as 3; and the slow then fast (policy 4) is represented by the purple line




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Base run: (blue line, with number 1) - Implementing five new work processes in the
first year and two new work processes each year after.
Five new work processes and related knowledge are introduced in the first year. There
are not enough resources to mature all of them. In resource conflicts, resources are
first allocated to mature new work processes. Therefore, new knowledge matures only
very slowly in the beginning. From year 2 on, two new work processes are
implemented each year. The amount of mature new work processes increase steadily.
And the amount of mature new knowledge gradually picks up. Both new work
processes and new knowledge approach twenty at the end of the simulation. The
“frequency of incidents” increases sharply in the beginning because the quick
operation transition during the first year introduces more threats to the platform and
the platform is highly vulnerable mainly due to the accumulation of immature
knowledge and the big knowledge gap. The “frequency of incidents” stays at the high
level as new work processes and knowledge are introduced on a continuous basis. The
“frequency of incidents” starts to decrease in year 8 since most new work processes
and knowledge have been introduced already by then. Since the “incidents response
capability” is low in the traditional operation, with a sudden sharp increase in the
occurrence of incidents, there is not enough capability to handle them. Therefore, the
“severity of incidents” increases. It takes time to realize the inadequacy of incident
response capability, to make investment, and to build up incidents response capability.
As the “incidents response capability” builds up, the “severity of incidents” starts to
drop from year 2. The “incidents response capability” starts to decrease in year 6 as
fewer incidents occur. Thus the “severity of incidents” stabilizes. The “monthly
profit” drops in the first year for two reasons: First, resources are allocated to mature
new work processes and knowledge, - which leads to reduction of production output
and, thus, to a drop in revenues. Second, the benefit of Integrated Operation is small
at the beginning. As more new work processes are implemented, the increased
productivity and reduced cost improve the “monthly profit”. The “monthly profit”
increases after year 2, and exceeds the original level in year 3. After year 6, the
“monthly profit” increases faster than before since most new work processes and
knowledge have matured so that resources are released to address production.
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Policy 2: Fast transition (red line with number 2) – Implementing five new work
processes each year
The number of mature new work processes builds up more quickly than in any other
of the policies since five new work processes are implemented each year. Under such
circumstance, the operators’ are kept busy being trained in new work processes and
thus having little time to acquire new knowledge. Moreover, a fast introduction of
new work processes creates high “new initiatives burden” which reduces the
operators’ learning efficiency. As a result, the amount of mature new knowledge
remains quite low during the first 5 years. After that, as most new work processes are
matured, more resources are allocated to mature new knowledge. When knowledge
maturation increases, the “new initiatives burden” is reduced. That further accelerates
the maturation of new knowledge. A reinforcing loop generates increasing growth of
mature new knowledge during the last 5 years, reaching around 19 sets of mature new
knowledge in the end. Among all four policies, knowledge maturation in policy 2 is
the slowest during the first 5 years. Thus in this policy, the amount of immature new
knowledge accumulates to its highest level and the knowledge gap is its largest. The
widened knowledge gap makes the system most vulnerable and thus causes most
incidents. The “frequency of incidents” peaks around 1.7 incident/month in year 5. It
decreases thereafter as the knowledge maturation picks up. With the highest
“frequency of incidents”, the “severity of incidents” is also the highest among all
policies. Yet the “severity of incidents” is only a little bit higher than in the base run,
because more “incident response capability” has been built to handle the increasing
number of incidents. The “incident response capability” is also the highest among all
the policies. The “monthly profit” drops in the first year and exhibits at that time a
behavior similar to the one in the base run. Thereafter, the “monthly profit” increases
slowly, the slowest in all four policies. This is because the operation transition speed
is so fast that the operators could not learn how to work effectively in the new
operation. Therefore, the benefit of new operation could not be fully achieved. This
policy keeps up with the old saying that “haste makes waste.”
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Policy 3: Slow transition (green line with number 3) – Implementing two new work
processes each year
The number of mature new work processes and amount of knowledge accumulate
relatively slowly in this policy and end both at the lowest value among the four
policies. This is mainly due to the slow operation transition speed. The “frequency of
incidents” is lowest because the platform is less vulnerable with a slow operation
transition. Operators can take time to learn the new work processes and acquire new
knowledge, reducing the immature new work processes and knowledge and the
knowledge gap. With least incidents occurrence, the “severity of incidents” is also the
lowest and the “incident response capability” is not as high as in other policies. The
“monthly profit” does not drop as sharply as in policies 1 and 2 at the beginning, and
reaches the lowest point by month 12. Then it starts to pick up. The “monthly profit”
is not as high as that in policy 1 because the slow operation transition delayed the
realization of the benefit of the new technology. But the “monthly profit” is higher
than that in policy 2 as operators have learnt how to work effectively with the new
technology.
Policy 4: Slow then fast (purple line with number 4) – Implementing two new work
processes in the first year and three new work processes each year after
Because of the modest operation transition schedule, there are fewer mature new work
processes during the first 4 years in this policy than in the base run. Subsequently, the
number of mature new work processes in this policy exceeds that in the base run. The
amount of mature new knowledge is lower than in the base run, because, from the
second year on, the operation transition speed is faster in this policy than in the base
run. Less operators’ time is available for maturing new knowledge. The “frequency of
incidents” is lower than in the base run at the beginning as fewer new work processes
and less knowledge are introduced. However, the “frequency of incidents” continues
to increase until year 6, reaching a higher level than in the base run. The “severity of
incidents” is much lower than in the base run, because there is no sharp increase in
the “frequency of incidents” at the beginning. Though the “frequency of incidents”
keeps increase until year 6, reaching a higher level than in policy 1, the “incident
response capability” has been built up to handle incidents. Therefore, the “severity of
incidents” is never higher than in the base run. The “monthly profit” behaves similar
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to that in policy 3. It does not drop as sharply as in policies 1 and 2, and reaches the
lowest point by month 12, when it starts to pick up. The “monthly profit” is not as
high as that in policy 1, but higher than that in policy 2.
8.1.1.2 Policy evaluation
We have studied the key model outputs in the case of four policies. Here, we provide
an overall evaluation and a direction for a sound policy.
For a business unit, whether a retail store or an oil platform, an important goal is to
make profit. Therefore, the monthly profit is a crucial indicator for the policy
evaluation. Moreover, specific to an oil platform, the management is keen to avoid
severe incidents that might cause production disruption or even threaten health, safety,
and environment (HSE). Therefore, the severity of incidents is another key indicator
used in the evaluation of the policies. Originally, we planned to include the frequency
of incidents as an indicator. However, in the model validation interview most
informants mentioned that the management does not consider minor incidents.
Therefore, the frequency of incidents is not the key concern of the management. This
variable is not included as a policy evaluation indicator.
With our emphasis on the severity of incidents and the monthly profit, it is clear that
policy 2 is not a good choice. In this policy, the monthly profit is the lowest and the
severity of incidents is the highest among all policies. This shows that a fast operation
transition, with little time for the operators to be trained in the new work processes
and acquire new knowledge, is not only dangerous but also less profitable, because
the amount of immature new knowledge prevents the effective use of new technology.
In the other three policies, we identify conflicts in the two indicators: A fast transition
generates more profit, but it also causes incidents to be of high severity (such as in the
base run policy). In contrast, a slow transition reduces the severity of incidents while
it generates less profit (such as policy 3). What policy is considered the best depends
on the range of what is considered acceptable values for each of the indicators as well
as the weight assigned to each of them. For example, if an incident over 2 million
NOK must be prevented, then the transition speed in policy 1 (base run) is not
acceptable since the severity of incidents reaches more than 1.5 million NOK at the
end of year 1. Because the severity of incidents simulated by the Brage model
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represents the average severity of incidents, 1.5 million NOK average severity of
incidents means that among all incidents, those more severe ones could be well above
2 million NOK. Policy 3, “slow transition” and policy 4 “slow then fast transition” are
better choices in this respect. Comparing policies 3 and 4, the monthly profit for the
latter is slightly higher, but its severity of incidents is marginally higher. Considering
the scale of the monthly profit, a slight increase in monthly profit could result in large
absolute amount, policy 4 might be a better one. So far, the speed of implementing
two new work processes during the first year and three new work processes each year
in the succeeding years is the best among the four tested policies. In cases wherein
severe incidents over 2 million NOK is acceptable, policy 1 might be considered as
the best since it generates the most monthly profit.
Although the choice of transition speed depends on the management’s judgment of
the two key indicators, the “monthly profit” and the “severity of incidents”, some
basic rules may be followed in order to determine the best transition speed policy.
In the case where four months are needed to mature new work processes, and eight
months to mature new knowledge during the operation transition, implementing more
than three new work processes a year will lead to the accumulation of immature new
work processes, immature new knowledge, and a widened knowledge gap (when the
operators do not have enough time to mature new work processes, less time will be
allocated to mature knowledge). In this case, implementing two new work processes a
year might be a quite safe approach. Herein, all new work processes can mature and
1.5 sets of corresponding new knowledge can mature, thus leaving only a half-set of
new knowledge remaining to mature thereafter. Implementing fewer than two new
work processes a year is an unnecessarily slow transition of operations. Such a slow
transition will only result in slightly lower severity of incidents, but in a much less
monthly profit. Therefore, a sound policy could be to implement two to three new
work processes each year, depending on the level of risk that the management is
willing to take and the pressure to make profit.
In more general terms, for any major operation transition project, the management
should plan the implementation of new work processes with time-steps that offer time
for employees to mature not only their new work processes but also their new
knowledge. If the only focus is on immediately reaping benefits from new technology
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and implementing many new work processes in a short period of time, the project
might face risks wherein employees feel burdened with novelties and where the
learning efficiency is reduced, resulting in the improper use of new technology. This
might lead to a situation where operators work in the “old way” with new technology.
The expected benefits from new technology will not be realized while great
vulnerabilities will be introduced into the system.
8.1.2 Resource allocation during operation transition
There are limited resources on a platform. The operators work 12 hours a day, seven
days a week. During operation transition, apart from their routine production task, the
operators have to be trained in new work processes and acquire new knowledge, - a
disruption in routine work. Given the limited resources, if more operators’ time is set
aside for new work processes and acquiring new knowledge, less of their time is
available for production, and vice versa. Here, we will investigate how different
resource allocation policies affect the operation transition and information security
risks. Three policies are simulated: 1) “base run,” (the same as the policy 1 in section
8.1.1), 2) “fewer resources for maturation,” and 3) “more resources for maturation.”
Table 8-2 Resource allocation policies
Base run
(Policy 1)
This policy implies that 90% of the operators’ time is reserved for
production, (10% of the operators’ time is available for maturing new




This policy implies that 95% of the operators’ time is reserved for
production, (5% of the operators’ time is available for maturing new




This policy implies that 85% of the operators’ time is reserved for
production (15% of the operators’ time is available for maturing new
work processes and knowledge)
In the base run, we set the “minimum operators resources for production” to 90% of
the total operators’ working time. During the model validation interview, the
informants suggested that there was always a strong focus on production and that
management could not afford major drop of production performance. As a result, we
test what if less time is provided for training and learning by setting the “minimum
operators resources for production” to 95%, leaving only 5% of operators working
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time for the operation transition. During the workshops, the group members came up
with policies for more training, which means more time is provided for the operators
to mature new work processes and knowledge. We test this policy by setting the
“minimum operators’ recourses for production” to 85%, leaving 15% of the operators’
working time for training and learning.
8.1.2.1 Simulation results analysis
In this section, we will present the results and an analysis of the behavior resulting
from model-based simulations when applying the three policies. The base run (policy
1) is represented in figure 8-3 by the blue line numbered as 1; “less time for learning”
(policy 2) is represented by the red line numbered as 2; and “more time for learning”









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Here, we will not repeat the base run analysis, but focus on the other two policies.
Policy 2: Fewer resources for learning (red line, number 2) – 95% operators’ time is
reserved for production, leaving 5% operators’ time for learning new work processes
and knowledge
Under this policy, less operators’ time is available for new work processes and
knowledge maturation. As the time is first allocated to mature new work processes,
the time to mature new work processes is almost the same in policy 2 as in policy 1.
However, the time to mature new knowledge, the remaining amount of time after
what is used for new work process maturation, is much less in policy 2 than in policy
1. As a result, the mature new work processes are only slightly lower than that in the
base run, but the mature new knowledge is much less than in the base run. Working
with new work processes without mature new knowledge makes the platform very
vulnerable, causing the “frequency of incidents” to continuously increase until year 8.
It reaches a much higher level than that in the base run. The “severity of incidents” is
only slightly higher because the “incident response capability” is built higher to
properly handle the incidents. The “monthly profit” doesn’t drop as much as the base
run in the beginning since more time is reserved for production. However, the
“monthly profit” increases slowly later. In the end, it only approaches 11million NOK,
almost 30% lower than in the base run (reaching around 14 million NOK in the end).
This is because the operators do not have sufficient knowledge to work with the new
work processes. The benefit of the new technology could not be fully realized.
Policy 3: More resources for learning (green line, number 3) –85% operators’ time is
reserved for production, leaving 15% operators’ time for learning new work
processes and knowledge
Under this policy, more operators’ time is made available for new work processes and
knowledge maturation. Having already enough time to mature new work processes in
the base run, additional time does not make a difference. The mature new work
processes are almost the same as that in the base run. Yet, in need of more time for
new knowledge maturation, additional time fastens the knowledge maturation. With
more mature new knowledge, the platform is less vulnerable and has fewer incidents.
The “severity of incidents” is also slightly lower than in the base run. The incident
response capability is lower in this policy. The “monthly profit” drops deeper at the
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beginning in this policy, even reaching negative figure. This is because more
resources are allocated to learning and fewer resources are left for production.
However, as the operators quickly learn to work with new technology, the “monthly
profit” increases faster later, exceeding the level in the base run in year 3.
8.1.2.2 Policy evaluation
We have studied the key model output for the three resource allocation policies and
will provide an overall evaluation of the results and a direction for a sound resource
allocation.
For the monthly profit, policy 3 is the best in the long run. At the same time, policy 3
produces fewer incidents and less severe incidents. The disadvantage of policy 3 is
that the monthly profit-drop in the short-term is more severe. With a long-term
perspective, however, policy 3 is found to be the best of the three.
Thus the allocation of resources during operation transition is a matter of short-term
versus long-term benefits. People tend to consider short-term benefits more than
long-term ones. During the model validation interviews, many experts mentioned that
the management’s main focus is on production, and big profit drops are unacceptable.
For that reason policy 2 may well be preferred to policy 3. Yet simulation results
show that policy 3 generates more profit in the long-term and the severity of incidents
under this policy is low.
Overall, the basic rule is that when new work processes are to be implemented and
new knowledge thus introduced, the management should expect and allow for a
production drop over a short period of time to allow for people to adapt. Such
activities are distractions from routine tasks. Under such circumstances, short-term
benefits often conflict with the long-term ones. If more time is given for people to
learn new work processes and knowledge, their short-term performance will drop
more severely. In the long run, however, the benefit of the new technology could be
fully realized at an earlier stage. If less time is given for people to be trained in new
work processes and acquire new knowledge, their short-term performance might not
drop so much, but in the long run, the benefit of the new technology could take a
longer time to realize. Based on the empirical evidence that management mostly
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focuses on short-term benefits, we would like to emphasize the need to sacrifice some
short-term benefits in exchange for more long-term benefits, as illustrated by the
simulation results resulting from the policies tested.
It might be wise to notify the operators of the expected short-term performance drop
before the start of operation transition. When trying to motivate people for a new
operation method, the management often focuses on the benefit that the new method
will bring. However, when people start to use it, complaints about the new method
often surface. People cannot complete their work as quickly and as smoothly as they
are used to, and they make mistakes, yet they do not know whom to contact when
deviation occurs. All the unfamiliarity generates negative feelings about the new
method, delaying the adoption process or even making it fail. Plenty of cases exist
wherein a new system is implemented, but people still work in the traditional way. It
is sometimes difficult for the operators to see that it is not the new method of
operations that causes the productivity drop, but their unfamiliarity with the new
method. By continuously using and learning of the new system, workers can regain
and even improve the productivity with the new operation method. Therefore, in order
to smoothly get over the operation transition period one may make people aware of
upcoming difficulties during the transition period and encourage them to overcome
the difficulties by using and learning the new method.
8.1.3 Management policy on investment in incident response
capability
Most organizations view security control as an overhead factor and adopt a reactive
security management approach, that is, they only address security concerns after
actual incidents happen. A proactive approach requires action before incidents happen.
For those who are responsible for security, it is often difficult to persuade senior
executives and board members to implement information security in a systemic way
(Allen 2005). The difficulty in selling proactive investment lies in the paradox of
information security management: if investment is made proactively, the frequency of
incidents and severity of incidents will be reduced, leading to a low perception of
risks and making it difficult to justify the investment in information security
management. This reasoning is best embodied by the statement, “Nobody ever gets
credit for fixing problems that never happened”.
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The same situation is reflected in the Brage case. During the group model-building
workshop, we have identified that the investments in incident response capability is
based on the frequency of incidents. When more incidents occur, management will
feel the need to make investments in incident response capability. Later, during the
model validation interview, experts thought that this assumption remains to be too
optimistic. Two out of four informants mentioned that the top management, people
who make investment decisions, does not know of any of the minor incidents taking
place in work place. They only recognize and are concerned about severe incidents
that cause production disruption. One informant thought that top management might
make an investment only when the incident cost is high.
The Brage model is based on the structure elaborated from the group model-building
workshop, that is, the investments in incident response capability is based on the
frequency of incidents. We will first test this policy rule. Then, we will adjust the
Brage model in order to test the other two policy rules, that is, investments in incident
response capability based on severity of incidents and investments in incident
response capability based on incident cost.
8.1.3.1 Invest when more incidents happen
In this part, we will use the Brage model to simulate two policies. The first one
represents a reactive policy, in which investment in incident response capability is
made when more incidents happen. The second policy is a proactive one, in which
investment is made before the operation transition starts.
Table 8-3 Response capability investment policies:
Policy 1: Invest when more
incidents happen (base run)
Keep the initial incident response capability at 0.1 incident / month.
Policy 2: Raise initial incident
response capability
Raise the initial incident response capability from 0.1 incident / month
to 0.3 incident/month.
In traditional operations, the incident response capability is quite low. There is no
need for high incident response capability with the limited use of ICT. The average
incident cost per month in traditional operation is only around 80,000 NOK. Normal
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severity of incidents is 500,000 NOK. Therefore, incident response capability in
traditional operation is only 0.1 incident/month. In accordance with the first policy,
the management keeps the incident response capability level despite their concern
about increasing information security risks. Following the second policy, on the other
hand, the management raises the incident response capability to 0.3 incident/month
before the start of the operation transition. The increase is significant (200%), but
small in absolute terms (0.2 incident/month), as the management would not raise the
incident response capability to a very high level considering the tight cost control.
Now, in Figure 8-4 and 8-5, we will present the model-simulated results of the two
policies along with an analysis of the model behavior. The behavior resulting from the
“invest when more incidents happen” policy is represented by the blue line numbered
as 1; the behavior resulting from the “raise initial incident response capability” policy
is represented by the red line numbered as 2.



























































































Figure 8-4 Mature new work processes and knowledge and frequency of incidents resulting
from a reactive vs. a proactive investment policy
Invest when more incidents happen
Raise initial incident response capability
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As shown in Figure 8-4, changing the initial incident response capability will not
affect the operation transition. Therefore, mature new work processes, mature new
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Figure 8-5 Severity of incidents and Incident response capability resulting from a reactive vs. a
proactive investment policy
The “severity of incidents” is greatly affected by the incident response capability.
Under policy 2, the severity of incidents peaks around 1.2 M NOK / incident, while in
the base run, it peaks to around 1.7 M NOK / incident. In comparison, the “severity of
incidents” reduces by around 35% under policy 2.
For these two policies, the “frequency of incidents” is exactly the same. The different
behavior of the “severity of incidents” is solely caused by the difference in the
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“incident response capability” under the two policies. Why does incident response
capability build up so slowly in base run? Why doesn’t management invest more as
many incidents happen? It is because the management does not know that so many
incidents are in fact happening. With a low incident response capability, only a small
fraction of incidents is detected, leaving a large fraction of incidents undetected.
Therefore, the management’s perception of the frequency of incidents is much lower
than the actual frequency. This causes underinvestment in incident response capability,
which results in the high severity of incidents. As seen in Figure 8-6, policy 2 causes







































Figure 8-6 Incident detected resulting from a reactive vs. a proactive investment policy.
This is what people call the “capability trap” during the group model-building
workshop. Herein, a low incident response capability leads to a small fraction of
incidents detected, resulting in the low perception of risks and underinvestment in
incident response capability. This feedback loop traps incident response capability
from achieving the real desired level. One real example given by the experts in IRMA
is on a virus-stricken computer that kept on shutting down by itself after working for
several hours. The operators felt annoyed by the work disruption, but no one really
knew that it was caused by a computer virus. Months passed before people finally
found that it was a virus causing the problem. If this virus contaminated the
production system, and the production system shut down during production, it would
have caused severe incidents. This case reflects that low incident response capability
cause low incident detection. Moreover, undetected incidents are of great danger and
could eventually have severe consequences.
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Policy conclusions
The results from the policy tests support proactive investments in incident response
capability. As suggested by the information security experts from the IRMA team,
any incident cost from 100 K NOK -2 M NOK is labeled as “dangerous”, ranked level
3 (level 5 for most serious incident) and incident cost from 2 M NOK-20 M NOK is
labeled as “critical;” ranked level 4. The variable severity of incidents represents the
average cost of incidents, which implies that among all incidents in the base run, those
more severe ones are critical incidents. Under policy 2, most incidents are still within
a dangerous level.
However, investing in incident response capability is not always cost-beneficial.
Whether additional investment in incident response capability is efficient depends on
the adequacy of incident response capability. If the incident response capability is
already adequate, further investment will be in vain. During the operation transition,
when the original incident response capability is deemed inadequate, the management
should consider proactive investments. Based on the simulation, we can see that with
low incident response capability, fewer incidents are being detected. Thus, a reactive
policy will trap the management into being unable to discover an increasing number
of incidents and into under-investment in incident response capability. Besides,
building incident response capability takes time. It might be too late to invest when
the signs of an increasing number of incidents show up. Overall, during the operation
transition, the policy to make investments only after recognizing that more incidents
happen, will lead to high probabilities for severe incidents.
The above model not only applies to oil and gas companies during the operation
transition but also to other high-risk organizations under normal operations. The
number of Internet users is ever-increasing and the tools for attacks are quickly
evolving. Even without any operation transition, companies constantly face a
changing environments and increasing threats. If a company only observes a few
incidents, the management should not simply draw the conclusion that the company is
in low risk condition. In fact, there are two possibilities: it could be that the company
has managed its information security risks very well, or that the incident response
capability is so low that only few incidents are being detected and reported. In the
latter case, the company is actually under great risk. An audit program for information
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security would be necessary to investigate the real information security condition of
any company.
8.1.3.2 Invest when severe incidents happen
From the model validation interview, we learned from the informants that those who
make investment decisions do not seem to be aware of the minor incidents occurring
in the workplace. “They only care about those severe incidents that disrupt
production,” one informant claimed. As such, we changed the model structure to
capture this observation. In the original Brage model, the investment in incident
response capability (based on the “desired incident response capability”) is affected
by the perception on the frequency of incidents (see left of Figure 8-7). Now the
model is adjusted in that the investment in incident response capability is affected by
the severity of incidents (right of Figure 8-7). There is a threshold level, under which
no investment is made. In such way, the model represents the decision rule that
investment decisions are made only when severe incidents happen.

















Effect of severity of incidents
on desired incident response
capability
Figure 8-7 Structure adjustment for severity based policy
We simulate two policies, - both of them designed to avoid severity of incidents
exceeding the level of 1 M NOK/incident. Under the first policy, when severity of
incidents is under 1 M NOK/incident, management does not make investments in
incident response capability because of lack of concern. If the severity of incidents is
above 1 M NOK/incident, then management will make a significant investment
(increase the incident response capability by 30%) to make sure that the severity of
incidents be controlled under 1 M NOK / incidents. Under the second policy, already
when the severity of incidents reaches 0.7 M NOK/incident, management starts
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investing preemptively in incident response capability. Yet the investment is not as
much as under the first policy. Management only invests 10% of the current incident
response capability.
Policy setting:
Policy 1: Invest when severe
incidents happen
When the severity of incidents is over 1 M NOK/incident, invest to
make incident response capability increase 30%.
Policy 2: Invest earlier When the severity of incidents is over 0.7 M NOK/incident, invest to
make incident response capability increase 10%.
Result analysis:
Below we present the results of the two policies along with an analysis of the model
behavior. In the diagram below, the “invest when severe incidents happen” policy is
represented by the blue line numbered as 1; the “invest when we seem to approach a
severe incident” policy is represented by the red line numbered as 2 (see below).
The change in this model structure does not affect the operation transition. As a result,
the mature new work processes, mature new knowledge, vulnerability index, and
frequency of incidents all remain the same as in the original Brage model (see Figure
8-8).
Invest when severe incidents happen
Invest when we seem to approach a severe incident
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Figure 8-8 Mature new work processes and knowledge and frequency of incidents
resulting from policies on severity of incidents
The severity of incidents oscillates under both policies (see Figure 8-9). Under the
first policy, even though the management invest a lot (30% of the current incident
response capability) to prevent incidents higher than 1 M NOK/incidents from
happening, the severity of incidents often reaches well above 1 M NOK/incident.
When incident response capability is high, the severity of incidents is low. However,
the incident response capability obsoletes over time, and the severity of incidents
gradually increases. Yet, the increasing severity of minor incidents is ignored by the
management. When the incident response capability becomes so low that incidents are
not detected and handled properly, severe incidents eventually will occur. When
investment is made at that time, there is time delay for capacity building. And during
the time delay, the organization is under risk of having even more severe incidents. As
indicated by the simulation results, the severity of incidents in policy 1 will not stop
increase when it reaches 1 M NOK/incident, rather, it gets to higher than 1.1 M

















































































Figure 8-9 Severity of incidents and incident response capability resulting from policies on
severity of incidents
In many investigation reports on severe incidents, researchers found that before major
incidents happen, there are signs of increasing number/severity of minor incidents
happening (Hopkins 2008). However, the management did not notice these small
signs. Our simulation result illustrates such kind of behavior. Under the second policy,
the management is aware of less severe incidents: When severity of incidents reaches
0.7 M NOK/incident, management starts investing in incident response capability.
Even though they invest a less amount, the severity of incidents is well controlled
within a small range, thus avoiding any severe incidents. We can see that, - except for
the first year of operation transition, when the incident response capability is
inadequate and the severity of incidents reaches a high level, for the remaining years
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the severity of incidents is controlled between 0.6 M NOK and 0.8 M NOK
throughout.
From Figure 8-9, we see that under the first policy, the incident response capability
drops to a relatively low level, while it does not do so under the second policy.
Noticing the increasing severity of incidents and investing earlier helps prevent the
incident response capability from dropping much under the second policy. Hence, the
severity of incidents is well controlled under less than 1 M NOK/incident. Of course,
as the new work processes and knowledge mature, the system is becoming less
vulnerable with fewer incidents happening. Therefore, the need for incident response
capability is, in general, decreasing.
While this part of the thesis was under development, a comparative case of car
accidents took place in China. In three consecutive weeks, three car drivers, driving
after drinking, killed three pedestrians, one in each car accident. There was a heated
discussion about how such tragedies could happen. Some experts pointed out that one
reason is that the authorities do not take minor traffic accidents seriously. Drivers
under the influence of alcohol or drugs will not receive a serious punishment, unless
they cause a severe accident. The authorities have not invested a great effort aimed at
detecting and punishing offenders in such minor accidents. As a result, lots of people
tend to drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Consequently, the risk of severe
accidents happening is very high.
Policy conclusions
Ignoring minor incidents and caring only about severe incidents is a reactive approach.
This approach ignores increasing risks, thus, actually increases the possibility of
severe incidents happening. In general, a reactive approach is not preventive. It is
necessary to be proactive, to take care of less severe incidents and make investment in
incident response capability earlier. As shown in the case of the two policies, if
management investigates less severe incidents (when the severity reaches no more
than 0.7 M NOK / incident), and makes investments to improve incident response
capability, then it is less likely that incidents of a severity reaching over 1 M NOK
will occur. On the contrary, in the case of a reactive approach, investments are made
after a severe incident has happened, as there is delay in capability building, the
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severity of incidents may well climb much higher than expected. During the time of
the delay, potential incidents might materialize and lead to severe consequence.
The threshold level 0.7 M NOK is used here as an example. The management has to
decide on its own threshold level based on the company’s characteristics. For example,
if the company could build up incident response capability quite quickly, the level of
threshold may be high. On the contrary, if it takes a long time to build up incident
response capability, the threshold level may well be low. Another factor to consider is
the consequence of a severe incident. The high hazardous industry such as oil and gas
production, nuclear plant, chemical plant, wherein severe incidents could lead to a
disaster to people and the environment, the threshold should be at a low level. In other
industries, such as in retail companies, where the consequence of incident is less
severe, the threshold may remain relatively high. There are other factors to consider
as well. Here, we will not list all. The key point is that it will not be very effective to
care only about those severe incidents. A more effective approach will be to prevent
severe incidents by dealing effectively with less severe incidents and make proactive
investment before a severe incident actually happens.
8.1.3.3 Invest when the incident cost is high
In the model validation interview, one informant mentioned that the decision to invest
in incident response capability might well depend on the incident cost. This kind of
decision rule is financially easy to justify. Since the incident cost is high, it will be
worthwhile to make investments in incident response capability to reduce incident
cost. We now change the model structure to capture this decision rule. In the original
Brage model, the investment in incident response capability is affected by the
perception on the frequency of incidents (see left of Figure 8-10). In present model,
the investment in incident response capability is affected by the expected incident cost,
which is the product of “frequency of incidents” and “severity of incidents.” There is
a threshold level, under which no investment is made (see right of Figure 8-10). In
such way, the model represents the decision rule that investment decisions are only
made when incident cost are high.
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Figure 8-10 Structure adjustment for cost based policy
Two policies are evaluated by way of simulation. Under the first policy, if the
expected incident cost is less than 0.5 M NOK/month, no investment will be made;
when it is more than 0.5 M NOK/month, the management will invest significantly (to
increase the incident response capability by 30%) in order to reduce incident cost.
Under the second policy, the management makes an earlier (preemptive) investment.
When the expected incident cost reaches 0.3 M NOK/month, the management starts
investing, but by an amount less than one invested under the first, - to increase the
incident response capability only by 10%.
Policy setting:
Policy 1: Invest when the
incident cost is high
When the expected incident cost is over 0.5 M NOK / month, increase
30% of the incident response capability in order to reduce the incident
cost.
Policy 2: Invest earlier When the expected incident cost is over 0.3 M NOK / month, increase
10% of the incident response capability to reduce the incident cost.
Below we present the model behavior resulting from the two policies along with an
analysis of the model behavior. The “invest when incident cost is high” policy is
represented by the blue line numbered as 1; the “invest when we seem to approach
high cost” policy is represented by the red line numbered as 2 (see below).
Invest when incident cost high
Invest when we seem to approach high cost
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The change in the model structure will not affect the operation transition. As a result,
the mature new work processes, mature new knowledge, vulnerability index, and
frequency of incidents all remain the same as in the original Brage model.



























































































Figure 8-11 Mature new work processes and knowledge and frequency of incidents resulting
from policies on incident cost
The incident cost oscillates under both policies (see Figure 8-12). Under the first
policy, it exceeds 0.5 M NOK/month periodically. This is because when the incident
cost reaches 0.5 M NOK/month, the management starts investing in response
capability. However, building such a capability takes time. In the meantime, the
incident cost exceeds 0.5M NOK/month. If management wishes to prevent incident
cost from exceeding 0.5 M NOK/month, it must invest before the incident cost
actually reaches that level. Under the second policy, the incident cost oscillates
around 0.3 M NOK / month. The amplitude is considerably less than under the first
policy due to the fact that investment is made preemptively and there is no need to
invest large amount. The incident response capability will not go up much and it will
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Figure 8-12 Incident cost, Severity of incidents and incident response capability resulting from
policies on incident cost
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There is a decreasing trend of incident response capability under both policies. The
incident response capability is higher under the second policy, as compared to the first
one. As fewer incidents occur when new work processes and knowledge mature,
investments in incident response capability is being reduced. Under both policies, the
incident response capability reaches a relatively low level.
There is another potential problem associated with this decision rule. In the long run,
the severity of incidents exhibits an increasing trend under both of these policies.
Under the first policy, the severity of incidents reaches a level higher than 1M
NOK/incident by the end of simulation. This is because when new work processes
and knowledge matures, frequency of incidents is reduced. As a result, incident cost
will be low, and thus the investment in incident response capability is reduced
correspondingly. The incident response capability diminishes by way of obsoletion
over time. When incidents do occur, they will be severe incidents because the
capability is inadequate and they may therefore not be handled effectively.
Policy conclusions
Investing in incident response capability solely based on the incident cost will not
prevent the low-probability, high-impact incidents. Rather, it merely works to reduce
high probability incidents. Most incidents arise with a high frequency, but also with
low impact. However, it is the low frequency, high impact incidents that have the
most severe consequences. The oil and gas companies are in a hazardous industry that
seeks to prevent such kind of incidents. Thus, making investment in incident response
capability based on incident cost alone is not a proper decision rule. If this method is
used for decision making, the management should, in addition, pay special attention
to signs of the increase in severity of incidents and keep the incident response
capability at a reasonable level in order to avoid severe incidents.
8.2 Mixed Policy
We have studied the implications of individual policies above. In reality these policies
could be used together (synthesized) to achieve a more desirable result. For example,
when a high transition rate is desired, then more of the operators’ resources could be
allocated to learn new work processes and acquire new knowledge. A fast transition
of operations might generate high information security risks. In that case, it is better to
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raise incident response capability to a higher level preemptively, i.e. before the
transition of operations takes place. Below, we study the combination of the three
individual policies using the Brage model. Note that this means the investment in
incident response capability is based on frequency of incidents. For what discussed in
section 8.1.3.2 and 8.1.3.3, the Brage model has been adjusted. We have gained
insights about these two decision rules during the previous discussion. Now, we will
return to work on the Brage model in the following study. We seek a combination of
policies that best mitigate information security risks during the operation transition.
Two combinations of policies will be compared to the policy governing the base case
(base run). Insights from the investigation of individual policy lead to the settings of
the combined policies. Fast operation transition is desirable. However, we have learnt
that fast operation transition will lead to high immature new work processes and
knowledge, and enlarged knowledge gap. All of these cause high information security
risks. Allocating more resources (operators’ time) to learn new work processes and
acquire new knowledge helps to reduce immature new work processes and knowledge,
reducing knowledge gap. At the same time, preemptively investment in incident
response capability can control the severity of incidents and thus, control the
information security risks. Based on such general rules, we set up the second
combination of policies with a transition speed corresponding to the introduction of
three new work processes and the associated knowledge per year (faster than the base
run), with 85% of resources reserved for production (more resources allocated for
learning), and the initial incident response capability set to 0.3 incident / month
(higher initial incident response capability). In the third combination of policies we
operate with a transition speed of four new work processes and the associated
knowledge per year (even faster than policy combination 2), with 80% of resources
reserved for production (even more resources allocated for learning than policy
combination 2), and the initial incident response capability raised at 0.5 incident /
month (even higher than policy combination 2). The three policy combinations are
summarized in Table 8-4.
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Table 8-4 Policy combination set-up
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Below is a presentation of the results of the three policy combinations along with an
analysis of that model behavior. The base run policy combination is represented by
the blue line numbered as 1, the result of policy combination 2 is represented by the
red line numbered as 2, and the result of policy combination 3 is represented by the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Here, we will not repeat the discussion of the base run, but focus on the other two
policy combinations.
Policy combination 2: Implementing three new work processes per year (red line,
number 2)
Due to the slack in operation transition schedule at the beginning of policy
combination 2, less mature new work processes accumulate initially compared to the
result of the base run. After year 3, however, the cumulative matured new work
processes under policy combination 2 exceeds the level attained in the base run.
Mature new knowledge builds up quicker under policy combination 2 than that in the
base run because: a) more resources have been made available for knowledge
maturation; and b) more new work processes and knowledge are introduced in policy
combination 2 after year 3 (the transition speed for the base run is five new work
processes in the first year and two new work processes each year after and the
transition speed for policy combination 2 is three new work processes per year). The
“frequency of incidents” gradually increases as the fast transition of operations
introduces threats and vulnerability to the platform. When most new work processes
and knowledge have been matured, i.e. after year 5, the “frequency of incidents”
starts to decrease. The “severity of incidents” is much lower mostly because that high
“initial incident response capability” keeps incident response capability at a higher
level in policy 2. The “monthly profit” drops deeper in the beginning. It picks up
from year 2 of, but is, for several years, lower than that in the base run. After year 5,
there is a period of rapid increase in the “monthly profit” and it exceeds the level in
base run at year 5.5. The reason why the “monthly profit” is lower during the first
couple of years is mainly because more resources are used to mature new work
processes and knowledge, which leads to a lower production output and, thus, lower
revenues. After year 6, when most of the new work processes and knowledge have
been matured, resources are released from learning activities to focus on production.
That is why the “monthly profit” subsequently increases fast.
Policy combination 3: Implementing four new work processes per year (green line,
number 3)
This policy combination is similar to the former one (policy 2), but incorporates a
faster transition of operations. After year 2, the level of mature new work processes
exceeds the level of that in the base run. There is more mature new knowledge,
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because the transition of operations is faster and more of the operators’ time has been
made available to mature new knowledge. The “frequency of incidents” follows the
same pattern as the one resulting under policy combination 2, but reaches, eventually,
a higher level. This is because the faster transition of operations brings more threats
and vulnerability to the platform. When most new work processes and the associated
knowledge have matured, the “frequency of incidents” is quickly reduced to the same
level as under policy 2. The “severity of incidents” is the lowest among all the three
combinations. This is because the “initial incident response capability” under this
policy 3 is the highest, 0.5 incident/month. The “monthly profit” drops even lower,
reaching almost -1M NOK/month at the end of year 1. It increases from year 2 to 4 to
the same level as in policy combination 2. As new work processes and the associated
knowledge mature earlier, the increase of “monthly profit” starts earlier than under
policy combination 2, reaching the top level earlier as well.
Policy conclusion
Policy combination 3 has the fastest operation transition speed, while the severity of
incidents is the lowest of the all policy combinations. This is because the incident
response capability has been raised to 0.5 incident/month before the operation
transition is initiated. That way, incidents could be readily detected and handled, so as
to control the severity of incidents. From our analysis, we conclude that it is possible
to carry out a fast and smooth transition of operations so long as the management is
prepared in advance for information security risks. Needless to say, with a fast
transition of operations, more of the operators’ time is required for maturing new
work processes and assimilating the associated knowledge. This will lead to severe,
fall in production and, thus, revenue and profit. The monthly profit under policy
combination 3 drops to negative level for several months during the years 1 and 2,
while, in the long run, the monthly profit under policy combination 3 is the best. It is
not easy for the top management and shareholders to support this policy combination
because, in view of uncertainties, the future outcome is typically discounted compared
to the current outcome. It is difficult to accept a worse-before-better scenario. This
model could help them understand that the small short-term profit drop will enable the
company to gain considerably larger earnings and profit in the mid- to long-term
future. That may well add confidence in such a conclusion and lead to investments of
the operators’ time for learning. However, if the management still cannot commit
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resources to mature new work processes and the associated knowledge, than it is
better to reduce the operation transition speed. As we have argued before, without
enough knowledge, the monthly profit will be lower in the mid and long term and the
platform will be much more vulnerable (see section 8.1.2).
8.3 Model extension
The Brage model describes how operation affects information security risks—changes
in the vulnerability index, frequency of incidents, severity of incidents, and incident
cost during operation transition. However, the model has not included how security
incidents could affect the speed of operation transition. During the group
model-building workshops, representative from the top management of Hydro
expressed that should a severe incident occur, the operation transition might be
delayed, or even stopped. The reason for not including such linkage in the current
Brage model is that this managerial decision remains vague. Even to Hydro’s
management, it is not clear what kind of incident could trigger a decision to slow
down or stop operation transition. Here, we add such a feedback to investigate how
the model behavior changes for different policies.



















Figure 8-14 Causal loop diagram of feedback from a major incident
The bolded link is added for the current policy analysis. Adding this link creates a
new balancing loop: When the incident cost reaches certain high level, the
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management will perceive that the transition to Integrated Operations is risky and thus
decide to reduce the speed of this operation transition. Slower operation transition
generates fewer immature new work processes and less immature knowledge on the
platform and will reduce vulnerability and thus lower the frequency of incidents.
Under a certain incident response capability, fewer incidents imply that more response
capability is made available to handle each incident, which will then lead to better
incident handling and reduced severity of incidents. Reduced severity of incidents and
reduced frequency of incidents both lower the incident cost.
8.3.2 Policies under the model extension
In addition to the base run, where incident cost does not affect the transition speed,
two more policies are made subject to investigation using this extended Brage model.
In both of these cases, the incident cost affects the transition speed, yet with different
starting points - different level of incident cost. For details on settings see Table 8-5.
Table 8-5 Policy settings for extended Brage model




incident cost is high
When the incident cost reaches a level 5 times higher than its
initial value, then the transition speed will be reduced to half.
When the incident cost reaches 10 times higher than the initial
level, the operation transition will be stopped.
When the incident cost is lower than twice the initial level, the





When the incident cost reaches a level 3 times higher than its
initial value, then the transition speed will be reduced to half.
When the incident cost reaches 10 times higher than the initial
level, the operation transition will be stopped.
When the incident cost is lower than twice the initial level, the
management will make an effort to catch up with the schedule.
Below, we present the results produced by the three policies along with an analysis of
that model behavior. The base run policy is represented by the blue line numbered 1,
the “reduce transition speed when incident cost is high” is represented by the red line
numbered as 2, and the “reduce transition speed when incident cost is moderate” is






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We can see in Figure 8-15 that the mature new work processes are delayed in policy 2
and even more delayed in policy 3. In policy 2, it reaches around 19 mature new work
processes at the end of the simulation; in policy 3, it only reaches around 17.
Here, we will not repeat the base run policy analysis, but focus on policies 2 and 3.
Policy 2: Reduce transition speed when the incident cost is high (red line, number 2)
The maturation of new work processes is delayed under policy 2. This delay actually
releases some of the operators’ time to mature new knowledge. Therefore, in the
beginning, the mature new knowledge builds up more quickly under policy 2. Later,
however, as the transition is delayed, the mature new knowledge is lower than in the
base run. With more mature knowledge under policy 2, the platform is less vulnerable,
and fewer incidents occur. This also reduces the “severity of incidents” and the
“incident response capability”. The “monthly profit” is slightly lower than that in the
base run.
Policy 3: Reduce transition speed when the incident cost is moderate (green line,
number 3)
The behavior pattern under policy 3 is similar to the one under policy 2. The
maturation of new work processes is, however, even more delayed in this case. In the
beginning, new knowledge matures to a somewhat larger extent, compared to what
happens in the base run, but much less in later years. The “frequency of incidents” is
lower than in the base run, and so are the “severity of incidents” and the “incident
response capability”. The “monthly profit” is much lower in this policy than in the
base run because the operation transition is delayed so much that the benefit of the
new technology has not been fully realized at the end of the simulation.
Policy conclusion.
Overall, the policy to delay operation transition when incident cost is high can help
reduce the severity of incidents at the expense of lower monthly profit in the long run.
In some cases, it is worthwhile to delay the operation transition to avoid severe
incidents. For example, under policy 2, the monthly profit is slightly reduced, while
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the peak of severity of incidents is 20% lower than that in the base run. This may be
an acceptable choice. However, if we delay the operation transition relatively early,
such as under policy 3, then the severity of incidents is only a somewhat lower than
under policy 2, yet the monthly profit is much lower. And this is probably not an
acceptable policy.
The management should realize that there are information security risks during the
operation transition. The increase in the frequency of incidents and severity of
incidents should be expected and, to some extent, be tolerated. If the operation
transition is delayed in cases of a small increase in severity of incidents, then this will
delay the realization of the benefits from Integrated Operations. The result is not only
the reduced profitability, as demonstrated under the various policies, but also the loss
of competitive advantage of the firm. In fact, during the operation transition, after the
harsh startup phase, one may note that the frequency and severity of incidents will
drop as a consequence of the new work processes and knowledge eventually having
matured, as shown in the base run simulation. Of course, it is important to ensure that,
in the meantime, no incidents with a devastating impact occur. When incident cost
reaches high levels, it might be wise to slow down the operation transition and give
the operators more time to absorb the new work processes and knowledge. The
management should also consider the negative impact of the severe incidents on the
operators’ perception about Integrated Operations. The operators might feel insecure
and resistant to use the advanced technology associated with Integrated Operations.
Therefore, implementing proactive policies could be a better option than delaying the
operation transition when severe incidents happen. The proactive policies include
allocating more resources for operators to learn new work processes and knowledge,
and building up a stronger incident response capability prior to operation transition.
8.4 Closing remarks for chapter 8
In the chapter, we used the validated Brage model to investigate the model behaviors
under different policy and reached some insights on how to mitigate information
security risks during the transition to Integrated Operations. Some insights are specific
for the Brage platform, e.g. the transition speed should be between two new work
processes per year and three new work processes per year. Some insights are
applicable to other organizations, for example, the short-term performance drop
during the operation transition is the expense for realizing the benefits of new
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technology in the long-term; the reactive approach in investment in incident response
capability would lead to high probability of severe incidents. These insights will be
summarized in chapter 9 conclusion.
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9 Conclusion
In this final chapter, first, we recapitulate the research and its findings. Then, we
discuss the contribution of this work, not only to our client Hydro but also to the
information security management and the system dynamics field at large. Third, we
critique our work, mostly on the underachieved client relationship: what were the
problems we encountered?; what could we have done better to improve the situation?
Finally, we point out the direction of our future research.
9.1 Recapitulation of the research and its findings
9.1.1 Model development
This project spans over more than five years, from March 2005 to present.9
According to the standard modeling process, the research can be divided into four
stages:
Modeling process Time period Activities
Model Conceptualization Mar 2005- Oct 2005 Two group model building
workshops
Model Formulation Oct 2005 - Feb 2007 Meetings and interview
Model Testing Feb 2008 – Dec 2008 Interview with experts
Implementation &
Documentation
Jan 2009 – present Write thesis
The summary of the activities and achievements in each of these stages is as follows.
Stage 1 Model Conceptualization: Two Group Model-building Workshops
The first group model-building workshop articulated the client’s problem. Before the
workshop, Hydro’s concerns on and fears in operation transition and information
security risks were vaguely stated.
9 This study had a one-year maturity leave from February 2007 to February 2008.
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In the first workshop, it was acknowledged that the operation transition not only
includes the introduction and maturation of new work processes, but also the
introduction and maturation of new knowledge. Knowledge-building takes longer
time and is often overlooked, leading to unappreciated knowledge gap, which causes a
suboptimal operation transition to result higher information security risks. All the
participants reached consensus that the information security concerns Hydro had was
specifically on the immature new work processes, immature new knowledge and the
knowledge gap during the operation transition that make the platform vulnerable
(more prone to incidents). Severe incidents on an oil platform could cause huge
finance losses and even threaten HSE (Health, Safety and Environment). The critical
factors are the speed of the operation transition, the speed of maturation (related to
resources allocation), and how investments in incident response capability could help
control the severity of incidents.
The second workshop formed the reference mode of the operation transition schedule
and articulated the general model structure. The Brage model is by and large in line
with this model structure, as analyzed in section 5.1.1.
Stage 2 Model formulation: Meetings and Interview
After the second workshop, we had series of teleconferences with Hydro and IRMA.
Such conferences usually started with a presentation of the model we had developed,
-both model structure and model behaviour. The recognition of the model structure
and behaviour from the client (Hydro) and the experts (IRMA) add confidence to the
model. Then discussions about the definition of variables, their terminology, value,
and other concerns followed. Many of the questions raised by the client pointed out
further model development direction. The information and data we obtained from the
conferences helped us to further improve the model.
Stage 3 Model Testing: Model Review Interview
When the Brage model was completed, we performed the direct structure tests and the
behavior oriented structure tests (see chapter 6). However, due to the unavailability of
historical time series data, the normal behavior pattern tests were deemed inapplicable.
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As an alternative, we invited the IRMA team to review the model behavior. Detailed
interview results are presented in section 7.4. Experts’ recognition of the model
behavior increased the confidence in the model’s validity.
Stage 4 Implementation: Interactive learning environment
To disseminate the model insights to a more general audience, we proposed using the
story-telling method. Stefanie Hillen, a member of our research project team,
developed a framework for authoring such dynamic stories for interactive learning.
Based on our model, dynamic stories were developed and tested with Students in
University of Agder and Gjøvik University College. We hope to get Hydro’s
collaboration in the implementation of these dynamic stories as part of our future
research.
9.1.2 Model insights
The validated Brage model was used to simulate different policies to seek answers to
our research questions. The model insights are summarized below:
I. Considering the trade off between financial gains and information security risks,
what is an appropriate speed for the transition to integrated operation?
For an operation transition to be successful, the operators need to learn not only what
to do (new work processes) but also how to do and why to do in a particular way (new
knowledge), i.e. to have sufficient knowledge about the new work processes. It takes
longer time to build knowledge than to learn the new work processes. When planning
the operation transition speed, the management should consider the time needed for
new knowledge to mature. The following Figure 9-1 shows how various operation
transition speeds affects the operation transition (accumulated profit, at the left hand
side, purple line with square label) and information security risks (peak severity of
incidents, at the right hand side, blue line with round label).
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Figure 9-1 Transition speed
We can divide the transition speed into three categories. First, transition speed below
1.5 new work processes implemented per year (three new work processes per two
years) is categorized as “slow.” Under such a transition speed, the accumulation of
immature new work processes and knowledge is not high and the knowledge gap is
not big. Thus, information security risks are not high. From Figure 9-1, we can see
that by increasing the operation transition speed in this range, the accumulated profit
increases faster than the peak security of incidents. Therefore, the decision to increase
the transition speed within this range is mostly beneficial and desirable.
Second, transition speed between 1.5 and 2.5 new work processes implemented per
year is categorized as “medium.” Under such a transition speed, the accumulation of
immature new work process is low, yet the accumulation of immature new knowledge
is relatively high, and the knowledge gap is significant. Therefore, the platform is
more vulnerable and information security risks are relatively high. Increasing the
transition speed in this range, the accumulated profit increases at a similar pace as the
peak of severity of incidents. The judgment as to what constitutes the optimal
transition speed depends on the acceptance range of both of these variables and the
relative weight assigned to each of them as well.
Finally, transition speed over 2.5 new work processes implementer per year is
categorized as “fast.” Under such a transition speed, the accumulation of immature
new work process is high, leaving no time to mature new knowledge. The






























































larger. Therefore, the platform is most vulnerable and the information risks are higher.
When the transition speed increases in this range, the accumulated monthly profit will
decrease because the operators cannot work effectively without the knowledge about
how to work effectively with new work processes. As we often say, haste makes
waste. It is not a wise decision to increase transition speed within this range if there
are no additional resources available to help mature new work processes and
knowledge.
One of the difficulties in implementing this model insight is identifying how long
time is needed for new work processes and knowledge to mature. This is especially
difficult in the case of knowledge, most of which is tacit. The management should
carefully observe how people work with the new work processes, the kinds of
comments they give, and the difficulties they have working with new work processes.
Sometimes, surveys and interviews may help investigate whether knowledge has
matured or not.
II How does resource allocation during operation transition affect the effective use
of new technology and the security risks during the operation transition?
There are limited resources on the platform. Policy simulations demonstrate that the
introduction of new work processes and knowledge will generate a short-term
production drop for around 2 years. This is because the operators need to learn the
new work processes and knowledge. The learning activities are distractions from
routine production tasks. As the operation transition continues, the effect of the new
technology on productivity will exceed the effect of reduced resources for production.
And the monthly profit will be higher than its original level. The pattern of profit
change (first drop then increase) was expressed by the group members in the first
group model-building workshop (see Figure 9-2).
227
Figure 9-2 Net Benefit from group model-building workshop
From the model validation interview, the IRMA experts suggested that the
management of Hydro has the focus to meet the production target. The simulation
results shows that if the management strives towards meeting the production target
during the operation transition, the operators are encouraged or forced to work on the
production task and left with little time to learn new work processes and knowledge.
This may lead to the operators working in the old ways under the cover of the new
work processes, or finding out short-cut to get work done. The former way will hinder
the realization of the benefits of the new technology. The latter way makes the
platform more vulnerable.
This research question is related to the first research question raised. When the
transition speed is slow, there will be fewer new work processes and less new
knowledge that need to mature. Thus, fewer resources are needed for learning
activities and the production drop will not be that significant. If, on the other hand, the
transition speed is fast, more new work processes and knowledge need to mature.
Under such condition, the management should set aside more time for the operators to
learn the new work processes and acquire the new knowledge. In the short term, this
will lead to a deeper drop in production output. However, when the operators have
learned what to do and how to perform effectively with the new operation, the
production output will sharply increase. Considering the long-term benefit, it is
worthwhile to sacrifice one or two years’ profit in exchange for high profit during the
latter eight or nine years. However, most people focus on the short-term benefit so
that policies endure short-term loss, but long-term benefit is more difficult to
implement. For example, a CEO who endures short-term performance drop might be
fired before the realization of long-term benefit. The “worse before better” situation is
not widely understood. Decisions on the long-term benefit produce a higher yield if
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more people understand the distinction between the “better before worse” and the
“worse before better” situation better.
The Brage chief estimated that, on average, to mature one new work process, 4% of
the operators’ working time is needed, and to mature one set of knowledge, 4% of the
operators’ working time is needed. In reality, the resources needed for maturing each
specific new work processes and related knowledge are not the same. It depends on
how difficult the new work processes are. If the new work process is difficult, then
more resources will be needed for learning. Again, the management should carefully
observe how the operators are working with the new work processes. If the operators
show signs of discomfort working with the new work processes, the management
should consider setting aside more time for the operators to learn the new work
processes and acquire new knowledge.
III. How do management decision rules on investment in incident response
capability affect the security risks?
We have identified three types of management decision rule regarding investments in
incident response capability from the group model-building workshop and the model
validation interview: (1) invest when more incidents happen; (2) invest when severe
incidents happen; and (3) invest when incident cost is high.
Invest when more incidents happen. In a traditional operation, the incident response
capability is low because the limited use of ICT technology has incurred very few
information security incidents. When operation transition starts, the management is
aware of the increasing information security risks. But it is not willing to invest in
incident response capability until more incidents occur. It is difficult to justify
investments without real signs of increasing incidents. However, when incident
response capability is low, only a small fraction of incidents can be detected. That
results in a perception of low risk and underinvestment in incident response capability.
This feedback prevents incident response capability from quickly achieving its real
desired level. Inadequate incident response capability may lead to untimely detection
of incidents and improper handling of them, which might lead to truly more severe
incidents.
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This was referred to as the “capability trap” in the first group model-building
workshop. The model simulation shows that the proactive approach, raising incident
response capability before the operation transition starts, is effective in reducing the
severity of incidents during operation transition. (See simulation results in Section
8.1.3.1)
Invest when severe incident happens. Experts have reported during the model
validation interview that the top management does not know the minor incidents
occurring in the workplace. They only care about severe incidents that disrupt
production. Thus, we modified the Brage model to capture this decision rule. The
simulation results show an oscillation of the severity of incidents. Severe incidents
that the management is keen on preventing do happen once in a while primarily
because the management does not notice the signs of increasing risk and the need for
investing in incident response capability. When the severity of incidents reaches their
warning line, they start to make investment. However, as there is delay in building
incident response capability, the severity of incidents continues to increase before the
incident response capability is ready in place. As a result, the severity of incidents
reaches higher than the accepted level repeatedly.
The proactive approach is to care about the less severe incidents and make
investments on incident response capability when signs of increasing risks are
observed, such as increasing number of minor incidents or increasing severity of
minor incidents. (See simulation results in Section 8.1.3.2) In this way, it is possible
to prevent severe incidents from happening.
Invest when high incident cost occur. This kind of decision rule is financially easy
to justify. As incident cost is high, it will be worthwhile to make investment in
incident response capability and reduce incident cost. This decision rule works
effectively in reducing incidents with high frequency. When the frequency of
incidents is low, incident cost will also be low, and thus no investment will be made
in incident response capability. Incident response capability becomes obsolete over
time. If an incident occurs, expectedly, it will be severe because there is not enough
capability to handle the incident properly (see the simulation result in section 8.1.3.3).
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This decision rule is not a good choice for the management who is keen on preventing
severe incidents. If this decision rule is used in reality, the management should also
pay special attention to the increase in severity of incidents. The severity of incidents
should be an additional indicator for investment in incident response capabilities.
9.2 Research contribution
The research presented in this thesis is grounded on the case of operation transition in
Hydro. It specifically focuses on the change in information security during operation
transition. The research utilizes system dynamics to build simulation model and elicit
information using model-based interventions. This research contributes not only to
our client (Hydro), but to the information security field and system dynamics field at
large as well.
9.2.1 Contributions to the client
The contribution of this research to our client Hydro is twofold.
First, the group model-building workshop helped our client clarify the problem it is
facing and the mechanism that causes the problem. Trond Lilleng, the person in
charge of the operation transition in Hydro, expressed the following during the first
group model-building workshop: “Brage faces risks that Hydro does not really
understand. The management does not know whether it is right to make the transition.
They fear intruders will come to the network.” Through the first group
model-building workshop, it became clear to all the participants that the operation
transition not only includes the introduction of new work processes, but also related
new knowledge. Knowledge building takes longer time and is often overlooked. The
immature new work processes, immature new knowledge and the knowledge gap will
cause the platform to be vulnerable, increasing the probability of incidents happening.
In the second group model-building workshop, after having identified the feedback
loops in a discussion with the participants, the platform chief and the chief
information security office in Hydro realized the importance of knowledge maturation
during the operation transition. A discussion ensued on how to reduce time for
knowledge maturation. One idea was to adopt a technical device that could allow the
operators on vacation to obtain data and updates from the operators working on the
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platform. That way, the operators would more likely remember what they had learned
when they come back to work on the platform after vocation.
Second, we provided Hydro with a validated model that gave rise to insights into how
the operation transition speed, the resource allocation during operation transition, and
the management decision rule on investment in incident response capability affect
information security risks. Many other platforms were to be moved into Integrated
Operations, following Brage’s experience. These model insights could help the
management in Hydro to improve the operation transition schedule by better planning.
Moreover, the model served as a vehicle by which we could study how various
policies play out in the long run. One of the challenges in policy design is caused by
the uncertainty of the long-term effect. Statistics tools may be useful for short-term
forecasts, but it is difficult to evaluate the long-term effect. The system dynamics
simulation model, represents causal structure, provides a vehicle by which we may
investigate various scenarios. It facilitates the search for a robust policy that fosters a
successful (smooth and fast) operation transition, i.e. one that will work successfully
under a wide variety of possible circumstances (scenarios).
9.2.2 Contributions to information security management
Research on information security management has a tradition of merely focused on
the technology aspect. Research has, however, recently given more attention to human
and organizational factors. This thesis contributes to the field of information security
management in three different ways.
First, the change of in information security risks during the operation transition (new
technology adoption) period has not been subject to model-based studies before. It has
been well recognized that new technology adoption is a complex and difficult process.
A substantial amount of research has been conducted to examine the various factors
that affect successful adoption of new technology (Attewell 1992; Fichman 2001;
Burnes 2003; Lee and Kim 2007). The factors identified includes, but are not limited
to, the following ones: characteristics of the user community (education, job tenure,
resistance to change), characteristics of the organization (centralization, formalization,
specialization), characteristics of the technology being adopted (complexity),
characteristics of the task to which the technology is being applied (task autonomy,
variety, and uncertainty), and the organizational environment (uncertainty,
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interdependence) (Lee and Kim 2007). However, information security risks have not
been considered. In the literature of information security, research has focused on user
interfaces of security-related systems, on counterproductive computer usage and
human compliance study (from human aspect), and on information security checklist
and standards and various methods for risk assessment (from organizational aspect)
(see section 2.3.2 and section 2.3.3). The change of information security risks during
the operation transition period has not been studied in depth before. We are now in a
fast changing society. Information security risks are deemed to be higher during those
changes. How we manage information security risks in this fast changing environment,
is an important issue. This research is among the first attempts to address this issue.
Second, we introduce a dynamic view with the long-term perspective on information
security management. Although information security incidents happen in an eruptive
manner, the underlying mechanism that leads to such incidents often exists for a
relatively long period of time. Understanding such mechanism helps us reduce
information security risks.
Last, but not least, this thesis illustrates how formal modeling and simulation could
enhance our theory building on the dynamics of information security management.
The Brage model demonstrated how key information security indicators, such as
frequency and severity of incidents and incident cost, could be included in a
simulation model. Moreover, the model can be used to identify important information
security variables, such as incident response capability and risk perception, which
may be considered as key information security indicators later. Information security
management involves not only “hard” knowledge, such as work processes and
technology, but also “soft” knowledge, which includes people’s awareness, people’s
perception, and the culture of the organizational environment. These soft aspects are
actually the key factors that affect information security risks. Identifying changes in
“soft” variables, such as risk perception, is important in order to improve information
security management.
9.2.3 Contributions to the field of system dynamics
It is well acknowledged that system dynamics models are used to help the client seek
solutions for their problems. “The modeling process should be placed in the context of
the ongoing activities of the people in the system” (Sterman 2000 p. 27). Unlike other
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mathematical models, which mainly rely on numerical data, system dynamics models
are based on the causal structure of the system, which means understanding the
client’s system is critical to model building. To understand that client system, proper
communication is necessary. Therefore, utility of the system dynamics modeling
process relies heavily on the quality of our communication with client.
Some of the research efforts have been devoted to establish best practice for
communication with a group of client representatives for model conceptualization,
named group model-building workshop. (Vennix, Andersen, and Richardson 1997;
Vennix 1999; Vennix 1996; Richardson, Andersen, and Luna-Reyes 2005;
Richardson and Andersen 1995; Andersen et al. 2007; Andersen, Richardson, and
Vennix 1997; Andersen and Richardson 1997; Luna-Reyes et al. 2006). Though a
number of standard procedures have been developed, the researchers also agree that
the communication with client is still more art than science. The group
model-building process is sometimes compared to a football match or an
improvisation jazz concert. Though much could be planned beforehand, the outcome
relies heavily on the interactive process. Therefore, documenting and reflecting on
different cases is an important step towards the accumulation of knowledge in group
model-building (Luna-Reyes et al. 2006).
In this study, we used two group model-building workshops in a series: first to
articulate the client’s problem and secondly to conceptualize the dynamic model. In
this thesis, we fully documented these two group model-building workshops. This
adds to the knowledge accumulation on group model-building cases. Many group
model-building workshops are conducted with a clear problem definition in mind.
Therefore, concept models are prepared in advanced and shown to the client at very
early stage of the workshop. In our case, however, we did not have a clear problem
definition as a point of departure during the first group model-building workshop.
Therefore, the exercises were designed in such a way as to extract information first
(divergence) and then converge on a clarification of the problem. The schedule
designed for the first workshop was mostly divergent exercises to obtain information
related of the problem. The divergent exercises were followed by convergent
exercises that allowed the real problem to emerge. As a result, the concept model,
based on the problem, was built and presented to the group. This process included
obtaining information from the client, making information converge and feed the
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converged information back to client in modeling language. In the second group
model-building workshop, instead of presenting the concept model, we did an
exercise asking the group members to experiment with the concept model. This
exercise triggered group members great interest to the model. Also, it helped them to
think about the relationship between model structure and model behavior, and to link
the model with the reality. Such experience is important for group model-building
practice.
Group model-building techniques have received much attention in research as a
model-based communication method, while communication with clients during other
model building stages, e.g. model validation is less studied. Experts in system
dynamics seem all to agree that direct structure validation of a model is a qualitative
process, that includes a discussion with client to confirm that the model addresses the
client’s problem and that the model structure is in agreement with the client’s and / or
the major stakeholders’ perception of the problem at hand. However, there is little
literature about how such communication should be conducted. In case where
historical data do not exist for behavior test, interview with experts to confirm that the
model behavior conforms with reality could be used as an alternative method.
Literature on this issue is also scarce. We refer to what Dr. Rich did in his dissertation
and conducted structured interview with experts for behavior test. We hope that such
case accumulation would lead to further research effort to standardize the best
practice of communication in model validation.
9.3 Critique on the model-building process
Based on our research design of various model-based interventions with client, it was
expected that Hydro would be highly involved in the model-building processes.
However, Hydro’s participation in this project was not as comprehensive as expected
in the initial stage. Though the situation improved during the model-building process,
we lost opportunities to elicit more information in the beginning. In retrospect, we
have looked into the reasons why we encountered such initial difficulties in the
beginning. That may help other researchers when using tools such as the model-based
interventions with client in their studies.
Finding the right person. As we mentioned in Section 4.2, only one person in Hydro,
Trond Lilleng, the leader of the Integrated Operations project, attended the first group
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model-building workshop. It is important to obtain support from the high level
management in the beginning. However, meeting with only one high level person is
not sufficient to undertake a model-building exercise of this kind. We found that
Trond Lilleng, focusing on the strategy level of the operation transition, can express
the overall picture of the whole Operation Integration very well, but couldn’t provide
a detailed picture on the operational level. Using divergent and ranking exercise, the
group members identified who the important stakeholders are. In our second
workshop, we successfully involved a variety of people with high influence and high
impact that constituted the major stakeholders. From these people we obtained more
detailed information about new work processes implementation and related
organizational changes. For future research, when planning for a model-based
intervention with a client, an ideal structure is to interact with one person,
representing the top management and three to four mid-level managers.
Meeting place. While Hydro is located in Bergen, our research cell is located in
another city, Grimstad. Though, the two cities are less than 200 miles apart, however,
and a trip from Bergen to Grimstad takes at least four hours, in total. The first
workshop was organized in Grimstad. We assume this was one of the reasons why
only Trond Lilleng attended this first group model-building workshop. It was difficult
for the platform chief and other management personnel to leave the control center at
the same time for a two-day period. We held the second workshop in one of the
training rooms in Hydro, Bergen. Five key persons participated, all of whom became
interested in the system dynamics method, which is a key success factor. For only that
way we may be able to obtain the information necessary to build the Brage model. We
conclude from our experience that location is very important for an effective
model-based intervention to take place. If possible, a place convenient for clients’
participation is always preferred.
Client contact. Only IRMA had an agreement with OLF for the collaboration with
Hydro. AMBASEC also work with Hydro because of its collaboration with IRMA
required by the Norwegian Research Council. Therefore, AMBASEC didn’t have
direct contact with Hydro. The meetings we wanted to have with Hydro were
organized through IRMA. This complicated the matter and was not efficient.
Sometimes, it was difficult for IRMA to argue for the necessity/time with Hydro
contacts when they excused themselves amid their busy schedules. Much time has
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been wasted in the process of negotiation and communication. It is important to have
a direct channel of communication with client to ensure efficiency.
Language. The IRMA team was able to participate in many of the OLF’s meeting on
operation transition and information security. These meetings provided information
relevant to the research and were opportunities to present our primary research result,
obtain feedback, and keep contact with Hydro. However, as these meetings were in
Norwegian and the two main researchers in the AMBASEC team, Ying Qian and
Stefanie Hillen, did not understand Norwegian, we could not participate in such
meetings. Our inability to understand Norwegian proved to be a disadvantage when
working with our client, since the meetings, documents, and language at work were
all in Norwegian. Though English is the working language in academia, a research
project that closely works with client has to consider the local language applied.
9.4 Future research direction
The current Brage model is at a highly aggregated level. It is possible to disaggregate
the model to include more details about work processes and knowledge. At the same
time, the model can be extended to include more sectors. The model can likewise link
with the risk matrix developed by IRMA. In the remainder of this section, we detail
some of the specific extensions of our work that we propose be undertaken in the
future.
9.4.1 Disaggregate the model
In the current version of the model, work process and knowledge are aggregated
concepts, and we did not differentiate one work process from the others. Every work
process takes four months to mature, while the corresponding knowledge takes eight
months to mature. The impact of new work processes and knowledge on vulnerability
is identical. We also did not distinguish how much benefit each new work process
brings to the platform and only assumed that earlier implemented work processes
would bring more benefit because management would eventually implement those
higher impact work processes earlier to harvest the benefits of Integrated Operations
as early as possible.
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In reality, the 20 new work processes to be implemented on the Brage platform are all
different from each other. Some may be easier to implement than the others, implying
a shorter maturation time for this new work process and new knowledge. Some work
processes could have a large impact on information security, bringing more threats or
vulnerabilities into the system. Some work processes bring more improvement by
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Figure 9-3 Disaggregate work processes and knowledge
If provided with detailed information about each new work processes, the model can
be disaggregated from abstract new work processes into specific new work processes1,
new work processes 2, …, and new work processes 20. Accordingly, new knowledge
can also be disaggregated into new knowledge 1, new knowledge 2, …, and new
knowledge 20. In doing so, the model could be used not only to investigate transition
speed in general, but also to form a detailed transition schedule: when to implement
what. Such an operation transition schedule takes into account the desire for a fast







9.4.2 Extend the model
The Brage model describes the operation transition and the change of information
security risks during this process. Additional sectors could be added to the Brage
model to tackle various questions.
One example is the issue of human compliance. During the model validation
interview, the experts mentioned that when people are new to the work processes,
they tend to follow the instructions carefully and obey the rules. However, as soon as
they get used to new operations, they tend to find ways to cut corners. Some may
ignore security rules, which will lead to more vulnerability. This theory sounds
reasonable, but it requires more research efforts to be solidified and adding it to the
model.
Another example is on the expectation regarding the effects of the new operations.
During our discussion with the client, the representatives mentioned that the operators
form an expectation of the effects of the new technology before it is implemented.
However, upon implementation, the operators often find that their expectations are
not met. To motivate the operators for new operations, the management often focuses
on the benefits of the new technology, thereby setting high expectations. However,
when the operators start to use new technology, its effectiveness cannot be fully
realized, because the operators are not familiar with that new technology. Therefore,
an expectation gap is generated. This gap, if large, will reduce the operators’
willingness to make use of and learn to use the new technology effectively. Thus, the
effectiveness of the new technology will remain low. This will trap the effectiveness
of using new technology at a low level (see Figure 9-4). On the other hand, if the
expectation gap is not large, the operators are willing to use it and to learn about the
new technology. This will improve the effectiveness of using new technology and
further reduce the expectation gap, - which make the new technology adoption
successful.
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Figure 9-4 Expectation has an impact on the effectiveness of using new technology
We formed our theory about the expectation gap, as shown in Figure 9-4. We were
not able to further contact Hydro for a validation of this theory. If validated, this
theory could also be included in the Brage model to investigate how different
expectation levels affect the operation transition.
9.4.3 Link to the risk matrix developed by IRMA
In the current Brage model, the severity of incidents and frequency of incidents are
both highly aggregated: They are the average for all kinds of incidents. In this way,
we observe the general trend of how, on average, the information security indicators
develop over time. But we are not able delve into various types of incidents.
The IRMA team developed a risk matrix for the Brage platform, presenting the
frequency and severity of various kinds of incidents. It is possible to incorporate the
IRMA’s risk matrix into our model and to disaggregate the average frequency and
severity of incidents using the data in the risk matrix. By doing so, we may see the
trend in the development of each type of incidents.
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For example, if we disaggregate the incidents into five types, say “Terror attacks”,
“DOS attacks”, “Illegal insider activities”, “Viruses” and “Human errors”. Then we
will have the frequency and severity incidents for each category. The cost of each
type of incidents could be calculated as the product of the frequency and severity of
this type of incidents. And the total incident cost is the sum of incident cost of the five
types of incidents (see Figure 9-5).
Figure 9-5 Link risk matrix in the Brage model
Operation transition affects various types of incidents differently. For example, it will
definitely have a major impact on the frequency of human errors, but it will not have
such an impact on the frequency of terrorist attacks. With these detailed data for
different kinds of incidents, the model simulation can, then, show how the risk matrix






































Risk matrix in 2010
Risk matrix in 2015
Figure 9-6 Sample future risk matrix
Such a forecast will help the management for their decision-making on what kind of
investment is needed for in information security.
However, the difficulty of linking current risk matrix into the model is associated with
in several factors. First, until now, there is no widely accepted classification of
incidents. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to form a complete and exclusive list
of incidents. For example, some terror attacks also utilize insiders. Many really
successful attacks are the result of the collaboration of outsiders and insiders. Another
example, some viruses are intentionally planted into the client ICT system, while
others are spread around unintentionally and resulting from human error. Sometimes,
it is difficult to identify to which category an incident belongs. Second, the current
risk matrix for Brage is based on the historical data about incidents that have occurred
on Brage. Incidents that have not occurred are not presented in the risk matrix. Such a
risk matrix is not a complete representation of information security risks. Forecasts
based on such risk matrix could be misleading. A maturation of the risk matrix is the


















9.5 Closing remarks for chapter 9
This chapter revisits the model-building process and the model insights. The
model-building process is a two-way communication centered on system dynamics
modeling, including group model-building workshops, model-development meetings
and interview, and the model validation interview. The two-way communication
process helped us gather qualitative information and quantitative data for model
development. It also helped our client understand the current problem and the system
structure causing the problem. Through this two-way communication process, we
have built consensus with client, which facilitated our model development and our
client’s model apprehension.
The work contributes to helping our client to clarify the problems it is facing and
providing a vehicle (the validated system dynamics model) for policy investigation.
To the information security field, this research addresses the issue (the change of
information security risks during operation transition) that has never been address by
modeling method. This study introduces a dynamic view with the long-term
perspective on information security management and illustrates how formal modeling
and simulation could enhance our theory building on the dynamics of information
security management. This work also contributes to system dynamics field in the
accumulation of experience in model-based interventions.
In this chapter, we also critically reflect our communication with client. Several issues,
from the selection of meeting place to the communication channels utilized, have
been discussed where improvement could be made to obtain better results in future
research. Finally, we pointed out three directions for future research efforts.
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Appendix I Model Equations




Equation: variable name = formula or value
~ Unit of the variable




maturing new work processes = Immature new work processes / Time to mature new
work processes * Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new WP * Effect of
mature new WP on maturing new WP * Effect of resources on maturing new work
processes
~ processes/Month
~ The new work processes matured in a month
Fraction of changed work processes = Fraction of immature work processes +
Fraction of mature new work processes
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of work processes that are new, no matter mature or immature
Operator resources available for maturing new WP and knowledge = Total
operator resources - Minimum operator resources for production
~ fraction of working time
~ The percentage of operators' time available for maturing new work processes.
It depends on how much time is reserved for production.
Operator resources to mature new WP = min(Operator resources required to mature
new WP, Operator resources available for maturing new WP and knowledge)
~ fraction of working time
~ The percentage of time devoted to mature new work processes
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Effect of resources on maturing new work processes = 0.1 + 0.9 * (Operator
resources to mature new WP / Operator resources required to mature new WP)
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of resource adequacy on new work processes maturation
Effect of incident cost on transition to IO = WITH LOOKUP (Expected incident
cost/Initial average incident cost, ([(0,0)-(20,10)],(0,1),(20,1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ There is a possible policy that when the incident cost is high, the
management might reduce the operation transition speed. This variable reflects
the policy. It is set to 1 in the base model. And it will be assigned with different
value when to test the policy.
Initial average incident cost = 83346
~ NOK/Month
~ Average incident cost (per month) at the beginning of operation transition.





~ New initiatives burden hinders people from maturing new work process. This
variable ranges from 0.3 to 1. When there is no new initiatives burden, the new
work processes will be matured at full speed. When everything in the system is
new, new initiatives burden reach 1, the speed of maturing new work processes
will be reduced to 0.3.
Effect of mature new WP on maturing new WP = WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of
mature new work processes,
([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.5),(0.05,0.62),(0.1,0.72),(0.25,0.86),(0.5,0.96),(0.8,1),(1,1)))
~ Dmnl
~ Mature new work processes represent experience for maturing new work
processes. When more experience accumulate, as more new work processes are
matured, it will facilitate the further maturation of new work processes. This
variable ranges from 0.5 to 1. When no experience, the effectiveness of new work
processes maturation is only 50% of maximum effectiveness. It increases as new
work processes are matured and when 80% of the work processes have been
matured, people are so experienced that they mature new work processes at
maximum effectiveness.
Effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes = Normal effectiveness
of resources in developing new work processes*Effect of traditional WP on new WP
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development * Effect of changed WP on new WP development * Effect of new
initiatives burden on new WP development
~ processes/hour
~ The productivity of work processes development
Minimum operator resources for production = 0.9
~ fraction of working time
~ The minimum percentage of operators' time reserved for production




~ New work processes represent experience for developing new work
processes. When more experience accumulate, as more new work processes are
developed, it will facilitate the further development of new work processes.
This variable ranges from 0.5 to 1. When no experience, the effectiveness of new
work processes development is only 50% of maximum effectiveness. It increases
as new work processes are developed and when 80% of the work processes have
been developed, people are so experienced that they develop new work processes
at maximum effectiveness.
Effect of new initiatives burden on new WP development = WITH LOOKUP (New
initiatives burden, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,1), (0.1,0.97), (0.25,0.87), (0.3,0.78), (0.4,0.65),
(0.5,0.57), (0.6,0.53), (1,0.5) ))
~ Dmnl
~ Seeing much burden in the system holds people back from developing new
work processes. This variable ranges from 0.5 to 1. When there is no new initiatives
burden, the new work processes will be developed at full speed. When everything in
the system is new, new initiatives burden reach 1, the speed of developing new work
processes will be reduced to 0.5.
Management time to develop new work processes = WITH LOOKUP (Time,
([(0,0)-(200,120)], (0,100), (12,100), (13,34), (120,34) ))
~ hour/Month
~ Management personnel's time devoted to develop new work processes\!\!
Effect of traditional WP on new WP development = WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of
traditional WP, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0), (0.015,0.24), (0.045,0.47), (0.14,0.71), (0.27,0.83),
(0.422018,0.92), (0.55,0.96), (0.8,1), (1,1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ Traditional work processes offer potential for developing new work
processes. When this potential decrease, as the traditional work processes developing
into new work processes, it will make the further developing of new work processes
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more difficult. This variable ranges from 0 to 1. When all the work processes are
traditional, it is 1. When there is no traditional work processes, it becomes 0.
Fraction of traditional WP = Traditional work processes/Total work processes in place
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of work processes that are traditional.
Normal effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes = 0.006
~ processes/hour
~ The maximum amount of processes a person could develop in an hour.
Operator resources required to mature new WP = Operator resources for maturing
each WP*(Immature new work processes)
~ fraction of working time
~ The amount of resources required to mature all the new work processes in the
system
Operator resources for maturing each WP = 0.04
~ fraction of working time/processes
~ Percentage of operators' time needed to mature one work process
Time to mature new work processes = 4
~ Month
~ Time needed to mature one new work process given enough resources
Fraction of mature new work processes = Mature new work processes/Total work
processes in place
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of work processes that are matured new work processes
developing new work processes = Management time to develop new work processes *
Effectiveness of resources in developing new work processes * Effect of incident cost
on transition to IO
~ processes/Month
~ The new work processes developed in a month
New initiatives burden = (Fraction of immature knowledge*wt on new knowledge
burden + Fraction of immature work processes * wt on new work process burden)/(wt
on new knowledge burden + wt on new work process burden)
~ Dmnl
~ Immature new work processes and immature new knowledge are burden to
people in the sense of handling changes in what to do, how to do, who to contact
and in our case, also how to contact.
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Total work processes in place = Immature new work processes + Mature new work
processes + Traditional work processes
~ processes
~ Total work processes on the platform
Fraction of immature work processes =Immature new work processes / Total work
processes in place
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of work processes that are immature new
Mature new work processes= INTEG (maturing new work processes, 0)
~ processes
~ Mature new work processes are those new work processes that operators
could work unassisted.
Immature new work processes= INTEG (developing new work processes-maturing
new work processes, 0)
~ processes
~ Immature new work processes are those newly implemented work processes.
Operators still need management guidance to work with them.
Traditional work processes= INTEG (-developing new work processes, 20)
~ processes
~ Traditional work processes are those work processes that need to be changed
during the operation transition.
wt on new knowledge burden = 1
~ Dmnl
~ The weight of new knowledge burden on the total new initiatives burden
wt on new work process burden = 1
~ Dmnl




maturing new knowledge = Immature new knowledge/Time to mature new
knowledge*Effect of resources on maturing new knowledge * Effect of new
initiatives burden on maturing new knowledge * Effect of mature knowledge on
maturing new knowledge
~ knowledge/Month
~ The new knowledge matured in a month
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Effect of resources on maturing new knowledge = 0.1+0.9*(Operator resources to
mature new knowledge/Operator resources required to mature new knowledge)
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of resource adequacy on new knowledge maturation
Operator resources available for maturing new knowledge = Total operator
resources-Minimum operator resources for production - Operator resources to mature
new WP
~ fraction of working time
~ The percentage of time available to mature new knowledge
Effect of mature knowledge on maturing new knowledge = WITH LOOKUP
(Fraction of mature new knowledge,
([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.5),(0.05,0.62),(0.1,0.72),(0.25,0.86),(0.5,0.96),(0.8,1),(1,1)))
~ Dmnl
~ Mature new knowledge represents experience for maturing new knowledge.
When more experience accumulate, as more new knowledge is matured, it will
facilitate the further maturation of new knowledge. This variable ranges from 0.5
to 1. When no experience, the effectiveness of new knowledge maturation is only
50% of maximum effectiveness. It increases as new knowledge is matured and
when 80% of the knowledge has been matured, people are so experienced that
they mature new knowledge at maximum effectiveness.
Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new knowledge = WITH LOOKUP
(New initiatives burden, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,1), (0.1,0.97), (0.18,0.9), (0.27,0.72),
(0.37,0.57), (0.5,0.43), (0.7, 0.35), (1,0.3) ))
~ Dmnl
~ New initiatives burden hinders people from maturing new knowledge. This
variable ranges from 0.3 to 1. When there is no new initiatives burden, the new
knowledge will be matured at full speed. When everything in the system is new,
new initiatives burden reach 1, the speed of maturing new knowledge will be
reduced to 0.3.
Operator resources required to mature new knowledge = Operator resources for
maturing each knowledge unit * Immature new knowledge
~ fraction of working time
Normal effectiveness of resources in developing new knowledge = 0.006
~ knowledge/hour
~ The average amount of knowledge a person could develop in an hour under
normal condition
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Effect of new initiatives burden on new knowledge development = WITH LOOKUP
(New initiatives burden, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,1), (0.1,0.97), (0.25,0.87), (0.3,0.78),
(0.4,0.65), (0.5,0.57), (0.6,0.53), (1,0.5) ))
~ Dmnl
~ Seeing much burden in the system holds people back from developing new
work processes and knowledge. This variable ranges from 0.5 to 1. When there is no
new initiatives burden, the new knowledge will be developed at full speed. When
everything in the system is new, new initiatives burden reach 1, the speed of
developing new knowledge will be reduced to 0.5.
Effect of changed knowledge on new knowledge development = WITH LOOKUP
(Fraction of changed knowledge, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0.5), (0.05,0.62), (0.1,0.72),
(0.25,0.86), (0.5,0.96), (0.8,1), (1,1)))
~ Dmnl
~ New knowledge represents experience for developing new knowledge. When
more experience accumulate, as more new knowledge is developed, it will
facilitate the further development of new knowledge. This variable ranges from
0.5 to 1. Without any experience, the effectiveness of new knowledge
development is only 50% of maximum effectiveness. It increases as new
knowledge is developed and when 80% of the knowledge has been developed,
people are so experienced that they develop new knowledge at maximum
effectiveness.
Effect of traditional knowledge on new knowledge development= WITH LOOKUP (
Fraction of traditional knowledge, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0), (0.015,0.24),
(0.045,0.47), (0.14,0.71), (0.27,0.83), (0.422018,0.92), (0.55,0.96), (0.8,1), (1,1) ) ))
~ Dmnl
~ Traditional knowledge offers potential for developing new knowledge. When
this potential decreases, as the traditional knowledge developing into new
knowledge, it will make the further developing of new knowledge more difficult.
This variable ranges from 0 to 1. When all the knowledge is traditional, it is 1.
When there is no traditional knowledge, it becomes 0.
Fraction of changed knowledge = Fraction of immature knowledge + Fraction of
mature new knowledge
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of knowledge that is new, no matter mature or immature
Effectiveness of resources in developing new knowledge = Normal effectiveness of
resources in developing new knowledge*Effect of new initiatives burden on new
knowledge development * Effect of changed knowledge on new knowledge
development * Effect of traditional knowledge on new knowledge development
~ knowledge/hour
~ The productivity of new knowledge development
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Management time to develop new knowledge = WITH LOOKUP (Time,
([(0,0)-(200,100)], (0,100), (12,100), (13,34), (120,34) ))
~ hour/Month
~ Personnel's time devoted to develop new knowledge
Fraction of traditional knowledge = Traditional knowledge / Total knowledge in place
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of knowledge that is traditional.
Operator resources for maturing each knowledge unit = 0.04
~ fraction of working time/knowledge
~ Percentage of operators' time needed to mature one set of knowledge
Time to mature new knowledge = 8
~ Month
~ Time needed to mature one new work process given enough resources
Operator resources to mature new knowledge = min (Operator resources available for
maturing new knowledge, Operator resources required to mature new knowledge)
~ fraction of working time
~ The percentage of time devoted to mature new knowledge
developing new knowledge = Management time to develop new knowledge *
Effectiveness of resources in developing new knowledge * Effect of incident cost on
transition to IO
~ knowledge/Month
~ The new knowledge developed in a month
Total knowledge in place = Immature new knowledge + Mature new knowledge +
Traditional knowledge
~ knowledge
~ Total knowledge on the platform
Mature new knowledge = INTEG (maturing new knowledge, 0)
~ knowledge
~ Knowledge related to mature new work processes
Immature new knowledge = INTEG (developing new knowledge-maturing new
knowledge, 0)
~ knowledge
~ Knowledge related immature new knowledge.
Traditional knowledge = INTEG (-developing new knowledge, 20)
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~ knowledge
~ Knowledge that related to traditional work processes
Fraction of mature new knowledge = Mature new knowledge / Total knowledge in
place
~ Dmnl
~ Fraction of knowledge that is mature new knowledge
Fraction of immature knowledge = Immature new knowledge / Total knowledge in
place
~ Dmnl




New work processes = Fraction of changed knowledge * Total work processes in
place
~ processes
~ Immature new work processes plus mature new work processes
Desired mature new knowledge = New work processes * Mature knowledge per work
process
~ knowledge
~ Mature new knowledge required for the already mature new work processes
Knowledge gap = (Desired mature new knowledge - Mature new knowledge)
~ knowledge
~ The gap between the required mature new knowledge and the actual mature
new knowledge
Mature knowledge per work process = 1
~ knowledge/processes
~ The knowledge required for each new work process
Effect of knowledge gap on Vulnerability Index = WITH LOOKUP (Knowledge gap,
([(0,0)-(20,1)], (0,0.4), (20,0.8) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of knowledge gap on vulnerability. When there is no knowledge
gap, the 60% of the vulnerability will be reduced. When the knowledge gap is 20
(maximum), only 20% of the vulnerability will be reduced.
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Effect of immature new WP on Vulnerability Index = WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of
immature work processes, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0.4), (0.05,0.47), (0.15,0.56), (0.26,0.63),
(0.4,0.7), (0.6,0.77), (1,0.9) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of immature new work processes on vulnerability. When there is
no immature new work processes, 60% of the vulnerability will be reduced.
When the fraction of immature work processes reach 1, meaning all the new work
processes are new, only 10% of the vulnerability will be reduced.
Effect of immature new knowledge on Vulnerability Index= WITH LOOKUP
(Fraction of immature knowledge, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0.4), (0.05,0.48), (0.13,0.56),
(0.25,0.62), (0.4,0.67), (0.6,0.72),(1,0.8) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of immature new knowledge on vulnerability. When there is no
immature new knowledge, 60% of the vulnerability will be reduced. When the
fraction of immature work processes reach 1, meaning all the new knowledge is
new, only 20% of the vulnerability will be reduced.
Maximum Vulnerability Index = 1
~ Dmnl
~ The theoretical maximum fraction of events turning into incidents, which is
100%.
Vulnerability Index = Maximum Vulnerability Index * Effect of knowledge gap on
Vulnerability Index * Effect of immature new knowledge on Vulnerability Index *
Effect of immature new WP on Vulnerability Index
~ Dmnl




Normal severity of incidents = 500000
~ NOK/incident
~ The average total cost of incident before the operation transition
Effect of new initiatives burden on severity of incidents= WITH LOOKUP (New
initiatives burden, ([(0,0.5)-(1,1.5)], (0,1), (0.1,1), (0.2,1.04), (0.3,1.1), (0.5,1.2),
(0.6,1.24), (0.8,1.28), (1,1.3) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The new initiatives burden hinders the incident response. It ranges from 1 to
1.3. When there is no new initiatives burden, the incident cost will be as
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usual. When the new initiatives burden reaches 1, which means that everything in
the model is new, the severity of incidents will increase 30%.
Frequency of events = Initial frequency of events * Effect of new work processes on
events
~ event/Month
~ The average number of events happening every month
Effect of new work processes on events= WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of changed work
processes, ([(0,0)-(1,5)], (0,1), (0.05,1.4), (0.1,1.75), (0.2,2.1), (0.3,2.3), (1,3) ))
~ Dmnl
~ As the operation transition goes on, it affects the threats the system face
Effect of adequacy of IR capability on severity of incidents= WITH LOOKUP
(Incident response capability / Frequency of incidents, ([(0,0)-(10,10)], (0.1,5),
(0.2,3.5), (0.3,2.8), (0.6,1.5), (1,1), (2,0.8), (10,0.5) )))
~ Dmnl
~ The adequacy of IR capability affects the severity of incidents. When it is
very inadequate (0.1), the severity of incidents could be 5 times as high as normal
severity of incidents. When it is very adequate (10), the severity of incidents
could be reduced to 50% of normal severity of incidents.
Severity of incidents = Normal severity of incidents * Effect of resilience on severity
* Effect of adequacy of IR capability on severity of incidents * Effect of new
initiatives burden on severity of incidents
~ NOK/incident
~ Average total incident cost per month
Frequency of incidents = Vulnerability Index * Frequency of events
~ incident/Month
~ Average number of incidents happening every month
Expected incident cost = Frequency of incidents * Severity of incidents
~ NOK/Month
~ Average incident cost per month
Effect of resilience on severity = WITH LOOKUP ((wt on mature knowledge *
Fraction of mature new knowledge + wt on mature WP * Fraction of mature new
work processes) / (wt on mature knowledge + wt on mature WP), ([(0,0.6)-(1,2)],
(0,1), (0.098,0.99), (0.2,0.95), (0.3,0.9), (0.4,0.83), (0.5,0.78), (0.6,0.73),
(0.8,0.71),(1,0.7) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of resilience on average severity of incidents. When resilience is 0,
the severity of incidents will not be reduced. When the resilience is 1, meaning all
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the new work processes and knowledge have been matured, the severity of
incidents will be reduced to 70% of its original level.
Fraction of incidents detected = 0.4
~ Dmnl
~ The percentage of incidents that are detected
Frequency of detected incidents = Frequency of incidents * Fraction of incidents
detected
~ incident/Month
~ How many detected incidents per month
Initial frequency of events = 2
~ event/Month
~ Information security threats before the transition to Integrated Operations
wt on mature knowledge = 1
~ Dmnl
~ Weight of mature knowledge on the system resilience
wt on mature WP = 1
~ Dmnl




Effect of severity on learning= WITH LOOKUP ( Severity of incidents/Normal
severity of incidents, ([(0,0)-(10,10)],(0,0),(1,1),(10,10) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of severity of incident on learning from incidents. The severe the
incident is, the more people learn from it.
Learning per incident = Normal learning per incident * Effect of severity on learning
~ IR knowledge/incident
~ Incident response knowledge people learn from incident
learning from incidents = SMOOTH(Learning per incident*Incident detected, Time to
learn from incidents)
~ IR knowledge/Month
~ Incident response knowledge people learn from incidents every month
Time to learn from incidents = 3
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~ Month
~ Time needed from incidents happening to learn from incidents
Normal learning per incident = 1
~ IR knowledge/incident
~ Given normal condition, the amount of incident response knowledge people




change of perception = (Incident detected - Perception of frequency of incidents) /
Time to change perception
~ incident/(Month*Month)
~ Change of perception of frequency of incidents in a month
Adequacy of incident response capability = Incident response capability / Frequency
of incidents
~ Dmnl
~ The number of incidents handled over the number of incidents need to be
handled.
Effect of adequacy of IR capability on incident detected = WITH LOOKUP
(Adequacy of incident response capability, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0.2), (0.08,0.2), (0.2,0.3),
(0.3,0.45), (0.4,0.6), (0.5,0.74), (0.7,0.92), (0.8,0.97), (0.9,1), (1,1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of adequacy of IR capability on incident detected. When there is
no IR capability, 20% of incidents will still be detected. When the IR capability is
adequate, all the incidents will be detected.
Desired Incident Response Capability = Perception of frequency of incidents
~ incident/Month
~ The desired number of incidents that could be handled in a month
obsolete of IR capability = Incident response capability/Time to obsolete IR capability
~ incident/(Month*Month)
~ Decrease of incident response capability in a month
Time to obsolete IR capability = 12
~ Month
~ Average time for incident response capability to obsolete
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Effect of learning from incidents on Incident response capability = learning from
incidents / 100
~ 1/Month
~ The effect of learning from incidents on increasing incident response
capability
Time to change perception = 3
~ Month
~ Time needed to change perception
Perception of frequency of incidents= INTEG (change of perception, 0.1246)
~ incident/Month
~ Management’s perception of the amount of incident happening in a month
increase of IR capability = (Desired Incident Response Capability - Incident response
capability) / Time to adjust IR capability
~ incident/(Month*Month)
~ Increase of incident response capability in a month
Incident detected = Frequency of incidents * Effect of adequacy of IR capability on
incident detected
~ incident/Month
~ The amount of incident detect in a month
Incident response capability = INTEG (increase of IR capability - obsolete of IR
capability + Effect of learning from incidents on Incident response capability *
Incident response capability, 0.1)
~ incident/Month
~ The amount of incident could be handled in a month
Time to adjust IR capability = 3
~ Month
~ Time needed from making investment decision to incident response




Revenue = Normal revenue * Fraction of resources for production * (1 + Effect of
new work processes on productivity * Effect of knowledge adequacy on productivity)
~ NOK/Month
~ Monthly revenue from oil production
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Effect of new work processes on cost reduction = WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of
mature new work processes, ([(0,0)-(1,0.4)], (0,0), (0.08,0.01), (0.2,0.05), (0.3,0.1),
(0.4,0.15), (0.5,0.2), (0.6,0.23), (0.8,0.27), (1,0.3) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of mature new work processes on cost and expenditure for
production. The Integrated Operations is expected to reduce cost and expenditure
by 30%. It will gradually achieve this target as new work processes are
implemented and matured
Effect of new work processes on productivity = WITH LOOKUP (Fraction of mature
new work processes, ([(0,0)-(1,0.2)], (0,0), (0.09,0.035), (0.22,0.06), (0.42,0.083),
(0.61,0.093), (1,0.1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of mature new work processes on productivity. The Integrated
Operations is expected to increase productivity by 10%. It will gradually achieve
this target as new work processes are implemented and matured
Cost for incident response capability = Average cost per incident response capability
* Incident response capability
~ NOK/Month
~ The amount of money used for having incident response capability. The
amount mainly represents salary of the personnel.
Monthly Profit = Revenue - Product cost and expenditure - Expected incident cost -
Cost for incident response capability
~ NOK/Month
~ Revenue minus product cost and expenditure minus cost of incident and cost
for incident response capability
Average cost per incident response capability = 400000
~ NOK/incident
~ Average cost for having one incident response capability
Fraction of resources for production = Total operator resources - Operator resources
to mature new WP - Operator resources to mature new knowledge
~ fraction of working time
~ The percentage of operators' time devoted to production
Effect of knowledge adequacy on cost reduction= WITH LOOKUP (Adequacy of
mature new knowledge, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0), (0.05,0.18), (0.1,0.33), (0.2,0.55),
(0.4,0.79), (0.55,0.87), (0.75,0.95), (1,1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of having enough knowledge on cost and expenditure of
production
264
Adequacy of mature new knowledge = Mature new knowledge / Mature new work
processes
~ knowledge/processes
~ Mature knowledge over mature new work processes
Effect of knowledge adequacy on productivity = WITH LOOKUP (Adequacy of
mature new knowledge, ([(0,0)-(1,1)], (0,0), (0.05,0.18), (0.1,0.33), (0.2,0.55),
(0.4,0.79), (0.55,0.87), (0.75,0.95), (1,1) ))
~ Dmnl
~ The effect of having enough knowledge on productivity
Normal cost and expenditure = 2.6e+007
~ NOK/Month
~ Average monthly cost and expenditure related to oil production before the
operation transition. Here the cost of incident and cost for incident response
capability is not included
Product cost and expenditure = Normal cost and expenditure * (1-Effect of new work
processes on cost reduction*Effect of knowledge adequacy on cost reduction)
~ NOK/Month
~ Monthly cost and expenditure related to oil production. Here the cost of
incident and cost for incident response capability is not included
Total operator resources = 1
~ fraction of working time
~ Total percentage operators' time
Normal revenue = 3e+007
~ NOK/Month





FINAL TIME = 120
~ Month
~ The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
~ Month




~ The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 0.0625
~ Month [0,?]
~ The time step for the simulation.
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Appendix II List of look up functions
Work processes section:
Management time to develop new work processes Definition: Management
personnel's time devoted
to develop new work
processes
Base for this function:
This is a policy variable.




















Base for this function:
Estimated by modeler











Effect of new initiatives burden on new WP
development
Definition: The effect of
new initiatives burden


















Effect of changed WP on new WP development Definition: The effect of
changed work processes
(experience of developing
















Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new WP Definition: The effect of





































Management time to develop new knowledge Definition: Management
personnel's time devoted
to develop new knowledge
Base for this function:
This is a policy variable.












Effect of traditional knowledge on new knowledge
development
Definition: The effect of
traditional knowledge (as
potential for developing




Base for this function:
Estimated by modeler











Effect of new initiatives burden on new knowledge
development
Definition: The effect of
new initiatives burden


















Effect of changed knowledge on new knowledge
development
Definition: The effect of
changed knowledge
(experience of developing
















Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new
knowledge
Definition: The effect of
new initiatives burden on
the effectiveness of
maturing new knowledge













Effect of mature new knowledge on maturing new
knowledge




on the effectiveness of
maturing new knowledge













Effect of immature new WP on Vulnerability Index Definition: The effect of
immature new work
processes (not knowing
what to do in the new
work processes) on
vulnerability











Effect of immature new knowledge on Vulnerability
Index
Definition: The effect of
immature new
knowledge (not
knowledge how to do in
the new work processes)
on vulnerability










Effect of knowledge gap on Vulnerability Index Definition: The effect of
knowledge gap (not
knowing why to work in
the specific way) on the
vulnerability index.















(those that has the
potential to become
incidents).
















































Effect of adequacy of IR capability on severity of
incidents
Definition: The effect of
adequacy of incident
response capability
(compare to frequency of
incidents) on severity of
incidents













Learning from incidents section:
Effect of severity on learning Definition: The effect of
severity (severity of
incidents / normal
severity of incidents) on
learning from incidents












Incident response capability section:


















Production and profit section:
Effect of knowledge adequacy on productivity Definition: The effect of
knowledge adequacy

















Effect of new work processes on productivity Definition: The effect of
new work processes (and
the new technology
embedded in them) on
productivity













Effect of knowledge adequacy on cost reduction The effect of knowledge
adequacy (mature new
knowledge / mature new
work processes) on cost
reduction












Effect of new work processes on cost reduction Definition: The effect of
new work processes (and
the new technology
embedded in them) on
productivity














Appendix III Extreme Tests
Ex 1 – No operation transition
Variables change: Management time to develop new work processes (=0),
Management time to develop new knowledge (=0)
Expectation: No immature new work processes and knowledge; No mature new work
processes and knowledge; Other variables are stable.
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 2 – No resources set aside for new work processes and knowledge maturation
Variables change: Minimum operator resources for production (=100%)
Expectation: Immature new work processes and knowledge will be higher; Mature
new work processes and knowledge will be lower; Vulnerability keep
increasing; Monthly profit higher at the beginning but lower in the end.
(All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 3 – Extreme long time to mature new work processes
Variables change: Time to mature new work processes (=40 month)
Expectation: Immature new work processes and knowledge will be higher and
mature new work processes and knowledge will be lower.
Vulnerability keeps increasing; Monthly profit always lower. (All
compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)





















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1












































































































1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1




















1 1 1 1 1 1 1



























1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1












-80,000 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2




















Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 4 – Extreme long time to mature new knowledge
Variables change: Time to mature new knowledge (=80 month)
Expectation: Immature/mature new work processes will be affected slightly.
Immature knowledge will be much higher and mature new knowledge
will be much lower. Vulnerability keeps increasing; Monthly profit
lower. (All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 5 – Extreme long time to change the management’s perception of risk
Variables change: Time to change perception (=30 month)
Expectation: Operation transition will not be affected. The vulnerability index and
the frequency of incidents stay the same as base run. Expected incident
cost will be higher because the IR capability will be lower with lower
perception of risk (All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 6 – Extreme long time to adjust incident response capability
Variables change: Time to adjust IR capability (=30 month)
Expectation: Operation transition will not be affected. The vulnerability index and
the frequency of incidents stay the same as base run. Expected incident
cost will be higher because the IR capability will be lower with long
time to build capability (All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 7 – Extreme long time for incident response capability to deplete
Variables change: Time to obsolete IR capability (=120 month)
Expectation: Operation transition will not be affected. The vulnerability index and
the frequency of incidents stay the same as base run. Expected incident
cost will be lower because the IR capability will be higher with long
time to deplete capability (All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
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Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Ex 8 – All resources available to mature new work processes and new knowledge
Variables change: Minimum operator resources for production (=0%)
Expectation: The mature new work processes will be slightly higher but the mature
new knowledge will develop much quicker. Vulnerability index will be
lower as knowledge matures faster. Thus, the expected incident cost
and the perception of frequency of incidents will both be lower,
leading to less incident response capability. Monthly profit drop to
lower level at beginning and later will be higher than the base run.
(All compare to base run)
Model behavior: (Base: Blue line, with number 1; Extreme test: Red line, with
number 2)
Mature new WP Mature new knowledge




































Mature new work processes : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




































Mature new knowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mature new knowledge : E8 All resources 2 2 2 2 2 2










2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
21
1











Vulnerability Index : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Expected incident cost : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Expected incident cost : E8 All resources 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Perception of frequency of incidents IR capability
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Perception of frequency of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


































Incident response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incident response capability : E8 All resources 2 2 2 2 2 2
Adequacy of incident response capability Monthly profit
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Adequacy of incident response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



































Monthly Profit : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Monthly Profit : E8 All resources 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Result: Model stimulated results fit the expectation. Extreme test passed.
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Appendix IV Sensitivity tests
S1- Effect of the new initiatives burden on maturing new work processes
Base S11 S12
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S11: red line, No. 2; S12: green line, No.
3)
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When the table function of “Effect of the new initiatives burden on maturing new
knowledge” shifts from an inverted S shape into a linear shape (from base to S11), the
model simulation behavior exhibits a modest difference. When the curve table
function changes into a goal-seeking curve (S12), which rapidly decreases at the
beginning, the simulation behavior exhibits difference to a certain degree. The
behavior of “Mature new work processes” does not change significantly, as the effect
of change is offset by other loops: when it is extra difficult for new work processes to
mature, additional resources will be allocated. This leaves fewer resources for
maturing new knowledge, forcing “Mature new knowledge” to become lower than the
base run.
This generates a greater knowledge gap, which leads to higher vulnerability. The
expected incident cost is only slightly higher as more incident response capability is
built to control the cost of incident. With less mature knowledge, the benefits of
integrated operations can be fully realized. The monthly profit is lower in S12.
The sensitivity demonstrated in this test is reasonable. Empirically, when people are
faced with a small amount of burden from new things, they are able to respond
without affecting their performance. When the new burdens are high, their




S2 - Effect of mature new WP on maturing new WP
Base S21 S22
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S21: red line, No. 2; S22: green line, No.
3)
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The “mature new work processes” behaves similarly for the three runs because the
effect of change in this table function is offset by other loops. The effect is passed
onto “mature new knowledge,” which likewise leads to behavioral change in the
“vulnerability index” and “incident response capability.” The behavior of “expected
incident cost” does not change significantly because the increasing “incident response
capability” offsets the effect of increasing vulnerability. “Monthly profit” is slightly
affected because less knowledge matures in S21 and S22. The behavior of S21 and
S22 are fairly similar because their two table functions are quite similar as well.
Result: Pass
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S3- Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new knowledge
Base S31 S32
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S31: red line, No. 2; S32: green line, No.
3)
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Compared with S1- Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new work processes,
S3-Effect of new initiatives burden on maturing new knowledge possesses similarities
and differences. Like S1, the base run behavior and the S31 behavior exhibit a modest
difference, and the S32 behavior displays greater difference. However, the difference
in S32 is higher than the difference in S12. This may be explained by the fact that
knowledge requires additional time to mature, and new initiatives present a higher
burden that affects it more.
Result: Pass
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S4- Effect of mature knowledge on maturing new knowledge
Base S41 S42
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S41: red line, No. 2; S42: green line, No.
3)
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Compared with S2 - Effect of mature new WP on maturing new WP, the results of S4 -
Effect of mature knowledge on maturing new knowledge are similar. However, the
impact of S41 and S42 is bigger compared with the impact of S21 and S22.
Considering that knowledge requires a longer time to mature, it is reasonable that S4
creates a bigger impact.
Result: Pass
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S5- Effect of knowledge gap on Vulnerability Index
Base S51 S52
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S51: red line, No. 2; S52: green line, No.
3)
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Change in the “Effect of knowledge gap on vulnerability index” will not affect the
maturation of new work processes and knowledge, as demonstrated in the results.
This variable holds a direct linkage to the “vulnerability index;” therefore, the change
in this variable has an impact on the “vulnerability index.” This also leads to the
corresponding change in “expected incident cost” and “incident response capability.”
The impact on “monthly profit” is small.
The sensitivity displayed in the model behavior is reasonable.
Result: Pass
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S6- Effect of immature new knowledge on Vulnerability Index
Base S61 S62
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S61: red line, No. 2; S62: green line, No.
3)
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Change in the “Effect of immature new knowledge on vulnerability index” will not
affect the maturation of new work processes and knowledge, as demonstrated in the
results. This variable holds a direct linkage to the “vulnerability index;” therefore, the
change in this variable has an impact on the “vulnerability index.” This also leads to
the corresponding change in “expected incident cost” and “incident response
capability.” The impact on “monthly profit” is small.
The sensitivity displayed in the model behavior is reasonable.
Result: Pass
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S7- Effect of immature new WP on Vulnerability Index
Base S71 S72
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S71: red line, No. 2; S72: green line, No.
3)
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Change in the “Immature new WP on vulnerability index” will not affect the
maturation of new work processes and knowledge, as demonstrated in the results.
This variable holds a direct linkage to the “vulnerability index;” therefore, the change
in this variable has an impact on the “vulnerability index.” This also leads to the
corresponding change in “expected incident cost” and “incident response capability.”
The impact on “monthly profit” is small.
The sensitivity displayed in the model behavior is reasonable.
Result: Pass
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S8- Effect of resilience on severity
Base S81 S82
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S21: red line, No. 2; S22: green line, No.
3)
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Change in the “Effect of resilience on severity” will not affect the maturation of new
work processes and knowledge. Neither will it affect the “vulnerability index”. This
variable holds a direct linkage to the “severity of incidents,” therefore the change in
this variable has an impact on the “expected incident cost,” which slightly impacts the
“monthly profit”.
The sensitivity displayed in the model behavior is reasonable.
Result: Pass
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S9- Time to mature new work processes
Base run: Time to mature new work processes = 4
Sensitivity test: Range: 3-5; Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:
Mature new work processes Mature new knowledge
S9 Time to mature WP
Base
50% 75% 95% 100%
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Time (Month)
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Analysis:
The “mature new work processes” does not change much. When the “time to mature
new work processes” is long/short, more/fewer resources will be allocated to work on
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the maturation of new work processes. Thus, the change of time to mature new work
processes will not greatly affect mature new work processes. Yet when more/fewer
resources are allocated to mature new work processes, fewer/more resources are left
to mature knowledge. Therefore, the change time to mature new work processes has a
bigger impact on “mature new knowledge” than on “mature new work processes”.
Different mature knowledge level affects vulnerability level. Therefore, the
“vulnerability index” also varies in a certain range. The impact passes onto “expected
incident cost”, “Incident Response Capability” and “monthly profit”.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “mature new knowledge”, “vulnerability index”,
“expected incident cost”, “incident response capability” and “monthly profit”. But no
pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable regarding the
structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S10- Time to mature new knowledge
Base run: Time to mature new knowledge = 8
Sensitivity test: Range: 6-10;Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:
Mature new work processes Mature new knowledge
S10 Time to mature knowl
Base
50% 75% 95% 100%
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Analysis:
The change of “time to mature new knowledge” has little impact on “mature new
work processes”. Yet it has direct impact on “mature new knowledge”. If the time to
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mature new knowledge is longer/shorter, the mature new knowledge develops
slower/faster. Thus, the behavior of mature new knowledge is in certain range.
Different mature knowledge level affects vulnerability level. Therefore, the
“vulnerability index” also varies in a certain range. The impact passes onto “expected
incident cost”, “Incident Response Capability” and “monthly profit”.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “mature new knowledge”, “vulnerability index”,
“expected incident cost”, “incident response capability” and “monthly profit”. But no
pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable regarding the
structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S11- Operator resources for maturing each WP
Base run: Resources for maturing each WP = 0.04 (4% of the operator’s time)
Sensitivity test: Range: 0.03-0.05; Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:
Mature new work processes Mature new knowledge
S11 resource to mature WP
Base
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The change of “Resources for maturing each WP” has little impact on the “mature
new work processes,” because no matter how many resources are needed for maturing
each WP, enough resources will be allocated to mature new work process. But it
affects “mature new knowledge”. When more/fewer resources are allocated to mature
new work processes, fewer/more resources are left to mature knowledge, therefore,
the mature new knowledge will develop slower/faster. Different mature knowledge
level affects vulnerability level. Therefore, the “vulnerability index” also varies in a
certain range. The impact passes onto “expected incident cost”, “Incident Response
Capability” and “monthly profit”.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “mature new knowledge”, “vulnerability index”,
“expected incident cost”, “incident response capability” and “monthly profit”. But no
pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable regarding the
structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S12- Operator resources for maturing each knowledge unit
Base run: Resources for maturing each knowledge = 0.04 (4% of the
operator’s time)
Sensitivity test: Range: 0.03-0.05; Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:
Mature new work processes Mature new knowledge
S12 Resouce for maturing knowl
Base
50% 75% 95% 100%
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The change of “resources for maturing each knowledge unit” has little impact on
“mature new work processes”. Yet it has direct impact on “mature new knowledge”.
If the resources for maturing each knowledge unit are larger/smaller, the mature new
knowledge develops slower/faster. Thus, the behavior of mature new knowledge is in
certain range. Different mature knowledge level affects vulnerability level. Therefore,
the “vulnerability index” also varies in a certain range. The impact passes onto
“expected incident cost”, “Incident Response Capability” and “monthly profit”.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “mature new knowledge”, “vulnerability index”,
“expected incident cost”, “incident response capability” and “monthly profit”. But no
pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable regarding the
structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S13- Time to adjust IR capability
Base run: Time to build up IR capability = 3 (month)
Sensitivity test: Range: 2-4; Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:
Vulnerability Index Incident Response Capability
S13 Time to build IR capb
Base
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Analysis:
The change of “time to build up IR capability” does not affect the operation transition.
Mature new work processes and mature new knowledge do no change. As a result, the
vulnerability index does not change either. Yet the “time to build up IR capability”
has a direct impact on the incident response capability. If time to build up IR
capability is longer/shorter, the incident response capability will be lower/higher.
When the incident responds capability is lower/higher, the frequency of incidents will
be higher/lower. We can see both of these variables, “incident response capability”
and “severity of incidents” vary in certain range. The monthly profit is only slightly
affected because the change of expected incident cost.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “incident response capability” and “severity of
incident”. But no pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable
regarding the structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S14- Time to obsolete IR capability
Base run: Time to obsolete = 12 (month)
Sensitivity test: Range: 10-14; Distribution: Random Uniform; Runs: 200;
Simulation behavior:


























Vulnerability Index : S14 Time to obsolete 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vulnerability Index : Base 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Analysis:
The change of “time to obsolete” does not affect the operation transition. Mature new
work processes and mature new knowledge do no change. As a result, the
vulnerability index does not change either. Yet the “time to obsolete” has a direct
impact on the incident response capability. If time to build up IR capability is
longer/shorter, the incident response capability will be higher/lower. When the
incident responds capability is higher/lower, the frequency of incidents will be
lower/higher. We can see both of these variables, “incident response capability” and
“severity of incidents” vary in certain range. The monthly profit is only slightly
affected because the change of expected incident cost.
Numerical sensitivity is observed in “incident response capability” and “severity of
incident”. But no pattern sensitivity found. The numerical sensitivity is reasonable
regarding the structure of the system.
Result: Pass
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S15- Extending the run time of the model
Base run: run time=120 (month)
Sensitivity test: run time=240 (month)
Simulation behavior (Base: blue line, No. 1; S15: red line, No. 2)






























































































































































As the operation transitions is completing in 10 years time, we expect that the
behavior in month 120-240 will be mostly stabilized.
Result: Pass
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Appendix V Model validation interview booklet
Introduction
The purpose of this research project is to look for policies to mitigate information
security risks during transition to Integrated Operations (IO) in the Norwegian Oil and
Gas Industry. IO applies advanced information communication technology to increase
remote onshore operation. The transition from traditional offshore operation to IO
covers a long time span (10-12 years), evolves many work processes and has a
perplex impact on information security risks. We have developed a system dynamics
model to investigate this complicated process.
The model is grounded on the information from one pilot platform implementing IO,
related experts and literatures. We need your help to review and comment on model
behaviors. We will perform face-to-face interviews. (In case of unable to meet in
person, telephone interview will be conducted.) The expected length of the interview
is 3 hours.
Before the interview, please review section 1—background information (P 2-5). There
is an indicator where to stop. We will talk through the remaining part of this booklet.
When we speak, I will show you some model behaviors and ask your reaction to them.
There are no right or wrong answers – your comments and questions about what you
see are the important data for the project.
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions about this research,
please feel free to contact me at ying.qian@uia.no
Ying Qian
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Section 1 Background information
1. Transition to Integrated Operations
Integrated Operations (IO) adopts advanced computer control and communications
technology to optimize production and reduce costs. Thus, it can extend the life time
of mature platform and generate huge financial benefits. Yet changing from separated
offshore operation to connected remote operation introduces information security
risks. Oil and Gas Companies are in the hazardous Industry. Incidents could cause
huge damage, not only financial loss but also threatening health, safety and
environment (HSE). Therefore, the Norwegian Oil and Gas Company is cautious in
moving into IO. One pilot platform started transition to IO in 2005.
On this platform, there are 20 new work processes to be implemented. Each new work
process has a set of new knowledge related to it10. The plan is to implement 5 new
work processes related to production in the first year. Afterwards, new work processes
related to maintenance, vendors and suppliers will be implemented at the pace of 2
new work processes every year. New work processes with advanced technology
provide potentials to improve performance. New knowledge ensures the realization of
these potentials. New work processes and related knowledge work together to
improve production, reduce cost and make the platform more profitable.
When work processes and related knowledge are newly implemented, they are
immature. It takes time to mature new work processes and knowledge. (An example
explaining immature new work processes and immature knowledge, mature new work
processes and mature knowledge at footnote11) The maturation of new work processes
and knowledge are interacting. The quicker the immature work processes matures, the
quicker the immature new knowledge matures and vice versa. However, there is also
10 ‘Work process’ is the abstracted procedures, about what to do. ‘Knowledge’ is the detailed routines to perform
the work, about how to do. For example, “8am-8:30am, offshore control center and onshore control center have a
videoconference to make daily production plan” is a work process. How each participants work cooperatively in
the meeting is knowledge.
11 Example: Operation transition could be seen as asking people to go a new way to some place. You need to give
people a map (new work process) and tell them how to go (new knowledge). On the first trip, they check
frequently with the map to see where to go (new work process is immature) and think about your instructions of
how to go (new knowledge is immature). It takes much more efforts to reach the place than necessary. (These
efforts are used to mature new work processes and knowledge.) After several trips, people are able to go without a
map (work process is mature). However, they still need to cautiously think about how to go, checking out the signs
and etc. After some trips, they become so familiar with the new way that it seems they reach there without using
their brain (knowledge is mature).
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resource conflict. Resources (in terms of the operator’s working hour) will be
allocated to production, maturation of new work processes, and maturation of new
knowledge. The resources needed to meet production target has the first priority. The
remaining resources will be used to mature new work processes and then the
remaining resources will be used to mature new knowledge. The following figure
briefly summarizes these relationships.
Many literatures point out that it takes longer time to mature knowledge than to
mature work process. (See the example at Footnote 2 Page 2) Therefore, a knowledge
gap will be generated when new work processes are implemented. This knowledge
gap makes the system vulnerability increase. Things are more likely to go wrong
when we do not know them well. The system is more vulnerable when a lot of
immature new work processes and immature new knowledge are in place. High
vulnerability leads to more incidents, increasing cost of incidents and reducing profit.
The IO will make the system more resilient. When new work processes and
knowledge are mature, the severity of incidents will decrease. However, when new
work processes and knowledge are immature, the severity of incidents will increase.
The change of the severity of incidents impacts the cost of incidents and the profit too.
2. Incidents response capability
When more incidents happen, people perceive an increasing security risk and the
management team will make investment decision to build up incidents response
capability to handle incidents. It takes time to build up incidents response capability.
The higher incidents response capability, the lower the severity of incidents will be.














Learning from incidents improves incidents response capability. The following figure
briefly summarizes the relationship.
3. The whole picture and the system dynamics model
We build a system dynamics model representing the above mentioned structure. The
transition to IO has impact on many areas: production, cost, frequency of incidents,
severity of incidents and etc. Some of the impacts are desirable while some are not.
The desired output, a successful operation transition, is defined as increased profit
without major incidents.
In the following sections, I will show you up to six scenarios, depicting results of the
transition to IO under different management policies. These scenarios are:





































Scenario 2: Focus on production—What will happen if more resources are
allocated to production?
Scenario 3: Focus on knowledge—What will happen if more resources are
allocated to mature knowledge?
Scenario 4: Quicker to build IR capability—What will happen if less time is
needed to build up incidents response capability?
Scenario 5: Higher initial IR capability—What will happen if the perception of
risk is low at the beginning of the transition to IO?
Scenario 6: Delay transition—What will happen if the speed of transition to IO is
slowed down when the cost of incidents is high?
We will focus on the behavior of following variables. Here are their definition and
units:
Mature new work processes: When the operators can smoothly perform their
work in the new ways, no further guidance from management team needed, we
say these new work processes are matured (work processes)
Mature new knowledge: When the newly developed details of how to perform
job tasks for the new work processes has fully integrated into the system and
internalized to the operators, we identify them as mature new knowledge
(knowledge)
Frequency of incidents: How many incidents happen in a month
(incident/month)
Severity of incidents: The total cost of incidents, including the cost of
disruption of production and restore the system to normal condition
(NRK/incident)
Incidents response capability: How many incidents could be handled in a
month (incidents/month)
Monthly profit: It represents the monthly operating income of the platform. In
the model, it is calculated as Revenue - cost of production and expenditure -
cost of incidents- cost of incidents response capability (NRK/month)
The behaviors of some other related variables are also presented as references for
better understanding.




 As planned, 5 new work processes are implemented in the first year and
afterwards, 2 new work processes are implemented each year. It takes sometime
for new work processes to mature and it takes even longer time for new
knowledge to mature (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ decreases at the beginning and then increases. It exceeds its
original level around month 30. (panel b)
 The ‘Frequency of incidents’ increases quickly at the beginning and stays at the
high level for several years before it starts to decrease. The ‘Severity of incidents’
increases quickly in the first year and decreases quickly in the next three years. It
is relatively stable from year 4. The ‘Incidents response capability’ keeps
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Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(e)
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II. Your thoughts about the scenario 1 “Base”:
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel a) plausible?
________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Monthly Profit (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel c) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel e) plausible?
_________________________




III. Explaining why this occurs:
Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you









Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 The first year saw the most intensive operation transition, with 5 new work
processes and knowledge implemented. Not enough resources to mature all of
them. As mentioned, in resource conflicts, resources are first allocated to
mature new work processes. Therefore, knowledge only matures very little at
the beginning. From year 2, only 2 new work processes are implemented each
year. The ‘mature new work processes’ steadily follow the new work
processes implemented. And the ‘mature new knowledge’ gradually picks up.
(panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ drops in the first year mainly due to the drop of revenue
and increase of incidents cost. Revenue drops because resources are allocated
to mature new work processes and knowledge. And the increase of incidents
is caused by the increase of the ‘frequency of incidents’ and the ‘severity of
incidents’. The benefit of IO is small at the beginning but it increases as the
operation transition continues. ‘Revenue’ increases and ‘product cost and
expenditure’ decreases. And the ‘expected incidents cost’ also decreases as
more new work processes and knowledge mature. Therefore, the ‘Monthly
profit’ increases. It exceeds the original level. And after 6 years, the ‘Monthly
profit’ increases quicker than before since most new work processes and
knowledge are matured so that resources are released out to focus on
production. (panel b)
 The traditional operation has been mature for years and the offshore platform
does not use ICT technology. Therefore, the frequency of incidents is low.
When new work processes using advanced ICT technology is implemented, it
introduce new vulnerability to the system. The ‘frequency of incidents’
increases quickly. During the transition period, the ‘frequency of incidents’
stays at a relatively high level as new work processes are continuously
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introduced. Until most of the work processes and knowledge are mature, the
‘frequency of incidents’ starts to decrease. (panel c)
 The ‘severity of incidents’ increases sharply at the beginning since the
‘incidents response capability’ is very low in the traditional operation. It takes
time to realize the inadequacy of incident response capability and make
investment decision and it takes time to build up incidents response capability.
As the ‘incidents response capability’ builds up, the ‘severity of incidents’
starts to drop from year 2. The ‘incidents response capability’ starts to
decrease around month 60 following the decrease of frequency of incidents.
And the ‘severity of incidents’ stabilizes. (panel d & e)











Scenario 2 Focus on production
In the base scenario, the minimum resources for production are 90% of the total
person hour on the platform. In this scenario, management focus more on production,
the minimum resources for production are 95% of the total person hour, which means
only 5% of staffs time is available to mature new work processes and knowledge.
I. What happens?
 The ‘Mature new work processes’ is a little bit lower than base run. ‘Mature new
knowledge’ is much lower than base run (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ doesn’t drop as low as in the base run at the beginning but
doesn’t rise as high later. (panel b)
 The ‘frequency of incidents’ increases sharply in the first year and keeps
increasing in the following several years. The ‘severity of incidents’ peaks at
month 12 and reduces afterwards. The ‘incidents response capability’ increases
for the first several years and stays at the high level. (c, d & e)
(a)
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Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




II. Your thoughts about scenario 2 “Focus on production”.
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Monthly Profit (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel c) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel e) plausible?
_________________________




III. Explaining why this occurs:
Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you




Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 Since fewer resources are available, the new work processes and knowledge
mature slower than in the base run. However, in resource conflicts, resources
are first allocated to mature new work processes. Therefore, the ‘mature new
work processes’ are not affected much but the ‘mature new knowledge’ is
greatly affected by the resource shortage. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ drops not that low at the beginning because the revenue
does not drop too much with minimum 95% resources reserved for production.
However, it increases much slower than in the base run later because a big
portion of the new knowledge is not matured, which makes the benefit of IO
not able to realize. ‘Revenue’ doesn’t increase much and the ‘product cost and
expenditure’ doesn’t decrease much. Besides, the ‘expected incidents cost per
month’ is higher. The ‘cost for incidents response capability’ is higher due to
more incidents response capability needed to handle all the incidents. (panel
b)
 With less ‘mature new knowledge’, the system is more vulnerable. The
‘frequency of incidents’ keeps increasing for many years since the knowledge
gap is increasing. With more incidents happening, more investment is made to
improve the ‘incidents response capability’. The ‘incidents response
capability’ reaches higher and thus control the ‘severity of incidents’. The
‘severity of incidents’ only peaks a little bit higher. (panel c, d, & e)










Scenario 3 Focus on knowledge
In the base scenario, the minimum resources for production are 90% of the total
resources, i.e. 10% of the operators’ time is to mature new work processes and
knowledge. In this scenario, the minimum resources for production are reduced to
85% of the total resources so that 15% of the operators’ time is released out.
I. What happens?
 The ‘Mature new work processes’ is almost the same as base run. ‘Mature new
knowledge’ is higher than base run (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ doesn’t drop as low as in the base run at the beginning but
doesn’t rise as high later. (panel b)
 The ‘frequency of incidents’ increases sharply in the first year and keeps
increasing in the following several years. The ‘severity of incidents’ peaks at
month 12 and reduces afterwards. The ‘incidents response capability’ increases




































Mature new knowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mature new knowledge : Focus on knowledge 3 3 3 3 3 3
(a)
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Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




II. Your thoughts about scenario 3 “Focus on knowledge”.
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Monthly Profit (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel c) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel e) plausible?
_________________________





III. Explaining why this occurs:
Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you






Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 Since more resources are available, knowledge mature quicker than in the
base run. There is no big impact on the ‘mature work processes’ because even
in the base run, it gets enough resources already. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ drops lower in the first year but increases faster later.
‘Revenue’ is lower at the beginning because fewer resources are reserved for
production. But later, as more mature new knowledge available, ‘revenue’
increase to higher than in the base run. At the same time, the ‘product cost
and expenditure’ is lower due to more mature knowledge available. The
‘expected incidents cost’ is lower and the ‘cost for incidents response
capability’ is also lower. As a result, the ‘Monthly profit’ is higher than in the
base run later. (panel b)
 With more ‘mature new knowledge’, the system is less vulnerable. The
‘frequency of incidents’ peaks lower and decrease quicker to the low level.
With less incidents happening, less investment is made to build up the
‘incidents response capability’. The ‘incidents response capability’ is lower.
The ‘severity of incidents’ peaks a little bit lower and drops faster. But it is
not largely affected. (panel c, d & e)










Scenario 4 Quicker to build IR capability
In the base scenario, it takes 3 months time from management’s investment decision
on incidents response capability to incidents response capability ready. In this
scenario, we assume that with a focus on security, the time to build up incidents
response capability be shortened to 2 months.
I. What happens?
 The ‘Mature new work processes’ is exactly the same as base run. So is ‘Mature
new knowledge’. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ is only slightly better for several months. (panel b)
 The ‘frequency of incidents’ is exactly the same as base scenario. The ‘severity of
incidents’ peaks much lower and decreases to the lower level much faster. The





































Mature new knowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mature new knowledge : Quicker to build IR capability 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
(a)




































Mature new work processes : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Cost for incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Severity of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





































Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incidents response capability : Quicker to build IR capability 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
(e)
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II. Your thoughts about scenario 4 “Quicker to build IR capability”.
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Monthly Profit (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel c) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel e) plausible?
_________________________




III. Explaining why this occurs:
Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you






Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 The ‘mature new work processes’ and ‘mature new knowledge’ behave the
same as the base run because this scenario does not affect the transition to IO.
(panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ behaves similar because with the same operation
transition pace, ‘revenue’ and ‘product cost and expenditure’ are the same.
The ‘expected incidents cost’ is lower but the ‘cost for incidents response
capability’ is higher so that the net effect is small on ‘Monthly profit’. (panel
b)
 With the same pace of operation transition as the base scenario, the
vulnerability of the system is the same. So is the ‘frequency of incidents’.
However, with shorter time to build up ‘incidents response capability’, it
increases more quickly. The ‘severity of incidents’ is therefore peak lower
than base scenario. (panel c, d & e)











Scenario 5 Higher initial IR capability
In the base scenario, the initial incidents response capability is low because in
traditional operation, the offshore platform is separated from network so that
information security risk is low and there is no need to keep high incident response
capability. Now we assume that the management team realizes the high risks for IO
and raised incidents response capability in advance.
I. What happens?
 The ‘Mature new work processes’ is exactly the same as base scenario. So is
‘Mature new knowledge’. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ is only slightly affected for several months. (panel b)
 The ‘frequency of incidents’ is the same as base scenario. The ‘severity of
incidents’ peaks much lower. The ‘incidents response capability’ is higher than




































Mature newknowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mature newknowledge : Higher initial IR capability 5 5 5 5 5 5
(a)
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Severity of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





































Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1






















0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Time (Month)
incident/Month
Frequency of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Frequency of incidents : Higher initial IR capability 5 5 5 5 5 5
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II. Your thoughts about scenario 5 “Higher initial IR capability”.
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel a) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Monthly Profit (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel c) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel e) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
III. Explaining why this occurs:
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Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you







Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 The ‘mature new work processes’ and ‘mature new knowledge’ behave the
same as in base scenario because this scenario does not affect the transition to
IO. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ behaves similar to base run because with the same
operation transition pace, the ‘Revenue’ and ‘product cost and expenditure’
are exactly the same. The ‘expected incidents cost’ is lower but the ‘cost for
incidents response capability’ is higher so that the net effect on profit is very
small. (panel b)
 With exactly the same operation transition as in base scenario, the
vulnerability of the system is the same. Therefore, the ‘frequency of
incidents’ is the same as the base scenario. However, with higher initial
incidents response capability, the ‘severity of incidents’ is lower than the base
scenario for 5 years until it reaches the low stable level. The ‘incidents
response capability’ is higher than the base scenario for the first 5 years
before it starts to decrease. (panel c, d & e)











Scenario 6 Delay transition
In the base scenario, the operation transition proceed with its planned pace. The
implementation of new work processes is not affected by the incidents happening.
However, in reality, when severe incidents happen or high incidents cost occurs, the
management might decide to slow down the operation transition. In this scenario, we
study how model will behave with such feedback in the model. We assume that when
the incidents cost reaches 5 times higher than the initial level, the transition speed will
be reduced to half, and when the incidents cost reaches 10 times higher than the initial
level, the operation transition will stop. Only when the management feels very secure,
the incidents cost is lower than twice the initial level will they make an effort to catch
up the delayed implementation schedule.
I. What happens?
 The ‘New work process implementation’ is slower than the base scenario, which
means it is behind schedule. The ‘Mature new work processes’ is lower than base
scenario. The ‘Mature new knowledge’ is higher than the base scenario at the
beginning, but it is lower than the base scenario in the end. (panel a)
 The ‘Monthly profit’ underperforms the base scenario. At the beginning, it is
similar, but later, the ‘Monthly profit’ is lower than the base scenario. (panel b)
 The ‘frequency of incidents’ is lower than the base scenario for most of the time
but it doesn’t drop as low in the end. The ‘severity of incidents’ peaks lower and
stabilize at almost the same level later. The ‘incidents response capability’ is
lower than the base scenario most of the time but a little bit higher in the end. (c,
d & e)
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New work processes implementation : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New work processes implementation : Delay transition 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6





































Mature new work processes : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





































Mature new knowledge : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1








































Monthly Profit : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Frequency of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Severity of incidents : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1



































Incidents response capability : Base 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incidents response capability : Delay transition 6 6 6 6 6 6
(e)
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II. Your thoughts about scenario 6 “delay transition”.
Q1: Is the behavior of the key variables plausible? Do they match your beliefs
about the transition to IO and its effects?
Q1 a) Is the behavior of Mature New Work Processes (panel b) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 b) Is the behavior of Mature New Knowledge (panel d) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 c) Is the behavior of Frequency of incidents (panel e) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 d) Is the behavior of Severity of incidents (panel f) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 e) Is the behavior of Incidents response capability (panel g) plausible?
_________________________
Why or why not?
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
Q1 f) Is the behavior of Profit (panel i) plausible?
_________________________




III. Explaining why this occurs:
Q2 The above presented graphs are a summary of the model behavior. Can you









Below, we present one interpretation of the model behavior. Please answer the
related questions following it.
 The speed of operation transition is slowed down when the incidents cost is
high. Therefore, the ‘mature new work processes’ and ‘mature new
knowledge’ are lower than the base run. (panel a)
 The ‘profit’ behaves similar in the first 2 years. Though we are a little bit
behind schedule, but the ‘expected incident cost per month’ is much lower.
After year 2, it is a little bit worse than the base scenario, because the benefit
of IO is delayed as the transition is behind the schedule. The ‘product cost and
expenditure’ does not drop as quickly as the first scenario. (panel b)
 When the transition speed is reduced, less immature new work processes and
knowledge are there. Therefore, the system is less vulnerable and the
‘frequency of incidents’ is greatly reduced. With fewer incidents, the incident
response capability is more adequate so that the ‘severity of incidents’ is also
lower than in base run. With less incidents happening, the investment on
incidents response capability is less so that the ‘incidents response capability’
does not go as high as the base scenario. (panel c, d & e)
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Page iii “Odd H Longva” –changed to “Odd Helge Longva.” Helge is not a mid name but 
part of first name. It has to be spelled out 
Page iv “has been proved to high” – “has been proved high” grammatically, to is not needed 
here 
Page 2 “see Figure 1-2” has formatting problem. There is an unnecessary “enter”. The 
“enter” has been deleted. 
Page 10 The caption of figure 1-7 is moved to page 10, following the figure. 
Page 16 “incident cost incident cost” changed into “incident cost”.  
Page 16 “These are studies” changed into “They are investigated” There is grammatical 
problem with the first expression 
Page 31 Figure 2-1 is replaced by a high resolution figure. Except the resolution of the figure 
is high, there is no other difference. 
Page 59 “affect” changed into “effect”. “affect” here is the wrong word, it should be “effect” 
Page 67 “This exercises helps” changed into “This exercise helps”. It is not right using 
plurality 
Page 67 “The X axis and Y axis represents” changed in “The X axis and Y axis represent”. 
Grammatical error corrected 
Page 75 “incidents reporting” changed into “incident reporting”. “incident reporting” is used 
as the term in the document 
Page 150 “see Figure 6-1” there is an “enter” there. The “enter” is deleted 
Page 155 “Table 6-5 Table 6-5” delete one 
Page 173 “Table 7-5” there is a space on this caption. Delete the space. 
Page 207 “oto increase” changed into “to increase”. This “o” is a misspell 
Page 210 “decision rule In the long” changed into ”decision rule. In the long”. Lack a full 
stop 
Page 234 ”at hand .” changed into ”at hand.” There is an unnecessary space before the full 
stop. Delete it 
Page 243 ” Goerge” changed into ” George”. Misspell the name. 
Page 250 ”This variable range from” changed into ”This variable ranges from”. Grammatical 
error. 
